# 1nc

#### The liberal humanitarian ethos of immigration reform is rooted in the nationalist myth of the US as a city on a hill shining light upon the world. Such exceptionalism positions the US as a benign benefactor to paper over the continued dispossession of indigenous territory.

Patel, 2015 (Leigh – Associate Professor of Education @ Boston College, “Nationalist narratives, Immigration and Coloniality”, September 17, <https://decolonization.wordpress.com/2015/09/17/nationalist-narratives-immigration-and-coloniality/>, shae)

I am the daughter of immigrants. My family’s mixed history of sanctioned and subjugated migration has indelibly imbued our lives as well as our relationships to cultural practices, home and receiving countries, and to land. I am also a United States citizen and a scholar who studies migration. I have marched for immigrants’ rights and have met with local, state, and national policymakers to speak about the experiences of undocumented youth. I believe that the current push and pull of vulnerablized beings across nation-state borders is a project of dehumanization wrought by the insatiable settler capitalist project. It is because of this mix of experiences that you will never hear me condone the idea that the United States is a nation built by immigrants. Or that it is a melting pot. Or a tapestry. Or any of the other commonplace nationalist narratives of migration that settler colonies fervently need. Decolonial praxis and dreaming require explicit attention to the ways that nationalist narratives of migration collude with and sustain the structures that displace and exploit Indigenous and Black life. These narratives don’t do any durable favors for migrants of various racial backgrounds, either. In this essay, I propose that we must be precise and exacting in locating the effects of these narratives in order to dismantle and dream beyond the structures they sustain. While all narratives can be understood as fictional, they must also be understood as inherently political and therefore laden with the potential to be beneficent or malignant. As Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe wrote, “Belief in superior or inferior races; belief that some people who live across our frontiers or speak a different language from ourselves are the cause of all the trouble in the world, or that our own particular group or class or caste has a right to certain things which are denied to others…all fictions are generated by the imagination. What then makes them different from the beneficent fictions for which I am making rather large claims? What distinguishes beneficent fiction from such malignant cousins as racism is that the first never forgets it is a fiction and the other never knows that it is.” The narratives of a nation are not malignant because they are narratives. Rather, their malignancy resides in their impenetrability and material impact. The imaginary of settler nations being built by immigrants is a malignant fiction deeply needed to sustain systemic structures. First – and perpetually – the settler imaginary needs a story that can obscure its violently consumptive structure (of relegating land and bodies into property for the extraction of resources and labor). Settler colonialism has an insatiable thirst for land as a form of property to be held by a few. These violent material practices always involve harm, pain, suffering, and death – nothing less. This violence is made continually possible through narratives that contort, erase, remix, and re-present these violent realities. The nationalist narratives of immigrants building the nation through folksy determination, grit, and stick-to-it-ive-ness literally erase settler projects from view; in part, by making the appearance of access to material wealth seem both possible and somehow equally available. The appearance of access to material well-being is helmed by figurations of individualism and meritocracy, both of which work to obscure structures that organization swaths of populations. The individual immigrant in the nationalist narratives is male, revised and whitened over time. He is lauded for being a hero of conquest, manifest destiny, and patient lawfulness. Others are racially minoritized because of their disregard of mythic migration queues and placed in physical holding centers, guilty of their distal location relative to the fictive white settler hero. In fact, it is this white settler hero – the one who has followed manifest destiny and conquered savage lands and people – who is the figurehead for fantasies of equitable social mobility based on lawfulness and hard work. The narratives intertwine with structures that accrue and protect property for white settlers, justifying those inequitable processes as mere outcroppings of meritocratic practices. Little wonder then that the wake of this mythology includes not only structures for white material profit but fertile terrain for vulnerablized Black and brown peoples to be in competition with each other for the façade of available property ownership. The pervasive mythology of nationalist narratives of immigrant determination leaves little room to contend with the acutely distinct, yet intertwined, realities of the erasure of Indigeneity, the afterlife of slavery, and forced labor across nation-state borders, often subject to similar malignant fictions. For example, respectability politics demand undocumented youth be made liminally acceptable [read: more human] through details of their performances as good students and potential benefit to the national economy. Concurrently, respectability politics filters the violent state policing of Black youth through media evaluations of their innocence [read: humanity]. Both are manifestation of racialized respectability politics but with distinct locations that, cumulatively, support the evaluation of Black and brown bodies through whiteness. These racialized social locations are further blurred through mantras of multiculturalism, diversity, and democracy. Racially minoritized populations are left to decipher their relative social locations of dispossession, while settler privilege thrives. While the settler imaginary may superficially seem to be pro-migrant, it does few actual and durable favors for migrant peoples because it works from a political economy of contingent merit. That contingent worth is hinged to shifting constructs of lawfulness and the state’s coffers. In the 1960s, then United States President John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert Kennedy, published the book, “A Nation of immigrants.” While the entire book is homage to the nationalist myth of an immigrant nation, the details in the argument provide necessary windows into the material impact of this fiction. They wrote, “Every ethnic minority, in seeking its own freedom, helped to strengthen the fabric of liberty in American life. Similarly, every aspect of the American economy has profited from the contributions of immigrants.” The first sentence in the quote activates the erasure of Indigeneity and displacement of Black life, while simultaneously making heroes of settlers, making innocent their genocidal and appropriative actions (Tuck & Yang, 2012). The next sentence builds on this malignant fiction to hinge migrants’ worth upon the nation’s wealth. Ironically, despite the pro-migrant platforms that use success stories of entrepreneurship and assimilation in the current push and pull of vulnerabilized human labor from the South to the North, the real prospects of racially minoritized peoples attaining wealth-holding settler status are low. Additionally the proliferation of privatized for-profit incarceration facilities is in part fueled by the creation of stateless, and therefore rights-less, peoples who can be enclosed in these facilities, justifying their creation. Citizenship is always contingent, and undocumented migrants are always already ineligible. Attaching human worth to constructs of lawfulness seems almost satirical within these contradictory discourses and practices, except that these practices are materially deadly. The mythic nationalist narratives of migrant-built nations also facilitate structural racism experienced by migrants, by blurring the historical and ongoing racism fundamental to the nation’s property practices (Harris, 1993). Although not borne out by structural analyses of the cultural, economic, and social capital needed to secure safety and property in stratified societies, the ‘by-the-bootstraps’ mythology of meritocracy perpetuates individualism and deepens the white supremacist impact of colorblind dysconsciousness. The seductive narratives of immigrants who give up everything for a chance in a new nation, seemingly of their own autonomous will, and then succeed by sheer will and commitment obscures racial stratification and other structures of power and privilege. The laws and policies that have historically governed migration into settler nations are a far cry from the romanticized colorblind revision provided by the Kennedy brothers. Policies have shifted over to time to racialize migrants, in direct connection to protecting whiteness as property and providing racialized cheap labor pools across nation-state borders (Ngai, 2005). The United States’ most infamous anti-immigrant voice of the moment, Donald Trump, perfectly embodies the generationally protected white male settler wealth that racializes migration in order to re-instantiate nation-state logics of xenophobia and protectionism for its own material interests. Trump’s rhetoric, a mere stanza in long-standing variations on backlash to migration, is borne of mythologies of lone, independent [read: whiteness as individualization] immigrants. Settler nation locations like the United States, Canada, Israel, and Australia all display racism, specifically white terrorism, and xenophobia, precisely because their official rhetorics speak of frontiers, assimilation, and equitable pathways to citizenship. The material impacts of these nationalist narratives, though, do not mean that they are impenetrable or fixed in how they are used. Social movement groups including the DREAMERs undocumented movement and the Dream Defenders have strategically leveraged nationalist fictions. These two groups, in their very name, invoke the notion of the American Dream to lift up the transgressions that have been enacted on behalf of violent projects of nationhood. The Dream Defenders, for example, have refused to confine the ‘Dream’ to practices within the seized land of the United States, instead citing wars of aggression domestically and abroad as part of what must cease. The youth-led group, We Charge Genocide, samples the legal language of crime and tort to indict the racially violent state. These practices of calling out settler practices and, at times, appealing to the tenets of the nationalist narratives raise important questions about how and what kinds of theories of change (Tuck, 2009) can be practiced by agitating the very premises of these narratives. However, agitation of power structures should not be seen as synonymous with dismantling these same structures. With further, ongoing analysis of the precise contours of a complicated, intertwined set of colonial logics, we stand a much better chance of dreaming beyond those logics and refusing to settle for fleeting inclusion to structures built precisely to stratify and exclude. The answer to xenophobic racism towards racially minoritized immigrants isn’t found in Black and brown peoples assimilating into well-being here and there. The answer to the endless conversion of land to limited resource and property rights isn’t found in securing a mortgage. The answer to contingent citizenship isn’t found in a kinder, gentler ranking of contingency. The answer is the dismantling of citizenship as an enterprise of exclusion. The answer is in something that Robin D. G. Kelley wrote about having learned from his mother: having freedom dreams. Not citizenship dreams. Not ‘being validated as worthy’ dreams. Not dreams of getting yours and shrugging that others don’t. Collective freedom dreams. The quotes at the start of this essay point to the ways that dreams must be both ambitious and connected to histories. Nina Simone speaks of living fear without any qualifiers, caveats or conditions. Arrested Development speaks of wanting to go to another, unknown place, in part, to better know the current place. No movement or quest for liberation works well without both expansiveness and genealogical knowledge. Dreaming of equitable protection, safety, and balance for all living and nonliving beings must necessarily involve reaching beyond our deeply learned ways of seeing ourselves and each other through the eyes of the settler nation-state. The more precise we are with knowing those worn perspectives, the better we may be at dreaming and building on wholly different terms.

#### Immigration policy coheres the logic of the end of history by rendering borders immutable and governable through a central, unending sovereign. Disavowing the historically contingent borders of the settler state naturalizes the colonial condition into the indefinite future.

Volpp, 2015 (Leti, Robert D. and Leslie Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, The Indigenous As Alien, UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW, Vol. 5:289, 2015, JKS)

The absence of indigenous people in immigration law is apparent in the fact that the key concepts in the field—citizen, alien, borders, migration, and birthright citizenship—cannot address the actual relationship between the nation-state and indigenous peoples. Indians have been considered citizen and alien, as well as neither citizen nor alien; they have been described as simultaneously foreign and domestic; and they have been categorized in terms unfamiliar to immigration law: as quasi-sovereign nations, as domestic dependent nations, and as “wards ‘in a state of pupilage’” of the federal government.23 This nonrecognition reflects how immigration scholarship thinks about space. The field unreflectively reflects the tradition of Westphalian territorial sovereignty, whereby a single sovereign controls absolutely a defined territory and its associated population. Under this system, the legal jurisdiction of the sovereign is entirely congruent with its territorial borders in a way that would correlate with how maps are drawn, maps that are usually imagined to resemble a Mondrian painting, with dark borders absolutely separating brightly colored nation states.24 Such a map envisions no “fuzzy spaces,” transitional zones or bleeding boundaries, and suggests a world of nations “territorialized in the segmentary fashion of the multicolored school atlas.”25 This model of territorial sovereignty accords with what Kal Raustiala calls “legal spatiality”: the “supposition that law and legal remedies are connected to, or limited by, territorial location.”26 In legal scholarship generally, we find concern about fragmenting nation-states in an age of global migration and security risks, or about “extraterritorial” reaches of sovereign power; see, for example, the location of prisoners on Guantánamo, sited deliberately “offshore” in an unsuccessful attempt by the Bush administration to escape the purview of constitutional restraint.27 This fragmentation raises what some consider the novel problem of the attenuation between territorial space and governance.28 Raustiala notes that, despite this supposition, there have always been specific exceptions to this system in the form of territorial spaces where the territorial sovereign’s power did not reach, with sanctuaries and ambassadors’ residences, as well as exceptions in the form of sovereigns that controlled territory outside its own, with colonial governance and extraterritorial jurisdiction.29 And Teemu Ruskola argues that we need to move beyond understanding these practices as “exception[s]”—in particular, through a focus upon extraterritorial jurisdiction, whereby nation states exercised jurisdiction “outside” of their autochthonous sovereignty.30 Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed Westerners to be treated as if they remained in the sovereign territory of their home states, safe from having their civil or criminal cases adjudicated by the courts of a less-civilized state. By the magic of a legal fiction, each Western individual became a floating island of sovereignty. This practice was not exceptional; extraterritorial jurisdiction was the rule for much of the world outside Europe prior to the post-World War II decolonization movements.31 Nonetheless, the nation-state’s governance outside its territory is imagined away via the presumption that the legal jurisdiction of the sovereign is entirely congruent with its territorial borders. That presumption also shapes how the nation- state’s governance inside its territory is conceived. As Mark Rifkin observes, U.S.- Indian relations are repeatedly portrayed as peculiar, or anomalous.32 Non-national entities with claims to land ostensibly “inside the nation” produce a tension, one that is “sutured over” by proclaiming a sovereignty which codes Native peoples and lands as an exception.33 But ambiguous spaces, neither entirely foreign nor domestic, have characterized the building of the American nation-state, both in its relation to empire34 and in negotiating the relationship between settler colonialism and indigenous people. The spatial model of territorial sovereignty—which suggests a single sovereign that governs its associated population, negotiates with “foreign nations” that form its outside, relies upon the doctrine of federalism to parse out how power is divided with its internal “several states,”35 and either “includes” or “excludes” outsiders—does not capture a model of layered sovereignty that would more accurately describe the relationship between indigenous sovereignty and the sovereignty of settler society. We could think of this as “spatial governmentality,” in the words of Richard Perry, emerging from the inherited “layered mappings of spatial difference”;36 or as a “third space of sovereignty,” in the words of Kevin Bruyneel, residing neither inside nor outside the American political system, but on those very boundaries.37 The erasure of indigeneity also reflects how immigration scholarship conceptualizes time. Immigration scholarship generally presumes not only that borders are spatially fixed, but also that they are fixed over time; states seem to have always existed within their current territorial borders. The focus of inquiry is the lawfulness of the already-existing state’s deployment of sovereignty to keep out or kick out noncitizens. Largely forgotten are how states came to be, with the notable exception of Rainer Bauböck’s work, which focuses on the impact of shifting borders in Europe, and the phenomena of annexation, unification, partition, separation, or secession.38 Immigration law assumes that people cross borders. But it is also the case that borders cross people—and peoples.39 As Carole Pateman suggests, this tendency to presume borders are fixed over time is common to political theory: “discussions of the legitimacy of the modern state ([which is] always taken for granted) have said nothing about the land on which the state is created.”40 In immigration law, states are fixed, and people are in motion. The implicit temporality of immigration law is the present and the future. Immigration law presumes narratives of modernity; both in the positive valence of the mobility of the cosmopolitan and the diasporic and in the apocalyptic valence of the debased third-world migrant, the third-country national, the illegal alien, the irregular migrant, the anchor baby, and the terrorist sleeper cell, whose presence in the nation-state promises future trouble. In contrast, the time of indigenous persons is the time of the past. Immigration law’s erasure of how the state came into being places indigenous persons within anachronistic space and as temporally too far behind to be active agents within the space of modern life, as stuck in time.42 Symptomatic of the still pervasive myth of Indians as the “vanishing race” is the fact that many school children think that Indians are “extinct.”43 Indigenous people are also considered stuck in place and stuck to place—except when their insufficient attachment to place renders them “nomads,” who move too much and who fail to cultivate agricultural property, a relationship to land that was used to justify settler colonialism.44 Thus, the movement of indigenous people across space is either too much or not enough; either reading places them temporally at a prehistorical stage of human development. Their contemporary expressions of sovereignty in the form of tribal casino gaming are seen thus as atavistic45 and “out of time.”46 That indigenous people are imagined away from the contemporary moment reflects that, in the words of Elizabeth Povinelli, the settler state “projected the previous inhabitants as spatially, socially and temporally before it as the ultimate horizon of its own legitimacy.”47 The nonrecognition of indigeneity also reflects how the field thinks about membership in the national community. Immigration law presumes the relevant legal entity who bears legal subjectivity and rights to be an individual, not a collective subject (as an Indian tribe or nation).48 Immigration law presumes an all-powerful national sovereign regime regulating the movement of individual aliens, some of whom are excluded, some of whom are allowed in on a temporary basis, and some of whom may someday be recognized as part of a collective “We, the People.” We thus have immigration law regulating “the people who are not the People,” who are simultaneously “excluded from meaningful participation while remaining the objects of state control.”49 Yet, as Mark Rifkin points out, reflecting on the relation of indigenous persons to the settler-state raises a third category beyond the People and the people: peoples, whose claims to “older/other political formations” are displaced by the circular logic of the overriding sovereignty of the United States.50

#### The alternative is decolonization.

Tuck and Yang, 2012 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. *when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures* -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

# Links

## Anzaldua/Borderlands

#### Borderlands methodology is the death-knell of resistance to colonialism—Anzaldua erases an indigenous political subjectivity

Saldaña-Portillo 1 [Josefina, Associate Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at NYU, “Who’s the Indian in Aztlán? Re-Writing Mestizaje, Indianism, and Chicanismo from the Lacandón,” *The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader*, ed. Ileana Rodriguez, p. 414-415] // myost

In this passage Anzaldua’s borderlands promises to unsettle the conventional usage of mestizaje for Chicanos as well. For if Anzaldua’s borderland undoes the artificial duality of a border, of the “us” and “them’’ it does so in the service of recognizing the material violence of such artificial constructs. Thus, at this point in the text, Anzaldua could proceed to resituate the Chicana/o as mestizo, the Mexican as mestizo, and the Indian as Mexican within a transnational frame that would address the power relations among such positionalities. In other words, whereas the mestizaje of Aztlan in the 1970s allied Mexicanos and Chicanos through a common past—through a dead indigenous ancestry—the mestizaje of Anzaldua’s borderlands could disrupt such assumption and place each of these positionalities in that uneasy and “constant state of transition” within a capitalist world-system that depends on our differences for its own reproduction. Instead of taking up her own provocative challenge to do this, Anzaldua quickly slips back into the historic usage of mestizaje, constructing Chicana/os in the borderlands as the “us” against the Anglo “them.” She rallies mestizaje to access an indigenous ancestry that legitimates a prior claim to the Southwest for Chicanas and Chicanos, “The oldest evidence of humankind in the United States—the Chicanos’ ancient Indian ancestors—was found in Texas and has been dated 35,000 BC” (4). Ignoring the contemporary Native American inhabitants of the Southwest and their very different mythogenealogies, Anzaldua predictably claims this "oldest evidence of humankind” for Chicanos as evidence of the occupation of the Southwest by the Indian ancestors of the Aztecs. Consequently, a page and a few thousand years later, when the settlement of the Southwest by the Spaniards occurs in her book, she continues: “Our Spanish, Indian and mestizo ancestors explored and settled parts of the United States Southwest as early as the sixteenth century. For every gold hungry conquistador and soulhungry missionary who came north from Mexico, ten or twenty Indians and mestizos went along as porters or in other capacities. For the Indians this constituted a return to the place of origin, Aztlan, thus making Chicanos originally and secondarily indigenous to the Southwest” (5). Let us trace the circuitous route by which mestizaje makes Chicanos “originally and secondarily indigenous to the Southwest.” According to Anzaldua, Chicanos are originally indigenous to the area because of our biological tie to the first Indians who inhabited it some 37,000 years ago (her date), that mythical Indian tribe that traveled from Aztlan in the Southwest to Mexico City and subsequently formed the Aztec Empire. And we are secondarily indigenous through our “return” to this homeland with the Spaniards as Indians and mestizos. Once again mestizaje is deployed to produce a biological tie with pre-Aztec Indians rather than a political tie with contemporary U.S. Native Americans or Mexican Indians. Consequently, in this system of representation, indigenous subjectivity is once again put under erasure. The condition of possibility for Chicana/o nostalgia over our indigenous subjectivity made evident in this passage is the rarefication of indigenous peoples as past.

#### The AFF ultimately reaffirms settler forms of knowledge production and fluid identity that eradicate ongoing Native struggles

Saldaña-Portillo 1 [Josefina, Associate Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at NYU, “Who’s the Indian in Aztlán? Re-Writing Mestizaje, Indianism, and Chicanismo from the Lacandón,” *The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader*, ed. Ileana Rodriguez, p. 415-416] // myost

Of course, this is mestizaje with a feminist, queer twist. In a refreshing contradistinction to earlier Chicano deployments of mestizaje, Anzaldua draws from the female deities in the Aztec pantheon to explain a variety of Chicana-mestiza customs, to explain patriarchy in Chicano culture, to explain Chicana sexuality. Thus, throughout the book, Anzaldtia links Chicana artistic creativity to Coatlique, the goddess of fertility; Chicana sexual expression or freedom to Tlazolteyotl, a goddess of the underworld; and Chicana mourning or sorrow over oppression in all its guises with Cihuocowatl, a goddess of war. To access our mestiza consciousness as Chicanas, we must open ourselves up to the connections in our everyday lives to this pantheon of female deities, to our psychobiological links with the matriarchal Aztec culture of some five hundred years ago: "The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She juggles cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode" (79). Anzaldua is certainly correct when she suggests that in her model of mestiza consciousness one “learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture" because in Anzaldua's model we are right back where we started under the PRI’s state-sponsored mestizaje and indigenismo. What Anzaldua does not recognize—indeed, cannot recognize from her privileged position as First World minority rather than Third World subaltern—is that her very focus on the Aztec female deities is an effect of the PRI’s statist policies to resuscitate, through state-funded documentation, this particular, defunct Mexican Indian culture and history to the exclusion of dozens of living indigenous cultures. When she resuscitates this particular representation of indigenous subjectivity to be incorporated into contemporary mestiza consciousness, she too does so to the exclusion and, indeed, erasure of contemporary indigenous subjectivity and practices on both sides of the border.

## “Decolonize Your Mind”

#### Any attempt at decolonization which doesn’t call for the material recovery of land normalizing settler control over land.

Martineau and Ritskes, 2014 (Jarrett – University of Victoria, and Eric – University of Toronto, “Fugitive Indigeneity: Reclaiming the Terrain of Decolonial Struggle Through Indigenous Art”, *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society* 3.1, shae)

Indigenous art reclaims and revitalizes the inherent creative potentiality of art to be activated in political struggle, not as an inseparable aesthetic experience but embedded in the embodied daily life experience of Indigenous Peoples, settlers and others globally. For those artists who take up the challenge of working within this vision, decolonial aesthetics “seeks to recognize and open options for liberating the senses” (Transnational Decolonial Institute, 2013 – emphasis added). In this issue, we propose to engage and move beyond a framework for understanding “ongoing artistic projects responding and delinking from the darker side of imperial globalization”, to re-center Indigenous land, communities and cultures as the force that energizes decolonization and provides fugitive possibilities for movement and creative expression. In this emerging field, as articulated and set in motion by many of the scholars and others represented by the Transnational Decolonial Institute, decolonization is frequently represented, conceptually, in expressions of “epistemic disobedience” (Mignolo, 2011) and discursive “de-linkings” (Mignolo, 2007) from colonial thought. Decolonization becomes defined and pursued in terms that center liberation of the mind (wa Thiong’o, 1986), over land and body. While we see so-called epistemic disobedience and de-linking as necessary and important aspects of decolonizing art and struggle, we choose to anchor our use of aesthetics within the artistic praxis of artists and communities engaged in material struggle for decolonization - those that connect to Fanon’s (1963) call to liberate “land and bread” (p. 44). As anticolonial activist-intellectuals like Amilcar Cabral have warned, if all we seek is decolonization of the mind, then we will have already conceded the loss of the most precious and transformative foundation of decolonization: land and place. Theory removed from the land, removed from practice, and detached from the contexts that give it form and content propose a decolonizing strategy that risks metaphorizing its constitutive ground. Land and place must remain at the center of decolonial thought and practice because, “wherever our heads might be, our feet are planted on the ground, on the land” (Cabral, 1979, p. 44).

## Deleuze

### Rhizomes

#### Lines of flight are the rhizomatic expansion of settler colonialism which maintain the ongoing extermination of indigenous people.

Young, 2013 (Alex Trimble – PhD candidate @ the University of Southern California, “Settler Sovereignty and the Rhizomatic West, or, The Significance of the Frontier in Postwestern Studies”, *Western American Literature* 48.1-2, Spring/Summer, shae)

In her 2011 monograph The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism, Chickasaw critical theorist Jodi Byrd addresses the relationship between US state power and the rhizome directly in a trenchant critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s investment in frontier logics: Drawing on the paradigmatic Indian wilderness to encapsulate an America in which arborescence becomes rhizomatic, A Thousand Plateaus performs a global, nomadic reframing in which the frontier becomes, again, Frederick Jackson Turner’s site of transformation, possibility, and mapping. … The maps of settler colonialism were always already proliferative, the nation state’s borders were always perforated, and the US lines of flight across treaties with indigenous nations were always rhizomatic and fluid rather than hierarchical, linear, and coherent, located not just in the nation-state but within the individual settlers and arrivants who saw indigenous lands as profit, fortune, and equality. (13) For Byrd, the power exerted over indigenous peoples during settler conquest is not “always arborescent” but rather expressed via the very [End Page 123] rhizomatic lines of flight that transgress the coherent juridical order of the settler state, here represented by the treaties that were supposed to guarantee the containment of settler expansion. While these frontier “lines of flight” did offer the potential of newfound material and formal freedoms for settlers and arrivants, the rhizomatic expansion of settler society also consigned indigenous lands and indigenous peoples themselves to the role of the “apparently open space,” the “transit” across which settler empire expands. For Byrd, the danger of embracing Deleuzian rhizomatics as a paradigm for cultural studies lies in Deleuze and Guattari’s tendency to imagine countercultural assemblages as modeled on the rhizomatic form of settler expansion, as well as in their penchant for citing questionable ethnographic evidence regarding American Indians in their work. Byrd argues that Deleuze and Guattari perform multiple acts of cultural appropriation, scholarly performances akin to those outlined by Philip Deloria in Playing Indian (1998), whereby the “left intellectual … steps forward to ventriloquize the speaking Indian by transforming the becoming- into replacing-Indian” (Byrd 16). Byrd goes on to perform readings of the many such acts of ethnographic ventriloquism in A Thousand Plateaus, lingering on a consideration of their enthusiasm for the work of the fraudulent anthropologist and the new age guru Carlos Castaneda’s writings on Yaqui spirituality.12 Byrd warns that multiple cultural studies works inflected by Deleuzian thought “flow from the phrase ‘Experiment, don’t signify or interpret!’” that Deleuze and Guattari read as the central injunction of Castaneda’s work (18). This slogan “functions as a call for transformational new worlds of relation and relationship that move us toward a joyously cacaphonic multiplicity and away from the lived colonial conditions of indigeneity within the postcolonizing settler society” (Byrd 18). Byrd goes on to argue that this motif, “even if it acknowledges all the divergent discourses that come into race, gender, sexual, and class assemblages,” “smoothes” the social field “once again into uncultivated wilderness that allows any trajectory or cultivation to enter it, but not arise from it” (18). In Byrd’s reading, for cultural studies to embrace Deleuze and Guattari’s slogan “experiment, don’t signify or interpret!” is to risk an overly sanguine critical practice whereby “transformational new worlds of [political] relation” are imagined in a manner that once again predicates liberatory potential on the erasure of indigenous peoples.13

### Fetishize Indigeneity

#### D&G fetishize and appropriate indigeneity.

Fawaz, 2012 (Ramzi – George Washington University, “Settling Scores: Claiming Ground for Native and Indigenous Critique in the Americas”, *Anthropological Quarterly* 85.1, Winter, shae)

As Byrd shows in her first chapter, poststructural theory and cultural studies have fallen into similar pitfalls by deploying the concept of the Indian as a figurative tool for making claims about postmodern subjectivity and the racial logics of the US empire. For instance, Byrd shows how in the works of thinkers like Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari, the Indian functions as a prediscursive or primordial figure that overturns Enlightenment assumptions about human rationality, historical teleology, and the stability of language and identity. Deleuze and Guattari fetishize the Indian as an embodiment of rhizomatic thinking, a migratory figure with no set history, what they call the “Indian without ancestry,” that represents the limits of Western linear (or arboreal) thought. In this scheme, the Indian becomes [End Page 261] the gateway in poststructuralist theory for experimental, rhizomatic modes of thinking about identity and history that also transforms Indianness into a kind of conceptual enchantment rather than a lived condition. This ahistorical appropriation of the Indian as a site of radical alterity, essentially the break with modernity, celebrates the Indian only to reify the colonial binary between Enlightenment rationality and the savage, pre-modern Indian subject, who is conceived not as a living person but as a conceptual metaphor that facilitates poststructural critique.

## Economics

### White Settler Economics

#### The economic logic of a just society defined by supposedly fair resource distribution fortifies the heroic myth of the Settler in the newest iteration of Manifest Destiny. Civilizational progress operates as the trope against which Indigeneity is rendered savage, exploitable, and disposable.

Arruda, 2016 (James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics”, Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto, <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>, shae)

A brief critical synthesis of the words ‘land’, ‘wealth’ and ‘economics’ suggests that although all the conceptions are actually tightly and materially connected, the authors of economics textbooks have effectively decoupled the terms from each other. Therefore, the hypothesis and worldview describes an implicit erasure of Settler colonialism and of Indigenous people in economics; mainstream economics, in this case. The definition of land, derived from the economics textbooks, does not point to the historical reality of how land was owned by early (and contemporary) Settlers. For the surveyed authors, wealth is not explicitly derived from land, since it is assumed that accumulation and distribution is given. The definition of economics did at least focus on wealth (and economic growth) in the classical century of economic thought (Backhouse & Medema, 2009b), but the North American economics’ attention on wealth started to be delinked in Samuelson’s text in 1948 (Backhouse & Medema, 2009a). Based on the surveyed textbooks, the authors do not define economics as a study of wealth. Rather, the definition of economics mainly attracts questions around unlimited needs, scarce means, and the utilitarian choice-making character of the individualistic economic actor. Thus, there are layers of erasure between each term that ‘logically’ delink the whole study of economics in Canada from the land dispossessions. Settler Colonial Land Story For Barker and Lowman (2015, p. 33) the Settler narratives “are the means through which violent colonization is transformed into the story of heroic struggle and the inevitable establishment of an exceptionally successful, just, and distinct society”. The concepts of land used in Canadian economics textbooks are stories that invade and displace not just Indigenous stories, but Settler as well. The most common narrated story in the textbooks is that nature gave land to the early Settlers for free. Moreover, the textbook’s narrative explains that only the Settlers’ improvement of the land gave it any economic worth. This myth makes White European Settlers as subjects with agency, and nature (or the ‘wild’) as an object with no agency. This positivist perspective then implies that Indigenous people are ‘wild’, as part of the natural background. In other words, since the textbooks do not mention Indigenous people living on or using the land, they are then imagined as ‘savages’ without agency, or even life. In fact, we can infer that life and value can only be transferred through White Settler ownership. The belief that nature gave land to Settlers “obscures” the fact “that many settlers only survived because of the generosity, knowledge and skills of Indigenous communities” (Barker & Lowman, 2015, p. 34). The story given by the economics textbooks closely resembles the Terra Nullius ideology: the “notion of empty land and a dualism between uncivilized people and ‘unworked’/unimproved land” (Hoogeveen, 2015, p. 124). The land is therefore believed to be empty and unimproved if there is no human agency, which is only formed by economic agents guided by market mechanisms. As a consequence, these stories then influence actual state policies. For instance, there are examples of early paper bills of credit backed by colonial arrogations over Indigenous lands, and how its continuous circulation in the form of money reproduced the colonial expropriation of Native land and labor (Vimalassery, 2013). Additionally, based on the critical geographer Dawn Hoogeveen (2015), the mineral claim-staking regime in Northern Canada parallels the Settler colonial structure of dispossession of mineral staking across North American, and the world. In fact, mineral staking is due to the free-staking principle. Basically, the principle gives full right to mining prospectors and companies to claim a piece of land (whether private or Crown land) without informing the people who own or live on the land (Hoogeveen, 2015). As Hoogeven (2015, p. 123) claims, present “mineral tenure regimes are not innocent or neutral but premised on an erasure of Indigenous claims to land”—legitimized by the textbooks’ narrative on land. Finally, this illustration of land and property also follows John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690). Briefly, John Locke’s theory of property (‘law of nature’) goes as follows: at first, land was God’s gift equally given to the heirs of Adam as a common. Subsequently, land becomes the private property of the individuals who improve it. In other words, nature is privatized when humans add value to it through labour. “His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself” (Locke, 1690, Sect. 29). Additionally, Locke saw the ‘art of government’ as the provider of land for those who wish to properly improve it and produce surplus. Thus, since mainstream political economics regards Indigenous people as pertaining to a lower level of economic development, Locke’s idea of improvement and labour absolutely favours the European philosophy of property exclusivity. Unsurprisingly, as argued by several scholars (Tully, 1995; Hsueh, 2006), the Lockean perspective in political philosophy invalidates the discipline’s capacity to study aboriginal self-government and ecology. The interesting research of political scientist Vicki Hsueh (2006), interrogating the credibility of Locke’s thesis, suggests that John Locke’s direct financial stake in American slavery and Indigenous dispossession depicts a vested interest in his political ideas. In other words, for Hsueh (2006), there was a clear conflict of interest. As such, and by extension that all Settler economists benefit from similar conflicts of interest, I argue that mainstream economics cannot generate epistemologies to evaluate any Indigenous economic relations to land. The discipline devaluates their political economies and superimposes (European) Settler stories and structures over those of Indigenous nations.

### Progressive Economics

#### The economic logic of rational markets is the perfection of terra nullius – the evacuation and clearing of Indigenous presence from the land to enable genocidal plunder.

Arruda, 2016 (James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics”, Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto, <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>, shae)

A particular tragedy and contradiction in mainstream economics is its manufactured background story. The presuppositions underlying the narrative of the discipline generally mirror a biased worldview; in general, that of an isolated individual performing rational (optimizing) decisions within a closed system (Pratten, 2007; 2004). Feminist economists argue that this model individual is also white, colonial, male11 (Grappard, 1995). The story of individuals constantly taking selfish and rational decisions within a closed world informs the methodology used by economists. With a narrow experience of life, the constructed nature of existence (ontology) inscribed within mainstream economics generates unreliable knowledge production tools (epistemology) about the economy—a complex system in which collectives of individuals live and exchange with each other. Furthermore, mainstream economics epistemology employs mathematical and deductivist tools. Critical realism12 argues that economics’ deductivist methodology is only appropriate to study a ‘small-closed-world’ system (Pratten, 1996; Spash, 2012). All in all, economic event regularities are deduced from an unreasonable and unrealistic ontology. For the Cambridge Journal of Economics co-editor Stephen Pratten (2007), the only path beyond mainstream economics is through the abandonment of the deductivist framework. This is a call for a complete epistemological revolution! I believe that to delegitimize institutions, their stories have to be delegitimized. If mathematical-deduction uses prior beliefs/stories to explain the past and predict the future, then a critical reformulation of economics ontology is absolutely required as well, but not sufficient. My ontological investigation of the discipline is inspired and drawn from revolutionary Indigenous feminist theorists. For instance, in I am Woman, Lee Maracle (1996) of the Sto:Loh nation pointedly argues that (mainstream) economics and mathematics are products of white (European) settler male worldviews. As a matter of fact, the latter character’s beliefs and experiences of the world are also at the root of mainstream economics ontology, and a catalyst for its form of knowledge production. My analytical focus is also informed by my Settler space of birth occupying Kanien’kehá:ka territory. It is also informed by my present space and (white settler male) character occupying the land protected by and shared between the Anishinaabe, Mississauga, and Haudenosaunee people, as per the Dish With One Spoon treaty. In this paper, I argue that the definitions of land13, wealth and economics in Canadian mainstream economics textbooks depict a Settler colonial ontology. Thesis Land. Wealth. Economics. These three interdependent words connect how we see and act in the world. In my opinion, land is loving, abundant, intelligent, and always remembers. Land encompasses a long list of wealth; life, resources, knowledge, stories. Land is wealth. Logically and ethically, an appropriate system of wealth exchange (an economy) can only be prosperous if it respectfully relies on land. An appropriate study of economics interlaces our material relationships with each other, with more-than-humans14 and with life all together. Yet, it is not sufficient to build a better economic way to relate to the land, while Settler institutions occupy Indigenous land and territories. Different forces of power are at play within the Settler colonial complex. In general, there are three ‘structures of invasion’: spaces, systems and stories. In Settler Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Barker and Lowman (2015) refer to these structures as they delve into the construction of Settlers in Canada. They elaborate on the types of Settler colonial invasions performed in Canada, which reinforce Settler power and authority over the land. In all instances, the spaces we15 take, the systems we build, and the stories we tell “are [ultimately] focused on the land” (Barker & Lowman, 2015, p. 31). First of all, ‘spaces’ as a structure of invasion is defined as the Settler colonial spaces that displace and replace Indigenous places (Barker et al., 2015). For example, the city of Toronto is a Settler colonial space since it intentionally covers and displaces Anishnaabe spaces. Second of all, ‘systems’ are constructed so that Settler colonialism can assert and develop itself (Barker & Lowman, 2015). The Indian Residential School system was a system that severed the ties of young Indigenous children from the land. Thirdly, the ‘stories’ created by Settlers to legitimize occupation, such as the ‘Peacemaker Myth’ and ‘Terra Nullius’, displaces Indigenous stories of land connection (Barker & Lowman, 2015). In the case of mainstream economics, the most relevant structures of invasion are the stories and systems it creates. Economic stories and systems that dismiss and replace Indigenous relations to land thus intentionally participate in the displacement and erasure of Indigenous spaces, systems and stories. Canadian economics textbooks regard land as given for free by nature (to Settlers) and (initially) without any agency16 to generate wealth, until Settlers improve and value the land. In other words, economics students assume that before the European arrival on (what is now commonly known as) North America, nature gave the land to the European Settlers—metaphorically understood, of course. All of nature’s contents was devoid of agency, and thus free for the new visitors (Settlers) to claim, to own. Completely ignoring wealth accumulation from land, the theoretical framework in Canadian economics textbooks does not question wealth distribution and mostly focuses on wealth production (see Green, 2013). Of course, wealth distribution and production occurs on land. Canadian economists nonetheless assume that all economic activities—in this case, production and distribution of wealth—begin on free and unoccupied land, transforming their respective spaces/locations (land) into improvable and privatized assets, ready for the (free) market. A Canadian definition of economics that does not encompass its socio-political (colonial) context is a structure that legitimizes Settler colonial invasion, against Indigenous peoples and their land. As such, young students who read, learn and interpret the world from Canadian economics textbooks do not face their complicity within Settler colonialism. Rather, they confidently reproduce their economic knowledge on unceded/stolen land. All in all, the underlying thesis of this chapter is that the constructed paradigm within Canadian standard economics textbooks derives from the imagination of a privileged and ahistorical Settler position of ‘objectivism’ and ‘authority’, camouflaged by Whiteness, by an empty ontology, and by storytelling derived from the dominant White Settler Male view.

## Extinction

#### Extinction impacts are fabricated by the settler death drive. Settlers have a psychological investment in imagining the end of the world to create a sense of white vulnerability at the expense of enacting decolonization.

Dalley, 2016 (Hamish Dalley received his Ph.D. from the Australian National University in 2013, and is now an Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College, Amherst, New York, where he is responsible for teaching in World and Postcolonial Literatures., (2016): The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160, JKS)

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social for- mations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few excep- tions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of pol- itical agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance¶ that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article.¶ Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler- colonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superior- ity, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because:¶ ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5¶ Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked.¶ I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial litera- ture, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between his- torio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler- colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature.¶ That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well.¶ The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonial- ism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm:¶ It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. [...] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. [...] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10¶ In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inha- bitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological super- iority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial geno- cide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth- century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds,¶ which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species.¶ Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of immi- nent loss’.11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change.¶ In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argu- ment that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspec- tive is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization think- able.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist?¶ I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinc- tion narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, biologically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as¶ equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the putative de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings.

## Gender Legalism

#### Claims to liberation for women through the law assume that the law is fundamentally gender-neutral rather than founded upon the continuation of male domination. The aff establishes new forms of patriarchal domination through colonial exploitation.

Coulthard, 2014 (Glen Sean – member of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation and an assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science @ the University of Victoria, Red Skin, White Masks, p. 101-102, shae)

The colonial state is not only a racial structure, however; it is also fundamentally patriarchal in character. To date, one of the best analyses of the patriarchal nature of settler-state power has come from one the most persistent and thoughtful critics of Charter protection for Indigenous women: the late Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture. As an unrelenting advocate of both Indigenous nationalist struggles and emancipation for Indigenous women, Monture's work embodies among the best of contemporary Indigenous feminist theory and practice, even though she did not identify her work in these terms.68 What Monture's work adds to the intersectionality of Indigenous feminist approaches to decolonization is a critical analysis of the colonial state as manifestation of male power, which she claims renders its legal apparatus very problematic as a site of emancipation for Indigenous women. "The Canadian state is the invisible male perpetrator who unlike Aboriginal men does not have a victim face," asserts Monture in her pathbreaking book, Thunder in My Soul. ''And at the feet of the state I can lay my anger to rest.”69 I think that Monture's concern with the legalist approach to seeking gender justice for Native women adopted by organizations like The Native Women's Association of Canada is that such an approach implicitly assumes that the colonial state is ultimately a gender-neutral apparatus that only historically adopted a patriarchal logic to frame Indian legislation, instead of understanding male dominance as a constitutive feature of state power as such. What are the implications of turning to the state as a protector of Indigenous women's rights if the state itself constitutes the material embodiment of masculinist, patriarchal power? Here I suggest that Monture's insights coalesce productively with those of political theorist Wendy Brown. For Brown, gender emancipation strategies that rely on the state apparatus in this way have deeply contradictory implications given that "domination, dependence, discipline, and protection, the terms marking the itinerary of women's subordination in vastly different cultures and epochs, are also characteristic effects of state power.”70 Subsequently, when women turn to the state apparatus in their struggles for gender justice they risk reiterating rather than transforming the subjective and material conditions of their own oppression. At the very least, Monture's Indigenous feminist critique of the colonial state provides us with a tool to critically reflect on the contradictory impulses associated with seeking emancipation from the adverse gendered and racist effects of state power by means of law. This does not require that Indigenous peoples vacate the legal field entirely, however. As Kwakwaka'waka scholar Sarah Hunt writes, "Surely we must engage with this powerful system, but appealing to the law alone will not stop the violence.”71 For Hunt, as with Monture, this system must be used very cautiously and strategically, so as to not "reproduce the systems and ideologies that colonialism has produced.”72 And, as Anishinaabe feminist Dory Nason suggests, these strategic engagements must be supplemented, if not eventually replaced, by "those values, practices and traditions that are the core of Indigenous women's power and authority-concepts that have been, and remain under attack, and which strike at the core of a settler-colonial misogyny that refuses to acknowledge the ways in which it targets Indigenous women for destruction."73

## Immigration

### Exceptionalism

#### The liberal ideal of immigration is rooted in the exceptionalist myth of America as free and tolerant, a city on a hill that eclipses the reality of native dispossession and genocide.

Volpp, 2015 (Leti, Robert D. and Leslie Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, The Indigenous As Alien, UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW, Vol. 5:289, 2015, JKS)

What is the link between the founding and immigrants? As Bonnie Honig writes, “immigrants [are treated] as the agents of founding and renewal for a regime in which membership is supposed to be uniquely consent based, individualist, rational, and voluntarist rather than inherited and organic.”199 The liberal consenting immigrant of the nation of immigrants obscures the nonconsensual bases of American democracy—if American is a product of free choice, there is no slavery, colonial possession, conquest, and genocide; the violent sources of the republic are recentered on the idea of voluntary choice continually reaffirmed by the figure of the immigrant consenting to membership in the regime.201 As she writes, “The people who live here are people who once chose to come here, and, in this, America is supposedly unique.”202 Lauren Berlant also notes that “the immigrant is defined as someone who desires America,” providing “symbolic evidence for the ongoing power of American democratic ideals”—the immigrant “provides an energy of desire and labor that perpetually turns American into itself.”203 The reiteration of the immigrant choosing to join suggests the repeated agreeing to of the social contract, from the founding to now, eliding the violent originary dispossession. The desiring of America eclipses the dispossession by America. This dispossession disappears, “buried underneath” the vision of America as a land of equality and liberty.204 The nation thus appears as an ethical community, rather than as the product of violence, or as an accident.205 The naturalization ceremony itself functions as a ritualized public performance of this consent. We are familiar with the contemporary form of naturalization ceremonies, staged ceremonies that function as a kind of “feel-good advertisement for the possibilities of a multiracial democracy, freely chosen by a global cadre of prospective U.S. citizens,”206 that Siobhan Somerville describes as the product of a deliberate federal effort to tell a story about naturalization as “the culmination of a romance between immigrants and the federal state.”207 Yet before these naturalization ceremonies for immigrants were developed, the United States conducted naturalization ceremonies for Indians becoming citizens through the Dawes Act. Starting in 1916, a competency commission simultaneously determined whether individual Indians would be assigned title to property allotments and U.S. citizenship. The commission began to stage citizenship ceremonies. Indian men were handed a bow and arrow and told to shoot a final arrow to mark the end of their resistance to the United States, and then place their hands upon a plow and vow to take up agriculture. Indian women received sewing kits.208 Somerville has found archival evidence that is suggestive of a link between these Dawes Act ceremonies and the first naturalization ceremonies staged for immigrants; it is possible that this ritual performance of naturalization of Indians inspired naturalization ceremonies for immigrants, whose naturalization at the time was conducted as an individual bureaucratic procedure, with little theatricality.209 This history of Dawes Act naturalization is forgotten in the presumption that only immigrants are naturalized and in the concomitant vision of the desiring immigrant.210 So the settler becomes an immigrant. The settler even becomes a refugee. Think of the story of Exodus, the journey to the Promised Land, the good ship Arabella, and John Winthrop declaring a divine mission, a “city upon a hill.”211 This vision of American exceptionalism and its presumption of a divinely ordained mandate has been evoked by numerous political figures, including John F. Kennedy,212 Ronald Reagan,213 and recently Mitt Romney,214 as well as Arnold Schwarzenegger who, hosting a forum on immigration reform, linked bodybuilding to the Puritans, placing himself within this historical trajectory—saying, “The life I’ve lived, the careers that I’ve had, and the successes I’ve had were possible only because I immigrated to the one place [where] nothing is impossible. . . . To me, President Ronald Reagan’s shining city on a hill was never just a beautiful metaphor.”215 And, foundationally, in yet another metaphorical and rhetorical inversion, settlers portray themselves as natives, to indigenize themselves.216 Colonization meant “the indigenous alienated, the newcomers domesticated.”217 As Patrick Wolfe writes: Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event. . . . [T]he romance of extinction, for instance (the dying race, the last of his tribe, etc.), encodes a settler-colonial imperative . . . . In the settler-colonial economy, it is not the colonist but the native who is superfluous.218 Thus, the native familial identity of the settlers (founding father, daughters of the American Revolution, native sons) is both proclaimed and premised on the disappearance of the actual native inhabitants, a disappearance that is both metaphorical and literal. This imagining away “banishes existing inhabitants to the margins of its consciousness.”219 “Imagining North America as ‘settled’ did not merely reject indigenous property claims; it presupposed a fundamental erasure of Indian presence.”220 This is the “Vanishing Indian,” as seen in the Edward Curtis portraits frequently offered for sale on the back of the New York Times.221

### Inclusion

#### The affs attempted inclusion of the underprivileged into liberal society is the completion of settler colonialism because any progress naturalizes the disappearance of Indigenous people.

Fawaz, 2012 (Ramzi – George Washington University, “Settling Scores: Claiming Ground for Native and Indigenous Critique in the Americas”, *Anthropological Quarterly* 85.1, Winter, shae)

Byrd boldly contends that if scholars acknowledged the contemporary reverberations of this foundational act of violent dispossession, it would reveal that the US empire does not expand through an active search for new frontiers, as has traditionally been argued, but rather through the projection of the category of the Indian onto a variety of landscapes and [End Page 262] peoples purportedly requiring the intervention of modern American civilization. Where the frontier model of the American empire locates the agent of colonialism in the US government and its ever-expanding military and economic reach beyond its national borders, the model of Indianness shows how the initial colonial settlement of native lands is re-performed within an empire by a variety of non-governmental agents. Most significant among these are the very minority populations once excluded from the sphere of full citizenship (including racial, gender, and sexual minorities) but now perceived as proper converts to liberal multiculturalism and hence legitimate agents of America’s “civilizing” mission within and without the borders of the US. This is perhaps one of Byrd’s most extraordinary discoveries and an argument in and of itself for the necessity of an indigenous critique capable of tracking how contemporary empire continues to mask its original decimation of native peoples even as it appears to address the needs of underprivileged minorities within its borders.

### Indigenous Migration

#### Tag

Nájera and Maldonado, 2017 (Lourdes Gutiérrez – Assistant Professor of Anthropology @ Drake University, and Korinta – Clinical Assistant Professor of Anthropology @ the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, “Transnational Settler Colonial Formations and Global Capital: A Consideration of Indigenous Mexican Migrants”, *American Quarterly* 69.4, December, shae)

Distinct violences erase and dispossess Native Americans at the same time that Mixteco, Triqui, and mestizo migrants arrive from Mexico seeking to escape that country’s own logics of elimination through assimilation, land encroachment, and state and narco violence. These Indigenous migrants take residence on stolen lands. These are the same lands that Yakama people are precluded from owning unless they can prove tribal membership through blood quantum. Such racialized entanglements foment anti-immigrant sentiments among some members of the Yakama nation. Matt Damaskins, a government liaison for the Yakama nation, says, “Indians are the only race that have to prove we are Indians. . . . we have to produce an enrollment card.”43 He points to the contradictions between Yakama and Indigenous Mexican reception and settlement experiences. While Yakama people struggle to be recognized as legitimate heirs of their lands, Indigenous migrants appear to blend into the social fabric more seamlessly. Yet Indigenous migrant identities are also flattened into either Mexican and/or Latinx, making their presence suspect of illegality. At other times, they play an important role within liberal multiculturalism settler colonialism as “exotic” others,44 carriers of ancestral knowledge, and noble savages in need of protectionism. An imperialist nostalgia is scripted over Indigenous migrants’ bodies, its exotic celebration and/or its [End Page 817] protection as in the case of the Zapotec in California, and its multicultural reverberations. Such racialized and vulnerable positioning serves the settler colonial project even as it obscures its relationality.45 This embodies a process of colonial unknowing, which “renders unintelligible the entanglements of racialization and colonization.”46

### Labor

#### Categorically excludes blackness which doesn’t experience alienation but fungibility. This distinction is a necessary component to the creation of the settler state because it lays the foundations for colonial expansion.

King, 2014 (Tiffany – Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies @ Georgia State University, “Labor’s Aphasia: Toward Antiblackness as Constitutive to Settler Colonialism”, June 10, <http://decolonization.wordpress.com/2014/06/10/labors-aphasia-toward-antiblackness-as-constitutive-to-settler-colonialism/>, shae)

While many scholars who understand themselves as humanists have long ago conceded that strict or heavy-handed Marxian (political economic) analyses are generally impoverished and wanting; labor as an analytic persists. Indeed, labor as a discourse, or what Shona Jackson would call a “metaphysics” and “ontoepistemology”—a way of living and a way of articulating this mode of living— still haunts our critical theories (Jackson, 2012, p. 217).[2] This is particularly true as scholars undertake the difficult work of understanding and naming how racialized people are situated within White settler colonial states. Configuring People of Color into the calculus of settler colonial relations is onerous and in fact laborious. It is especially difficult when trying to conceptualize the unique location of Blackness. I commend scholars for taking on this task. In order to do this cumbersome work, scholars tend to rely on the tried and true rubric of labor. Labor becomes the site and mode of incorporating non-Black and non-Indigenous people into settler colonial relations in White settler nation-states. People of Color scholars often rehearse histories of arrival as populations of coerced labor as a way of explaining their presence, as well as distance or proximity to the category of the Settler. Labor also becomes a liberal discourse that allows immigrants and migrants to narrate the terms of their belonging and citizenship within White settler colonial states. In this way, labor functions as another discourse of inclusion. Recently, Jamilah Martin in response to Ta-Nehisi Coates’ article “The Case for Reparations” made a similar and astute point in her blog post “On Reparations: Resisting Inclusion and Co-optation” that reparations work as a discourse of inclusion within the project of American Democracy within the “U.S. anti-Black settler-imperial state.” While the integrationist project of reparations may be a liberal project of inclusion, it also relies on a “teleology of modern labor” (Jackson 2012, p. 147). It holds out hope for Black inclusion into a human family of laborers/workers. Yet, despite the claim of the Black laborer as “subject”, embedded within the metaphysics of labor, the bill H.R. 40 (otherwise known as the Reparations Bill) has not gained traction. H.R. 40’s lack of success partially speaks to the inability of Blackness to become fully legible through human categories like the laborer/worker. Further, it evinces the ways that laborer and worker do not explain the ontological state of Blackness. In Red, White and Black, Wilderson attends to the ways that Afropessimists “have gone considerable lengths to show that, point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (Wilderson 2010, 14). The “alienation” and “exploitation” that the human worker experiences through labor are contingent conditions resulting from human conflicts. Many people can and have occupied these temporary and conditional abased human coordinates. White, Asian and South Asian, Latina/o and Middle Eastern indentured and other kinds of laborers have long inhabited White settler territories and nation-states and, as laborers, immigrants and migrants have all helped build the settler nation. Black laboring bodies have even been used to build the settler nation. However, Black labor is just one kind of use within an open, violent and infinite repertoire of practices of making Black flesh fungible. One way that I have explained fungibility to my undergraduate students in my course “Gender and Sexuality in the African Diaspora,” is to think about the slave owner Madame Delphine LaLaurie’s use of enslaved bodies in the FX television series, American Horror Story: Coven. LaLaurie uses Black flesh to meet uses and desires beyond those of labor and profit. She runs a torture chamber in order to satisfy lusts that include and exceed the sexual. In one episode, she murders and then uses the blood of an enslaved newborn child as an elixir that wards off the aging process. One gets a sense that the possibilities for Black flesh are unending under her ownership. The infinite possibilities for fungible Black flesh mark a fundamental distinction between fungible slave bodies and non-Black (exploited) laboring bodies. Further, Black bodies cannot effectively be incorporated into the human category of laborers. If Black laboring bodies were incorporated into the category; “laborer” would have no meaning as a human condition. Blackness is constituted by a fungibility and accumulation that must exist outside the edge and boundary of the laborer-as-human. If there were no Black fungible and accumulable bodies there could be no “wage laborer” that cohered into a proletariat. While labor as a discourse may work for non-Black and non-Native people of color as a way of interpellating themselves within settler colonial relations, it does not explain Black presence, Black labor or Black use in White settler nation-states. Theories that attempt to triangulate Blackness into the Settler/Native antagonism in White settler states do so by positing Blackness as the labor force that helps make the settler landscape possible.[3] It is true that Black labor literally tills, fences in and cultivates the settler’s land. However, this singular analysis both obscures the issue of Black fungibility and reduces Blackness to a mere tool of settlement rather than a constitutive element of settler colonialism’s conceptual order.

### “Nation of Immigrants”

#### Constructing the US as a “nation of immigrants” vanquishes any memory of indigenous presence from these lands – this perpetuation of terra nullius is the necessary condition of genocide.

Hall, 2008 (Lisa Kahaleole – Associate Professor of Women’s Studies @ Wells College, “Strategies of Erasure: US Colonialism and Native Hawaiian Feminism”, *American Quarterly* 60.2, shae)

Inextricable from this denial of both the existence and foundational significance of indigenous peoples to the development of the United States is the popular conception of race as paradigmatically black and white. In the absence of an understanding of colonialism as foundational to its identity, the U.S. self-construction as a "nation of immigrants" symbolically reconfigures slavery as involuntary immigration and, as such, the original racial sin of the nation. African Americans become symbolically indigenous while all other people of color are seen as potentially illegitimate and/or illegal "aliens."4 In a black-white dichotomy, indigenous peoples disappear completely, always already vanishing.5 This "vanishing" is helped along by a racial system in the United States in which blackness is assumed to subsume any other ancestry on the one hand while indigeneity must be documented and quantified to exist on the other.6 The primary beneficiary of this ideological schema is a white-supremacist political system that historically benefited from expanding the class of people considered property, and restricting the class of people holding property rights through treaty agreements. But non-indigenous people of color benefit as well from a national amnesia about the origin of "American" land and the particular political obligations owed to indigenous peoples.

### Reform

#### Expanding the sphere of legal immigration is a ruse which maintains the construction of dangerous, illegal, foreign others which must be destroyed in order to cohere settler identity.

Orphanides, 2016 (Alexandros – writer, researcher, and educator, “Moving Beyond Illegal Immigration: Settlers, Latinxs And Imagined Illegality”, Huffington Post, June 19, <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandros-orphanides/moving-beyond-illegal-imm_b_10496802.html>, shae)

Immigration reform activists often laud the U.S. as a “nation of immigrants,” but before it was that, it was, and still is, a nation of settlers. There is a direct connection between the colonization of the U.S., the development of its imagined community, and the criminalization of Latinxs as the embodiment of “illegality.” The U.S., as a settler colony, developed out of European settlements in North America, enacting genocide on indigenous communities, appropriating land as property, forcefully incorporating enslaved African people into its settlement project, and declaring the land the rightful home to the European settler population. Of course people born in the United States today do not think of themselves as settlers, instead they prefer and believe the term native-born, which naturalizes the idea that some belong and others do not. But make no mistake, every non-indigenous person in the U.S. consolidates the settler-colony; that includes many of us. In a multiracial, settler-colonial society, when we talk of citizenship, we are talking about more than legal protections—we are talking about having your humanity recognized. Illegality, or the perception of illegality, tells us that some people do not deserve human rights. By creating a construct of illegality and assigning it to a broad and diverse group of people, the U.S. racializes a category of human beings who, in the eyes of many in the dominant culture, embody illegality, regardless of their actual status. This erects both a real and imaginary border to police the boundaries of an imaginary community. For example, during a televised major league baseball game in 2013, Marc Anthony, a world-famous, New York-born Puerto Rican vocalist, sang “God Bless America.” The subsequent backlash on Twitter was palpable, as many seemed unaware that Marc Anthony is in fact an American citizen: The sad irony of Marc-Anthony-Is-Not-American-Gate is that “God Bless America,” a song that celebrates the U.S. settler colony, was written by a Russian-Jewish immigrant, and that all Puerto Ricans, by virtue of American neo-imperialism are U.S. citizens. Marc Anthony is rich and famous, and the consequences of the backlash for him were limited to a bruised ego and some media attention. But instances like this one are a reminder that to many white U.S. citizens, there are extrajudicial limits to American belongingness. This is part of a tendency in the United States to conflate all people of Latin American origin into the categories Latinx or Hispanic. In this way, people visibly racialized as Latinx, usually those perceived as non-white, cannot fully belong to the imagined community. For the less privileged, the policing of an imagined community can have very real consequences, like the targeted murder of Marcelo Lucero, an Ecuadorean immigrant. In 2008 he was killed by a gang of teens in the town of Patchogue, Long Island who were “hunting Latinos.” An event space near the site of his murder later became the location of a Donald Trump presidential rally in April of 2016, a move than many felt was an affirmation to the local white supremacist culture. In addition to acts of violence, an imagined community also finds legal ways to police its boundaries, such Arizona’s SB-1070, a state law which among other things, charges law enforcement officers with the duty to demand immigration papers of anyone who may appear to be an undocumented immigrant. Alabama and Georgia have followed suit with similar laws. In states like these, individuals that are racialized as Latinx find themselves in jeopardy of harassment, violence, and detention at the hands of law enforcement officers. This model of enforcement has been celebrated by Donald Trump as an effective and even desirable way by which undocumented immigration may be addressed. The construction of Latinxs as personifying the embodiment of “illegality” ensures the economic, political, and social designation of Latinxs in the U.S. as an inferior racialized group. And while it’s true that diverse perceptions of who is and is not Latinx leaves some untouched by this reality, for the Latinx communities around the country this has very real consequences. An immigration reform movement that attempts to accommodate “illegality” within its parameters affirms the perceived status of Latinxs. The key to reversing this is to undo illegality altogether and to question and dismantle, in solidarity with indigenous nations, the logic of the settler colony.

## Incarceration

### Carcerality

#### The aff’s linkage of the prison system to a causal explanation depoliticizes carceral violence and absolves colonialism of its role in imprisonment

Nichols, 2014 (Robert, Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, “The Colonialism of Incarceration,” *Radical Philosophy Review* 17.2 (2014): 435-455)

Much of the survey above is known. Although the general trajectory of critical prison studies has been driving towards the kind of distinctly political critique of carceral expansion outlined above, the field nevertheless still remains fixated primary upon causal explanations. To be clear, I am not suggesting that explicating the sociological causes of prison growth over the last thirty years or so is unworthy of time and attention. However no causal explanation, however complex and nuanced, can satisfy our need for a normative critique. And in this regard, historically and in the present, the indigenous peoples of North America provided indispensible tools since their critical praxis (decolonization) has always primarily focused on a robust normative critique of state sovereignty as such, and only secondarily upon its racist implementations. The focus of indigenous peoples' struggles has always been the imposition of the Euro-American state apparatus itself. This critique imports a broader perspective, one that activists from various other traditions (indigenous and non) can learn from and must contend with. In light of this perspective, sociological and demographic analysis of racialized incarcerated populations is inadequate when thinking about the political form of carceral power in North America. The colonial violence of carceral power in North America is not exclusively or even predominately a function of the number or proportion of racialized bodies within institutions. Moreover framing the matter in this way may exacerbate the problem. When the critique of incarceration rests upon the over-representation of racialized bodies within penal institutions, this tacitly renders carcerality as a dehistoricized tool of state power—even if distorted by the pathological effects of a racist society—displacing an account of the continuity and linkages between carcerality state formation and territorialized sovereignty. As indigenous scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred, Joanne Barker, Glen Coulthard, and Audra Simpson (inter alia) have consistently argued, unlike other racialized populations in North America, indigenous peoples constituted self-governing political communities prior to the imposition of European state and market forms.22 Their continued sovereign presence on the North American continent attests then not only to the failure of a series of projects of racial population management, but also fundamentally calls into question the very legitimacy of Euro-American states themselves. The central role of policing, prisons and the criminal justice system in the maintenance and reproduction of the state form is therefore challenged in a manner that exceeds the paradigm of over-representation. Moving beyond the over-representation model means then asking after the political function of the carceral system as a whole beyond that of racialized bodies within. In so doing, we confront a series of new questions: How can we analyze carceral power in the context of an ongoing denial of indigenous peoples not merely as individuals, nor even as "populations," but as self-organizing, self-governing political collectivities? How are we to apprehend the cataloguing and deploying of statistical evidence itself in this situation, especially when the evidentiary record is itself so indebted to a state apparatus of monitoring, tracking, and documenting indigenous bodies?23 How do we draw upon such statistical evidence while recognizing that these numbers constitute bodies as "populations" in a context of a depoliticizing biopolitics of surplus humanity and human management?24 Returning once more to the Canadian case then, indigenous peoples do not merely represent racialized bodies produced by a biopolitics of population management. Rather—and this is the radical actuality that must always be held at bay by the state—they constitute alternative political, economic, ecological and spiritual systems of ordering, governing, and relating. In the context of ongoing occupation, usurpation, dispossession and ecological devastation, no level of representation in one of the central apparatuses of state control and formalized violence would be proportionate. Instead, indigenous sovereignty itself calls forth an alternative normativity that challenges the very existence of the carceral system, let alone its internal organization and operation.

### Erasure

#### The 1AC is an erasure of the territoriality of the prison-industrial complex – only a recentering of place can resolve the violence of the carceral state.

Nichols, 2014 (Robert, Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, “The Colonialism of Incarceration,” *Radical Philosophy Review* 17.2 (2014): 435-455)

Ruth Gilmore has persuasively argued that if we are to understand and properly subject carceral power to an effective critique then we must not only "develop complex understandings of how prisoners became so massively available as carceral objects"—a matter surely deeply rooted in processes of racialization—but we must also "figure out how the ground the prisons stand on becomes available for such a purpose."34 In thinking about how this ground becomes available, Gilmore has in mind the manner in which a permanent crisis in the workfare-welfare state has been literally displaced onto the landscape of relatively low-density rural communities, which has produced new opportunities and demands for land grabbing. However highlighting the colonialism of incarceration further draws our attention to the territorial foundation of prison expansion in a deeper and longer history. It forces consideration of the politics of territoriality in North America in a variety of forms, including the ways in which territorialized sovereignty aspires to impose an exclusivity and singularity of command and control that obliterates alternative normative orders beneath and beyond its aegis. At the most immediate level, criminalized capture by the state is about management of "disorderly populations" through isolation. As Allen Feldman famously put it: "Arrest is the political art of individualizing disorder."35 Of course, isolation and sequester are always already geospatial and are thus implicated in territoriality in a general sense. Prisons are a spatial and territorialized matrix of punishment and control inasmuch as they attempt to provide geographical solutions to socio-economic and political contradictions (in the form of cages, walls and other technologies of isolation and segregation). As Gilmore forcefully put this point, incapacitation doesn't pretend to change anything about people except where they are. It is in a simple-minded way then, a geographical solution that purports to solve social problems by extensively and repeatedly removing people from disordered, deindustrialized milieus and depositing them somewhere else.36 Prisons certainly operate through geospatial media in this general sense, sharing a certain continuity with other technologies of spatial control such as "ghettoization." As a result, there is overlap here with other important experiences of for instance, African American subjugation and control. Prisons, ghettos, and other tools of capture and separation exhibit a revealing morphological continuity.37 Attending to the historical experience of indigenous peoples, however these general geospatial formations are re- focused through another lens of territoriality—settler colonialism and land acquisition—reframing Gilmore's considerations on the territorial foundation of the prison apparatus. Indigenous (Dene) political theorist Glen Coulthard provides a succinct and precise definition from which we may begin to bring the colonial-territorial politics to the fore here. He designates a "colonial relationship" in terms of the distinct form of domination it engenders. Colonialism is: A relationship where power—in this case, interrelated discursive and non-discursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority. In this respect, Canada is no different than any other settler-colonial power: in the Canadian context, colonial domination continues to be structurally oriented around the state’s longstanding commitment to maintain—through force, fraud, and more recently so-called "negotiations"—ongoing access to the land that contradictorily provides the material and spiritual sustenance of Indigenous societies on the one hand, and the foundation of colonial state- formation, settlement and capitalist development on the other.38 Coupling Coulthard’s work with the emergent field of settler colonial studies brings into focus the extent to which state and market formation in North America has always been intimately bound up with land acquisition and resettlement, and that these have called forth distinct ideologies rooted in notions of agrarianism, territorial possession and improvement. The defining feature of this particular political formation is not the appropriation of labour, nor the subjugation of indigenous self-governing powers (although these are both also present). Rather, as James Tully reminds us, "the ground of the relation is the appropriation of the land, resources, and jurisdiction of indigenous peoples, not only for the sake of resettlement and exploitation ..., but for the territorial foundations of the dominant society itself."39 Or as Patrick Wolfe states rather more bluntly: "Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element."40 Contemporary critical theory has largely evaded an analysis of territoriality and its relationship to classical colonial formations, oftentimes staking much on a supposed movement towards a decentred, deterritorialized, virtual or "postmodern" Empire thought to have succeeded the older land- based form of colonial power that held sway over an era now imagined as distant to us.41 However viewed from the vantage point of indigenous struggles, settler colonialism and—our focus here—carceral power as it is subtended by colonialism, predictions of a neoliberal hollowed-out state and/ or a deterritorialized Empire appear not merely premature but inattentive to the dialectical inversion of these tendencies, that is, to the processes of concretization and the persistence of fixity, rigidity and territoriality. Thinking through carceral power and indigenous incarceration, we can here in- stead ask after the continuation of classical state building practices, including its hard infrastructure, as well as classical colonial relationships to land acquisition and dispossession that have provided the literal terrain upon which biopolitical population management techniques as segregation and sequester rest, observing not only that these remain central to the global organization of capital and biopower but that such forces are in fact advancing rather than melting away. Work by political theorist Wendy Brown stands as an exception to this general occlusion in as much as she has attended to the paradoxes of the territoriality of contemporary sovereignty by highlighting the continued importance of walls, fences, borders, and barriers to the organization of political space. Brown notes that what we have come to call “globalization” in fact harbors fundamental tensions between opening and barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription. These tensions materialize as increasingly liberalized borders, on the one hand, and the devotion of unprecendented funds, energies, and technologies to border fortification, on the other.42 In other words, while capital and military technology is increasingly deterritorialized and fluid, it is so only through the reassertion of rigidity fixity and territorial segmentation for certain populations. And, quite rightly Brown draws a line of continuity between the contemporary resurgence of concrete barriers and the historical lineage of settler colonialism and land appropriations. In this way, she provides tools for understanding how the regulation of political space is not merely about the construction (or removal) of any specific walls, fences, or cages, but more properly "a technology of separation and domination in a complex context of settler colonialism and occupation."43 In so‐called “Indian Country,” there is nothing new about this paradoxical relationship of segregation and fluidity. Indigenous peoples are well acquainted with what Ann Laura Stoler has termed (following and building upon Foucault) the carceral archipelago of empire, which has always combined spatial isolation and confinement with linkages and connectivity—in this particular case, highlighted most dramatically by the circuit many indigenous peoples traverse today between the reserve or reservation and the prison, two sites of physical and spatial containment that are intertwined in one another.44 In settler colonial societies today, however, this reality is obscured not only by the ideological depoliticization of carceral expansion in general, but also by the delinking of prison abolitionism from decolonialism and the “land question” specifically. To speak of the colonial violence of carceral power in North America is precisely to focus attention to how incarceration facilitates dispossession, in this time, in this place.

## Mapping

#### Mapping is a product of Cartesian Enlightenment thinking. Even the aff’s remapping of settler society is indebted to a method of colonial domination which cannot be separated from their content.

Razack, 2002 (Sherene – Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education @ the University of Toronto, “When Place Becomes Race”, Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society, edited by Sherene Razack, p. 11-13, shae)

Kathleen Kirby elaborates on the individual body's relationship to space in the social/spatial configurations described above. Focusing on the respectable body, she argues, as Foucault did, that Enlightenment individualism is "inextricably tied to a specific concept of space and the technologies invented for dealing with that space."28 Kirby explains how the bourgeois citizen, the Enlightenment individual, and the figure Kirby calls "the Cartesian subject" are reducible to the same graphic schema: "The 'individual' expresses a coherent, consistent, rational space paired with a stable, organized environment."29 Cartography (the science of mapping), Kirby observes, both expresses this new subjectivity and enables it to exist. The subject who maps his space and thereby knows and controls it, is also the imperial man claiming the territories of others for his own; the inventor of terra nullius. The Cartesian or the mapping subject achieves his sense of self through keeping at bay and in place any who would threaten his sense of mastery. Maps sought to measure, standardize, and bind space, keeping the environment on the outside. Mapping the "New World" enabled Samuel de Champlain, for instance, to feel himself master of the lands he would eventually claim for the king of France. Only occasionally revealing himself to be overwhelmed by a landscape he does not know, Champlain, at such moments, considers the land itself (and its inhabitants) as inherently chaotic and unstable. 30 His sense of self is directly derived from controlling rigid boundaries and specific practices of knowledge production to create racial space, that is, space inhabited by the racial Other. Kirby's account of the Cartesian subject in space, a subject privileged enough to choose to be in unfamiliar landscapes, may be usefully contrasted with Radhika Mohanram's account of its opposite, the Black body. Mohanram describes the two bodies in terms of their racial and spatial attributes: "First, whiteness has the ability to move; second, the ability to move results in the unmarking of the body. In contrast, blackness is signified through a marking and is always static and immobilizing."31 To explain how the two bodies are imagined in a racial social order, Mohanram uses a text of the anthropologist Levi-Strauss in which he explains human intellectual activity and compares two ways of knowing-that of the engineer and the bricoleur (handyman). 32 Although Levi-Strauss does not suggest that one way of knowing is a more primitive form of thought than the other, Mohanram shows how, in Levi-Strauss's narrative, the engineer is white and male, a figure who is able to connect the laws of physics and chemistry in anthropological discourse, while the bricoleur is the native, the indigenous scientist who uses intuition, imagination, and signs to know the world. The engineer has science to guide him; the bricoleur has intuition. Significantly, while the bricoleur can only classify perceived differences, the engineer's scientific system enables him to classify things not yet seen. Thinking of Mary Louise Pratt's description of the European naturalists and cartographers who roamed Europe's colonies classifying plants and making maps with their scientific knowledge, and thus creating a European discourse about a non-European world,33 Mohanram reflects on how the bricoleur, a pre-capitalist and pre-modern figure, is tied to place while the engineer, located within capitalism and modernity, has the freedom to roam. Noting the same two figures in Alfred Cosby's book Ecological Imperialism where Europeans are described as shaping the environment of the Americas to their advantage, Mohanram comments that the European settler becomes the disembodied Universal Subject, "a subject who is able to take anyone's place." The Indigene, on the other hand, remains "immobile against the repeated onslaught of the settler."34 For the settler, it is through movement from European to non-European space that he comes to know himself, a journey that materially and symbolically secures his dominance.

## Redistribution

### Marxism/“Commons”

#### Their overly reductionist focus on economics makes no sense in the context of settler colonialism. Only the permutation, which takes the frame of colonial relations, can contest the various intersecting modes of oppression that maintain both capitalism and colonialism.

Coulthard, 2014 (Glen Sean – member of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation and an assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science @ the University of Victoria, Red Skin, White Masks, p. 10-15, shae)

But this still raises the question of how to address this residual feature of Marx's analysis. For our purposes here, I suggest that this can most effectively be accomplished by contextually shifting our investigation from an emphasis on the capital relation to the colonial relation. As suggested in his critical appraisal of Edward G. Wakefield's 1849 text, A View of the Art of Colonization, Marx was primarily interested in colonialism because it exposed some "truth" about the nature of capitalism.42 His interest in the specific character of colonial domination was largely incidental. This is clearly evident in his position on primitive accumulation. As noted already, primitive accumulation involved a dual process for Marx: the accumulation of capital through violent state dispossession resulting in proletarianization. The weight given to these constituent elements, however, is by no means equal in Marx. As he explicitly states in chapter 33 of Capital, Marx had little interest in the condition of the "colonies" as such; rather, what caught his attention was "the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World, and loudly proclaimed by it: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the ... expropriation of the worker" (emphasis added).43 When examined from this angle, colonial dispossession appears to constitute an appropriate object of critique and analysis only insofar as it unlocks the key to understanding the nature of capitalism: that capital is not a "thing” but rather a "social relation" dependent on the perpetual separation of workers from the means of production.44 This was obviously Marx's primary concern, and it has subsequently remained the dominant concern of the Marxist tradition as a whole.45 The contextual shift advocated here, by contrast, takes as its analytical frame the subject position of the colonized vis-a-vis the effects of colonial dispossession, rather than from the primary position of "the waged male proletariat [in] the process of commodity production”46 to borrow Silvia Federici's useful formulation. At least four critical insights into our settler-colonial present emerge from the resolution of these first two problems. First, by making the contextual shift in analysis from the capital-relation to the colonial-relation the inherent injustice of colonial rule is posited on its own terms and in its own right. By repositioning the colonial frame as our overarching lens of analysis it becomes far more difficult to justify in antiquated developmental terms (from either the right or the left) the assimilation of noncapitalist, non-Western, Indigenous modes of life based on the racist assumption that this assimilation will somehow magically redeem itself by bringing the fruits of capitalist modernity into the supposedly "backward" world of the colonized.47 In a certain respect, this was also the guiding insight that eventually led Marx to reformulate his theory after 1871. Subsequently, in the last decade of his life, Marx no longer condemns non-Western and noncapitalist social formations to necessarily pass through the destructive phase of capitalist development as the condition of possibility for human freedom and flourishing. During this period, Marx had not only come to view more clearly how certain features of noncapitalist and capitalist modes of production "articulate" (albeit asymmetrically) in a given social formation, but also the ways in which aspects of the former can come to inform the construction of radical alternatives to the latter.48 A similar insight informed Kropotkin's early critique of Marx as well. The problem for Kropotkin was that Marx not only drew an "erroneous division'' between the history of state dispossession and what has proven to be its persistent role in the accumulation process, but that this also seemed to justify in crude developmentalist terms the violent dispossession of place-based, non-state modes of self-sufficient Indigenous economic, political, and social activity, only this time to be carried out under the auspices of the coercive authority of socialist states. This form of dispossession would eventually come to be championed by Soviet imperialists under the banner socialist primitive accumulation.49 I suggest that by shifting our analytical frame to the colonial relation we might occupy a better angle from which to both anticipate and interrogate practices of settler-state dispossession justified under otherwise egalitarian principles and espoused with so-called "progressive" political agendas in mind. Instead, what must be recognized by those inclined to advocate a blanket "return of the commons" as a redistributive counterstrategy to the neoliberal state's new round of enclosures, is that, in liberal settler states such as Canada, the "commons" not only belong to somebody-the First Peoples of this land-they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior that harbor profound insights into the maintenance of relationships within and between human beings and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity, non-exploitation and respectful coexistence. By ignoring or downplaying the injustice of colonial dispossession, critical theory and left political strategy not only risks becoming complicit in the very structures and processes of domination that it ought to oppose, but it also risks overlooking what could prove to be invaluable glimpses into the ethical practices and preconditions required for the construction of a more just and sustainable world order. The second insight facilitated by this contextual shift has to do with the role played by Indigenous labor in the historical process of colonial-capital accumulation in Canada. It is now generally acknowledged among historians and political economists that following the waves of colonial settlement that marked the transition between mercantile and industrial capitalism (roughly spanning the years 1860-1914, but with significant variation between geographical regions), Native labor became increasingly (although by no means entirely) superfluous to the political and economic development of the Canadian state.50 Increased European settlement combined with an imported, hype-rexploited non-European workforce meant that, in the post-fur trade period, Canadian state-formation and colonial-capitalist development required first and foremost land, and only secondarily the surplus value afforded by cheap, Indigenous labor.51 This is not to suggest, however, that the long-term goal of indoctrinating the Indigenous population to the principles of private property, possessive individualism, and menial wage work did not constitute an important feature of Canadian Indian policy. It did. As the commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1890 wrote: "The work of sub-dividing reserves has begun in earnest. The policy of destroying the tribal or communist system is assailed in every possible way and every effort [has been] made to implant a spirit of individual responsibility instead.”52 When this historical consideration is situated alongside the contemporary fact that there has been, first, a steady increase in Native migration to urban centers over the last few decades, and, second, that many First Nation communities are situated on or near lands coveted by the resource exploitation industry, it is reasonable to conclude that disciplining Indigenous life to the cold rationality of market principles will remain on state and industry's agenda for some time to follow. 53 In this respect Marx's thesis still stands. What I want to point out, rather, is that when related back to the primitive accumulation thesis it appears that the history and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. Just as importantly, I would also argue that dispossession continues to inform the dominant modes of Indigenous resistance and critique that this relationship has provoked. Stated bluntly, the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous anticapitalism, is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land – a struggle not only for land in the material sense, but also deeply informed by what the land as system of reciprocal relations and obligations can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms-and less around our emergent status as "rightless proletarians.”54 I call this place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and practice grounded normativity, by which I mean the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships with human and nonhuman others over time. The third insight to flow from this contextual shift corresponds to a number of concerns expressed by Indigenous peoples, deep ecologists, defenders of animal rights, and other advocates of environmental sustainability regarding perceived "anti-ecological" tendencies in Marx's work. Although this field of criticism tends to be internally diverse-and some have argued, overstated (I am thinking here of eco-socialists like Joel Kovel and John Bellamy Foster) – at its core it suggests that Marx's perspectives on nature adhered to an instrumental rationality that placed no intrinsic value on the land or nature itself and that this subsequently led him to uncritically champion an ideology of productivism and unsustainable economic progress. 55 From the vantage point of the capital relationship-which, I have argued, tends to concern itself most with the adverse structural and ideological effects stemming from expropriated labor-land is not exploitable, people are. I believe that reestablishing the colonial relation of dispossession as a co-foundational feature of our understanding of and critical engagement with capitalism opens up the possibility of developing a more ecologically attentive critique of colonial-capitalist accumulation, especially if this engagement takes its cues from the grounded normativity of lndigenous modalities of place-based resistance and criticism. And finally, the fourth insight that flows from the contextual shift advocated here involves what many have characterized as Marx's (and orthodox Marxism's) economic reductionism. It should be clear in the following pages that there is much more at play in the contemporary reproduction of settler-colonial social relations than capitalist economics; most notably, the host of interrelated yet semi-autonomous facets of discursive and nondiscursive power briefly identified earlier. Although it is beyond question that the predatory nature of capitalism continues to play a vital role in facilitating the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous peoples in Canada, it is necessary to recognize that it only does so in relation to or in concert with axes of exploitation and domination configured along racial, gender, and state lines. Given the resilience of these equally devastating modalities of power, I argue that any strategy geared toward authentic decolonization must directly confront more than mere economic relations; it has to account for the multifarious ways in which capitalism, patriarchy; white supremacy; and the totalizing character of state power interact with one another to form the constellation of power relations that sustain colonial patterns of behavior, structures, and relationships. I suggest that shifting our attention to the colonial frame is one way to facilitate this form of radical intersectional analysis.56 Seen from this light, the colonial relation should not be understood as a primary locus or "base" from which these other forms of oppression flow, but rather as the inherited background field within which market, racist, patriarchal, and state relations converge to facilitate a certain power effect-in our case, the reproduction of hierarchical social relations that facilitate the dispossession of our lands and self-determining capacities. Like capital, colonialism, as a structure of domination predicated on dispossession, is not "a thing,'' but rather the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking oppressive social relations that constitute it. When stated this way, it should be clear that shifting our position to highlight the ongoing effects of colonial dispossession in no way displaces questions of distributive justice or class struggle; rather, it simply situates these questions more firmly alongside and in relation to the other sites and relations of power that inform our settler-colonial present.

### Historical Materialism

#### Historical materialism’s modernist approach to historical necessity is Eurocentric because it rate a particular civilizations development according to European standards.

Coulthard, 2014 (Glen Sean – member of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation and an assistant professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science @ the University of Victoria, Red Skin, White Masks, p. 8-10, shae)

To my mind, then, for Indigenous peoples to reject or ignore the insights of Marx would be a mistake, especially if this amounts to a refusal on our part to critically engage his important critique of capitalist exploitation and his extensive writings on the entangled relationship between capitalism and colonialism. As Tsimshian anthropologist Charles Menzies writes, "Marxism retains an incisive core that helps understand the dynamics of the world we live.” It "highlights the ways in which power is structured through ownership" and exposes the state's role "in the accumulation of capital and the redistribution of wealth from the many to the few.”32 All of this is not to suggest, however, that Marx's contributions are without flaw; nor is it meant to suggest that Marxism provides a ready-made tool for Indigenous peoples to uncritically appropriate in their struggles for land and freedom. As suggested above, rendering Marx's theoretical frame relevant to a comprehensive understanding of settler-colonialism and Indigenous resistance requires that it be transformed in conversation with the critical thought and practices of Indigenous peoples themselves. In the spirit of fostering this critical dialog, I suggest that three problematic features of Marx's primitive accumulation thesis are in need of such a transformation. The first feature involves what many critics have characterized as Marx's rigidly temporal framing of the phenomenon. As early as 1899, for example, anarchist geographer Peter Kropotkin made note of what seemed to be an "erroneous division'' drawn in Marx "between the primary [or primitive] accumulation of capital and its present day formulation.” 33 The critical point here, which many contemporary writers have subsequently picked up on, is that Marx tended to portray primitive accumulation as if it constituted "a process confined to a particular (if indefinite) period-one already largely passed in England, but still underway in the colonies at the time Marx wrote.”34 For Marx, although the era of violent, state dispossession may have inaugurated the accumulation process, in the end it is "the silent compulsion of economic relations" that ultimately "sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker.”35 This formulation, however, clearly does not conform well to our present global reality. As the recent work of scholars as diverse as David Harvey; Silvia Federici, Taiaiake Alfred, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Andrea Smith (to name but a few) have highlighted, the escalating onslaught of violent, state-orchestrated enclosures following neoliberalism's ascent to hegemony has unmistakably demonstrated the persistent role that unconcealed, violent dispossession continues to play in the reproduction of colonial and capitalist social relations in both the domestic and global contexts.36 The second feature that needs to be addressed concerns the normative developmentalism that problematically underscored Marx's original formulation of the primitive accumulation thesis. I stress "original" here because Marx began to reformulate this teleological aspect of his thought in the last decade of his life, and this reformulation has important implications with respect to how we ought to conceptualize the struggles of non-Western societies against the violence that has defined our encounter with colonial modernity. For much of his career, however, Marx propagated within his writings a typically nineteenth-century modernist view of history and historical progress. This developmentalist ontology provided the overarching frame from which thinkers as diverse as Immanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith sought to unpack and historically rank variation in "human cultural forms and modes of production'' according to each form's "approximation to the full development of the human good.”37 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, this modernist commitment often led Marx (along with Engels) to depict those non-Western societies deemed to be positioned at the lower end of this scale of historical or cultural development as "people without history," existing "separate from the development of capital and locked in an immutable present without the capacity for historical innovation.”38 As a result, Marx's most influential work tends to not only portray primitive accumulation as a historical phenomenon in the sense that it constituted a prior or transitional stage in the development of the capitalist mode of production, but that it was also a historically inevitable process that would ultimately have a beneficial effect on those violently drawn into the capitalist circuit. Take, for instance, Marx's often quoted 1853 New York Tribune writings on colonial rule in India. There he suggests that, although vile and barbaric in practice, colonial dispossession would nonetheless have the "revolutionary" effect of bringing the "despotic/ "undignified/' and "stagnant" life of the Indians into the fold of capitalist-modernity and thus onto the one true path of human development- socialism.39 Just as Hegel had infamously asserted before him that Africa exists at the "threshold of World History" with "no movement or development to exhibit/' Marx would similarly come to declare that "Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history.”40 Clearly, any analysis or critique of contemporary settler-colonialism must be stripped of this Eurocentric feature of Marx's original historical metanarrative.41

# Impacts

### Geographies of Violence

#### The supposedly inclusive gesture of migration shifts the violence south while modeling genocidal behavior to our European allies. Rampant abuse and violence of detainees.

des Landes, 2018 (Ann – PhD in Gender and Cultural Studies from the University of Sydney, “How colonialism shapes immigration policy in the US and Australia”, *Al Jazeera*, July 2, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/colonialism-shapes-immigration-policy-australia-180625095413988.html>, shae)

While the immigration policy of many sovereign nations has some basis in such insider-outsider rhetoric, it is a particular hallmark of settler colonial states which over-state the belonging of their settler founders. The Indigenous peoples of the US and Australia had no such choice over the incursion of settlers when the nations were founded. As postcolonial theorist and anthropologist Ghassan Hage writes, this generates an approach to immigration that is best described as "the sensitivity of thieves". But apart from rhetoric, Australia and the US are also using colonial-era and colonial-like power relations to coerce poorer nations into serving their racist immigration policy. Papua New Guinea has hosted hundreds of male refugees and asylum seekers who tried to make it to Australia on Manus Island, while children and families have been living in limbo in the island nation of Nauru. This is the result of controversial deals Australia made with the two poorer nations, over which it has historically exercised dominance. Both nations were subject to Australian control for much of the last century. Papua New Guinea was a colony of Australia from 1905 to 1975. After World War I and the formation of the League of Nations, Nauru was administered under an Australian mandate. So when Australia needed to simultaneously punish border crossers and save face in the international community, it was these states it turned to. The Nauru detention centre operated between 2001 and 2008, under Howard who catalysed anti-immigrant sentiment in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US. It was opened again in 2012 by a Labor (previously in opposition to Howard's Liberal-National Coalition) government. The Manus Island centre operated between 2001 and 2003 and was also re-opened in 2012. And for the US, the situation is not that different. The success of the US' draconian immigration policies is also heavily reliant on the cooperation of poorer countries in its region. For example, it needs Mexico to detain Central American migrants before they reach the US border, and Costa Rica to provide temporary protection for them. Mexico militarised its southern border with Guatemala in 2014 at the behest of the US, which provided the funds in order to "stem the tide", as former President Barack Obama put it, of the unprecedented number of people fleeing gang and drug-related violence in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Then in 2016, when the number of asylum seekers and migrants crossing the US-Mexico border went up again, the US turned to Costa Rica to screen, process and provide temporary protection to refugees. Historical US dominance over Latin America is well-known and dates back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which defined the region as the "America's backyard". Then in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt introduced a new policy which asserted the right of the US to exercise "international police power" in Latin America. That approach of exploiting poorer nations to enforce cruel anti-immigration policies has also been adopted - perhaps unsurprisingly - by European countries. The EU has already considered the idea of establishing "processing centres" in North African countries (former European colonies) and has been also investing heavily in militarising borders in Libya and Niger. Like the EU, the US and Australia have been spending billions to "contain" migration. In 2016 the Obama administration paid $75m towards a continued effort to fortify Mexico's southern border. Detaining unaccompanied migrant children in "shelters" has reportedly cost the US taxpayers $1.3bn in 2018. Meanwhile, Australia's offshore detention of asylum seekers and refugees contributed $1bn to a total cost of more than $4bn for "border protection" policies in the last financial year. This is not to mention the human cost - on the lives and bodies of those detained in their attempts to cross the border in search of greater security. Child sexual abuse, mental illness and medical neglect are endemic in the detention centres of Manus Island and Nauru and have resulted in murders and suicides. Writing in The Huffington Post, the Kurdish journalist Behrouz Boochani, who has been held on Manus for five years, notes that, "since 2014, 12 asylum-seekers have died in these island detention centers". US immigration detention centres have been marred by similar scandals surrounding deaths of detainees as well as massive-scale sexual abuse. Recent reports have also shown that immigrant children held in US detention centres have also been exposed to horrific abuse and neglect. But amid the spending spree on militarisation and domination of poorer nations and the continuing misery and suffering of hundreds of thousands of people stranded at borders and in detention centres, there is rarely any recognition of the fact that these refugees and "migrants" have been in fact escaping wars and murderous regimes propped by the US, Australia and EU states. And that is because these countries have never stopped behaving like colonial powers on the international stage, long after colonialism was supposed to have formally ended.

# Alternatives

## Indigenous Feminism

#### Decolonial feminism ruptures the patriarchal logic which undergirds colonial occupation.

Ladner, 2008 (Kiera L. – Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Politics and Governance in the Department of Political Science @ the University of Manitoba, “Gendering Decolonization, Decolonizing Gender”, draft of a paper presented at the 80th Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/ladner.pdf>, shae)

The process of decolonizing, and in turn creating ‘post-colonial’ thinkers and societies, must be grounded in Indigenous thought, traditions and language but in so doing, the decolonization project must also be protected from would be dominators and oppressors. Decolonization must, therefore, be a gendered project. It must be a project that is grounded in Indigenous understandings of gender - understandings that often speak of multiple genders and understandings that often reify strict understandings of gender roles and responsibilities but do so within a context of respect and gender neutrality (or even one which is gender positive as was the case among the Blackfoot). These understandings may have to be rediscovered or they may simply need to dusted off which ever the case, they must be grounded in language and tradition; language and tradition that will have to be understood from within and disentangled from the penetrating forces of colonialism (a process which began with contact as traders and missionaries began the process of transforming Indigenous understandings of gender when they refused to accept Indigenous women as their equal in negotiations or in every day life). This will be an onerous task, but as Henderson reminds, it is one that is absolutely necessary. Decolonization must also be a project protected from constructions of the past or ideas of today that are used to dominate and oppress women. Facilitating this process may take great leadership, leaders that ‘construct models to help them take their bearings’ (Henderson, 2000:254) as there will be pressure to recreate gender as it is within western-eurocentric thought or how it has become imbedded in colonial institutions and Indigenous societies. Indigenous languages and histories (oral traditions which speak to creation and tell of a people’s life within a territory both prior to and post-colonization) will assist in this process as they will serve as a guide and will enable leaders to take their bearings as Indigenous languages and histories speak of an entirely different understanding of the world and can be used to begin the process of destabilizing, disentangling and decolonizing gender. Such would be the case among Nehiyaw (Plains Cree) where language is not gendered (it is next to impossible to speak of gender without speaking in terms of ones roles or responsibilities which in turn allows for multiple genders) and histories speak about respecting diversity and inclusion (Innes, 2007). While Henderson’s work speaks to the need to decolonize gender as part of the post-colonial ghost-dance (his vision of decolonization), it is in fact necessary to both gender decolonization and decolonize gender. The works of scholars such as Smith, Turpel-Lafond, Green, Monture, and Voyager highlight the need for decolonizing gender, and to some extent have begun the process of constructing those models necessary to gain bearings and journey forward. A tremendous amount of work is still needed to effectively decolonize gender in a manner that both holds true to Henderson’s vision and Indigenous language and heritage. In doing this work, scholars must not simply focus on women for predominant constructions of masculinity also have to be decolonized and constructions of masculinity grounded in language and heritage must be part of the gendering of decolonization. It is necessary to both decolonize gender and gender decolonization as these two projects are, or at very least should be, a unified project of decolonization culminating in Henderson’s post-colonial ghost dance (see Henderson 2000a and 2000b). As it stands, it is absolutely necessary to reframe decolonization as a gendered project. That is to say, to challenge the masculinist ideas that now dominate organizations such as band councils and the corresponding discourses of sovereignty and nationalism, and to reframe with gender as a central consideration. This will not be easy, but gender cannot and should not be separated from considerations of sovereignty and nationhood – to do so is to perpetuate colonization. Is not the purpose to end colonization? The truth of the matter is, you cannot do one without the other, and it will be too late to rectify the situation once Indigenous sovereignty is (re)affirmed and (re)established, as this process may only serve to solidify and institutionalize colonial understandings of gender.

## Mnemonic Reading

#### The alternative is to forefront indigeneity. A mnemonic reading of the crimes of settler society is necessary to denaturalize the logic of Manifest Destiny.

Byrd 11 [Jodi A., Associate Professor of English and American Indian Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*, 2011, p. xii-xiv] // myost

This book, then, is a journey of sorts, its method mnemonic as it places seemingly disparate histories, temporalities, and geographies into conversation in the hopes that, through enjambment, it might be possible to perceive how Indianness functions as a transit within empire. My method here suggests a reading praxis inspired by Blackfeet novelist Stephen Graham Jones's Demon Theory, in which he delineates genre as mnemonic device in order to retell the Medea story through horror narrative.1 The story of the new world is horror, the story of America a crime. To read mnemonically is to connect the violences and genocides of colonization to cultural productions and political movements in order to disrupt the elisions of multicultural liberal democracy that seek to rationalize the originary historical traumas that birthed settler colonialism through inclusion. Such a reading Indianness becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into “Indians” through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East. The familiarity of “Indianness” is salve for the liberal multicultural democracy within the settler societies that serve as empire's constituency. In the wake of this transit, and indeed as its quality as colonialist practice, one finds discordant and competing representations of diasporic arrivals and native lived experiences—what I call cacophony throughout this book—that vie for hegemony within the discursive, cultural, and political processes of representation and identity that form the basis for what Wendy Brown has identified as the states of injury and Foucault and others have termed biopolitics. Bringing indigeneity and Indians front and center to discussions of U.S. empire as it has traversed across Atlantic and Pacific worlds is a necessary intervention at this historical moment, precisely because it is through the elisions, erasures, enjambments, and repetitions of Indianness that one might see the stakes in decolonial, restorative justice tied to land, life, and grievability. As Willow Rosenberg in Joss Whedon’s television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer once said, “A vague disclaimer is nobody's friend.”3 The Transit of Empire is built upon a number of foundational premises that may or may not be givens within critical theory but that are rapidly emerging as foundational to the disciplining of American Indian and indigenous studies. First, that colonization matters. For indigenous peoples, place, land, sovereignty and memory matter. In a world growing increasingly enamored with faster, flatter, smooth, where positionality doesn't matter so much as how it is that we travel there, indigeneity matters. Second, this book temporalizes U.S. empire to the birth of the United States, and within its assumption of European colonialist agendas that sought to appropriate indigenous lands, knowledges, presences, and identities for its own use. Third, that despite cautions against original and originary within post- structuralist theory, this book asserts that there must be the possibility of the originary in the new world, and that it is located within the historical experiences of new world colonizations, genocides, and violences. There is a long line of continuity between the past and the present that has not been disrupted despite the fact that the stories we tell may or may not acknowledge that continuity. And fourth, that indigenous peoples must be central to any theorizations of the conditions of postcoloniality, empire, and death-dealing regimes that arise out of indigenous lands. We are long-memoried peoples, and we remember what happened the last time the world was flat.4

## Refusal

#### Refusal is not a general method but a particular choice which sets limits on the expansion of colonial knowledge.

Tuck & Yang, 2014 (Eve – Associate Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies @ the State University of New York at New Paltz, and K. Wayne – Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department @ UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research”, <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>, shae)

At this juncture, we don’t intend to offer a general framework for refusal, because all refusal is particular, meaning refusal is always grounded in historical analysis and present conditions. Any discussion of Simpson’s article would need to attend to the significance of real and representational sovereignty in her analysis and theorizing of refusal. The particularities of Kahnawake sovereignty throb at the center of each of the three dimensions of refusal described above. We caution readers against expropriating Indigenous notions of sovereignty into other contexts, or metaphorizing sovereignty in a way that permits one to forget that struggles to have sovereignty recognized are very real and very lived. Yet from Simpson’s example, we are able to see ways in which a researcher might make transparent the coloniality of academic knowledge in order to find its ethical limits, expand the limits of sovereign knowledge, and expand decolonial representational territories. This is in addition to questions her work helpfully raises about who the researcher is, who the researched are, and how the historical/ representational context for research matters. One way to think about refusal is how desire can be a framework, mode, and space for refusal. As a framework, desire is a counterlogic to the logics of settler colonialism. Rooted in possibilities gone but not foreclosed, “the not yet, and at times, the not anymore” (Tuck, 2010, p. 417), desire refuses the master narrative that colonization was inevitable and has a monopoly on the future. By refusing the teleos of colonial future, desire expands possible futures. As a mode of refusal, desire is a “no” and a “yes.” Another way to think about refusal is to consider using strategies of social science research to further expose the complicity of social science disciplines and research in the project of settler colonialism. There is much need to employ social science to turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon. This form of refusal might include bringing attention to the mechanisms of knowledge legitimation, like the Good Labkeeping Seal of Approval (discussed under Axiom III); contesting appropriation, like the collection of pain narratives; and publicly renouncing the diminishing of Indigenous or local narratives with blood narratives in the name of science, such as in the Havasupai case discussed under Axiom II. As long as the objects of research are presumably damaged communities in need of intervention, the metanarrative of social science research remains unchallenged: which is that research at worst is simply an expansion of common knowledge (and therefore harmless), and that research at best is problem solving (and therefore beneficial). This metanarrative justifies a host of interventions into communities, and treats communities as frontiers to civilize, regardless of the specific conclusions of individual research projects. Consider, for example, well-intended research on achievement gaps that fuels NCLB and testing; the documentation of youth violence that provides the rationales for gang injunctions and the expansion of the prison industrial complex; the documentation of diabetes as justification for unauthorized genomic studies and the expansion of anti-Indigenous theories. Instead, by making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of social science research, researchers may bring to a halt or at least slow down the machinery that allows knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life. Thus, this form of refusal might also involve tracking the relationships between social science research and expansions of state and corporate violence against communities. Social science researchers might design their work to call attention to or interrogate power, rather than allowing their work to serve as yet another advertisement for power. Further, this form of refusal might aim to leverage the resources of the academy to expand the representational territories fought for by communities working to thwart settler colonialism. We close this chapter with much left unsaid. This is both because there is so much to say, and also because, as we have noted, all refusal is particular. Refusal understands the wisdom in a story, as well as the wisdom in not passing that story on. Refusal in research makes way for other r-words—for resistance, reclaiming, recovery, reciprocity, repatriation, regeneration. Though understandings of refusal are still emergent, though so much is still coming into view, we want to consolidate a summary of take-away points for our readers. A parting gift, of sorts, as each of us takes our leave to map our next steps as researchers, as community members, within and without academe. We think of this list as a tear-away sheet, something to cut out and carry in your pocket, sew into a prayer flag, or paste into your field notebooks. What can be said about refusal in social science research? Refusal can be a generative stance for humanized researchers. Refusal is not just a “no.” Refusal must be situated in a critical understanding of settler colonialism and its regimes of representation (i.e., the disappearance of Indigenous people, the enslavability and murderability of Black people, the right to make interdictions on Othered lives). Refusal makes space for desire and other representational territories, such as making the spectator the spectacle, and turning settler colonial knowledge back on itself. Refusal is multidimensional, in dynamic relationship between communities who refuse, the researched who refuse, and the researcher who refuses—or who do not. Social science knowledge is settler colonial knowledge. It also refuses (refuses the agency, personhood, and theories of the researched), and it also set limits (limits the epistemologies of the colonized/colonizable/to-be-colonized) and hides its own refusals and limits in order to appear limitless. Thus, refusal makes visible the processes of settler colonial knowledge. Refusal, by its very existence and exercise, sets limits on settler colonial knowledge. Similarly, refusal denudes power (and power-knowledge) without becoming an advertisement for power. Refusal problematizes hidden or implicit theories of change. Most efficacious might be the refusal by the researcher, how she determines the limits on what she can ask or what she will write. This refusal might take the form of: turning off the tape recorder; not disclosing what was on the tape even if it was recorded; hearing a story and choosing to listen and learn from it rather than report it; resisting the draw to traffic theories that cast communities as in need of salvation.

## Refuse Economics

#### Refuse white economics.

Arruda, 2016 (James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics”, Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto, <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>, shae)

Revolutionary Indigenous feminist theorists developed critical refusals to colonial epistemologies—meant to control Indigenous peoples and manage differences—forced against their bodies and their communities (Maracle, 1996; Simpson A. , 2014; Gaztambide-Fernández & Tuck, 2013; Flowers, 2015). Indigenous feminism also refuses economics epistemology grounded on oppressive beliefs and in nations occupying Indigenous lands and territories. In I am Woman, revolutionary feminist Lee Maracle (1996) concisely critiques economics epistemology. The author points at the anxieties of White Settler heterosexual male economists. For example, Maracle (1996) argues that the use of mathematics reduces our understanding of love, making homosexuality abnormal. The author also contends, “White men cannot stop thinking in terms of mathematical norms” (Maracle, 1996, p. 136). The white male perception is thus “completely divorced from any sense of humanity” and not “born of the natural world” (Maracle, 1996, p. 136). All in all, if we realize that “all decision-making is subjective and emotional” then economics epistemology is a product of “the rational thinkers among the Europeans [who] struggled to rationalize their own emotional attitudes and re-name their beliefs in vain” (Maracle, 1996, p. xi). As explained earlier, mainstream economists will not reform prior beliefs even when confronted with obvious political contradictions. Thus, mainstream economics copes with its anxieties by reproducing its futurity unto Indigenous peoples, nations, territories, and land; dismissing Indigenous nations of their distinct and respective economics knowledge and systems. Moreover, paraphrasing Lee Maracle (1996, p. 136), if prior beliefs are formed by the “unnatural condition of racism” then “internalized racism is the natural response […] Likewise is hating the perpetrators of racism.” Resentment of knowledge production is natural when prior beliefs are abnormal. Professor Glen Coulthard (2016, p. 157) also argues that resentment is a natural response to colonialism—“a politicized expression of Indigenous anger and outrage directed against a structural and symbolic violence that still subtly structures our lives, our relations with others, and our relationships with land.” Resentment powerfully generates refusals (‘no’) to economic and cultural rights handed down by the Settler state through forms of recognition and reconciliation that reproduce colonial relationships (Coulthard, 2016). In turn, refusals embody diverse affirmations (‘yes’), generating “forms of decolonized subjectivity and anticolonial practice” (Coulthard, 2014, p. 128). For Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang (2014, p. 812), Indigenous refusals of undesired research are generative stances, returning the burden of scrutiny and exposure unto “settler colonialism, and other colonial configurations, White supremacy, heteropatriarchy, and the pursuit of wealth by some at the expense of others [which] have indeed caused pain in the lives of real people.” Refusing Settler colonial economic knowledge production that seeks to ‘rationalize’ and ‘inferiorize’ Indigenous peoples turns the investigative gaze onto the economist, his institutions and epistemologies—“a deliberate shift in the unit of analysis, away from people, and toward the relationships between people and institutions of power” (Tuck & Yang, 2014, p. 815). The analytical shift is absolutely conceivable, as shown by the recent philosophical trend in accounting (Buhr, 2011).

## Solves Capitalism

#### Decolonization results in sustainable alternative to the capitalist economy.

Coulthard, 2013 (Glen – member of the Yellowknives (Weledeh) Dene First Nation and Assistant Professor in the First Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science @ the University of British Columbia, “For Our Nations to Live, Capitalism Must Die”, November 5, <http://nationsrising.org/for-our-nations-to-live-capitalism-must-die/>, shae)

What forms might an Indigenous political-economic alternative to the intensification of capitalism on and within our territories take? For some communities, reinvigorating a mix of subsistence-based activities with more contemporary economic ventures is one alternative. In the 1970s, for example, the Dene Nation sought to curtail the negative environmental and cultural impacts of capitalist extractivism by proposing to establish an economy that would apply traditional concepts of Dene governance – decentralized, regional political structures based on participatory, consensus decision-making – to the realm of the economy. At the time, this would have seen a revitalization of a bush mode of production, with emphasis placed on the harvesting and manufacturing of local renewable resources through traditional activities like hunting, fishing, and trapping, potentially combined with and partially subsidized by other economic activities on lands communally held and managed by the Dene Nation. Economic models discussed during the time thus included the democratic organization of production and distribution through Indigenous co-operatives and possibly worker-managed enterprises. Revisiting Indigenous political-economic alternatives such as these could pose a real threat to the accumulation of capital on Indigenous lands in three ways. First, through mentorship and education these economies reconnect Indigenous people to land-based practices and forms of knowledge that emphasize radical sustainability. This form of grounded normativity is antithetical to capitalist accumulation. Second, these economic practices offer a means of subsistence that can over time help break our dependence on the capitalist market by cultivating self-sufficiency through the localized and sustainable production of core foods and life materials that we distribute and consume within our own communities on a regular basis. Third, through the application of Indigenous governance principles to non-traditional economic activities we open up a way of engaging in contemporary economic ventures in an Indigenous way that is better suited to foster sustainable economic decision-making, an equitable distribution of resources within and between Indigenous communities, Native women’s political and economic emancipation, and empowerment for Indigenous citizens and workers who may or must pursue livelihoods in sectors of the economy outside of the bush. Why not critically apply the most egalitarian and participatory features of our traditional governance practices to all of our economic activities, regardless of whether they are undertaken in land-based or urban contexts? Cities are on Indigenous land too, and a hell of a lot of us currently live in them.

# Answers To

## Perm

#### The permutation is a settler move to innocence. Voting neg is necessary to produce settler discomfort---anything less allows for settler recuperation.

Tuck & Yang, 2012 (Eve, Unangax;SUNY-New Paltz, and K. Wayne, UC-San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1.1 (2012): 9-10, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630/15554>, JKS)

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve. In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.8 She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence’, “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335). Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, “I don’t experience the problems you do, so I don’t think about it,” and “tell me what to do, you’re the experts here” (p. 103). “The commonsense appeal of such statements,” Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations” (ibid.). In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we call ‘settler moves to innocence’. Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

## “Natives Were Migrants”/Land Bridge

#### The notion that indigenous people were migrants over the land bridge is a settler move to innocence.

Hurwitz and Bourque, 2014 (Laura, and Shawn, “Settler Colonialism Primer”, June 6, <https://unsettlingamerica.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/settler-colonialism-primer/>, shae)

Settler Moves to Innocence Settler identity has been built on a denial of settlers as non-Indigenous and a rejection of Indigenous Peoples rights to the land. The initial theft of land was often justified by terra nullius, that is viewing the land as empty and virgin, or at least not used to its fullest potential by Indigenous Peoples. Another complexity to settler identity is explained by wolfe: On the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, accordingly, its independence—from the mother country. A product of this schizo settler identity; simultaneously denying Indigenous Peoples rights, claiming to be “native” and also wanting to be morally absolved of responsibility for the known atrocities that settler sovereignty rests upon, have been referred to as “moves to innocence.” As Tuck and Yang write, There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of moves to innocence (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Some of these moves to innocence include: Settler Nativism “In this move to innocence, settlers locate or invent a long-lost ancestor who is rumored to have had “Indian blood,” and they use this claim to mark themselves as blameless in the attempted eradications of Indigenous peoples.” As Vine Deloria points out, the relative is almost always an Indian grandmother. Tuck and Yang explain that the claiming of an Indian grandmother not a grandfather fits into the history of rape and sexual assault against Indian women and the racilization and assimilation practices of settler society. Fantasizing Adoption “These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping.” Often settlers see being adopted as a way out of guilt and creating a place for themselves on the land absolved from settler status, which as Tuck and Yang point out, “is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along.” Colonial Equivocation In this move to innocence, settler colonialism and oppression/exploitation are conflated which, “creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work.” As they put it, “‘We are all colonized,’ may be a true statement but is deceptively embracive and vague, its inference: ‘None of us are settlers.’” Conscientization or Free Your Mind and the Rest Will Follow This is the idea if we change our thinking social conditions will transform. Although we all do need to decolonize our minds, this is just a start. It is more comfortable for settlers to focus on consciousness raising then confront the more unsettling undertaking of handing over stolen land and material privilege. Other Observed Moves to Innocence There are as many moves to innocence as there are settlers. Here we present a non-exhaustive list of observed examples. Indians are Drunk and Violent This move to Innocence is born of both the “Natives as savages” myth and the “degenerating/disappearing Native” myth. Settlers can justify their place by viewing Indigenous peoples as not Indigenous enough nor productive enough to deserve their land. Here Indigenous peoples become the scapegoat and the system of settler colonialism is left unquestioned. Often this move extrapolates that settlers are also more suitable stewards of the land, justifying their ownership and occupation. One Love/One People This is similar to the “colonial equivocation” move, yet it has been depoliticized. Settlers attest to their lack of regard for the race, creed or color of people and belief that all of humanity is one people. How could the idea of equality and unity among people be a settler move to innocence? These sweeping claims of a “color blind” world are easy to assert from a position of power and privilege. Distinct rights of Indigenous sovereignty and claims to the land are glossed over. Despite the fact that all people belong to the human family we cannot all be one people while settler colonial systems remain intact. Land Bridge/Migration In this move settlers use a historical “out” describing how people have always migrated around the planet and how Indigenous people’s themselves migrated here. What this fails to take into account—besides Indigenous accounts of their own origin—is the vast time that Indigenous Peoples have inhabited, managed and coexisted with their homelands. Not to mention the silencing of violence which has displaced Indigenous peoples; migrants join a culture, settlers eradicate them.

# Aff Answers

## Framework

### Immigration – Alt Facts

#### Debating and researching immigration policy is key to confront “alternative facts” that perpetuate Trump’s racist anti-immigrant policies.

Daftary, 2018 (Ashley-Marie Hanna Daftary is a Ph.D. in Social Work, University of Denver. February 28, 2018 “Confronting Immigration Myths with the Reality: A Necessary Perspective for Culturally Grounded Social Work Practice,” Published by Smith College Studies in Social Work, University of Nevada, Reno, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 96-98, Accessed through Taylor and Francis Online)

We live in an era of “alternative facts,” where policies and practices are often proposed and drafted based on uninformed opinion instead of information grounded in years of study and scholarly research. Although not new to public and political discourse, current decisions being made regarding immigration are often based on fear and inflammatory language that alienate and harm many communities that do not identify with the dominant, white, U.S.-born population. The aim of this article is to address some of the most common myths about immigrants and immigration in the United States. The focus is on the Latino immigrant population as it is currently the largest immigrant group in the United States (Zong & Batalova, 2017). This information is foundational for social work practitioners who strive for culturally grounded practice. The author begins by discussing the relationship between the social work profession and immigration. Next, she addresses common myths and their associated truths. She concludes with a discussion of implications for social work practitioners. Social work, immigration, and the construction of immigrant identities Social work scholarship has historically presented immigrants from a community deficits perspective. Immigrants have most often been portrayed as in need of saving or in an otherwise negative light—depicted as alien, uncivilized, lacking moral character, prone to criminal behavior, and unable to assimilate to the American way of life (Park, 2006; Park & Kemp, 2006). Historically, social workers have not taken an active role in addressing those who have exploited immigrants or addressing policies and practices that have either caused or contributed to their clients’ problems. Instead social workers have often played a patriarchal role where they provided direct services (i.e., providing solutions) to immigrants (i.e., viewed as in need of protection) (Park, 2006). Today, social workers are in jeopardy of continuing this pattern. In order to avoid this, social workers must critically reflect on how social work practice is influenced by common misconceptions about immigrants. The immigration debate today is filled with misinformation and fear-inducing tactics. This misinformation colors the perspective of many individuals and communities, promoting a culture of xenophobia and fear of anyone who is foreign-born or assumed to be foreign-born (including most people of color) (Huber, Lopez, Malagon, Velez, & Solorzano, 2008). This is especially concerning as social workers find themselves working with immigrant families at increasing rates (Engstrom & Okamura, 2007). Although immigrant groups that have been targeted by fear-inducing propaganda have changed over time, the dehumanizing propaganda surrounding immigration to the United States has remained fairly consistent. Immigrants have been frequently depicted as strange, alien, and vulgar creatures that threaten the dominant (white, male, elite) culture (Hanna & Ortega, 2016; Ortega, Hanna, & Haffajee, 2014; Park, 2006; Park & Kemp, 2006). Most recently, President Donald Trump has not only characterized Mexican immigrants as drug smugglers and rapists but also discussed building a wall between the United States and Mexico with the implication that the United States needs to be protected from Mexican invaders (Fang, 2015; Trump, 2015). This rhetoric and imagery have constructed the contemporary understanding of immigrants and immigration (Chavez, 2008) and enabled Trump to have the necessary political and public support to move forward with his plan to tighten immigration policies and practices, expand the internal and border policing of immigrants, and increase the militarization of the southern border, including his initiative to build a bigger wall to protect the United States. The following section reframes the often unchallenged narrative that immigration in the United States is a problem (Chomsky, 2007). It addresses and debunks four common immigration myths and the associated truths. These four myths are: (1) The United States is being overrun by immigrants (Chavez, 2008; Khakoo, 2003; Park & Kemp, 2006). (2) Immigrants do not integrate into U.S. society (Chavez, 2008; Chomsky, 2007; Cole, 1994; Foner, 2001; Khakoo, 2003; Passel & Fix, 1994). (3) Immigrants are a fiscal and/or economic burden to the United States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996; Massey, 2005). (4) Immigrants are criminals and more prone to criminal activity (Chavez, 2008; Rumbaut, 2008). Accessing historically accurate and researched data about immigrants and immigration is a necessary step for social workers who aim to address and confront the bias and misinformation that pervade U.S. society. In addition, a more realistic representation of immigrants can help move direct service practitioners from a community deficits framework to a strengths-based and empowerment perspective. This opens the space for social workers to provide more culturally responsive services, including intervention and advocacy with the immigrant community. Furthermore, increased understanding of current myths and the associated truths surrounding immigration can help social workers engage in well-informed, balanced dialogue with other service providers, community members and leaders about immigrants and immigration in the United States. To do this, social worker practitioners must first identify misinformation. Next, they should address the misinformation referring to reliable research and scholarship as needed. Directly confronting misinformation and providing correct information to political officials, lawmakers, and voters can strengthen the likelihood that policies, practices, and decisions made by lawmakers and political officials at local, state, and federal levels will be better informed in order to support the public well-being.

### Skills

#### Debate is a site for testing ideas where students develop skills and gain education to be used for advocacy outside of the round – we don’t have to win that reading the 1AC literally leads to immigration reform but that reform is a good idea.

Welsh, 2012 (Scott Welsh, “Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 1)

Jürgen Habermas’s Toward a Rational Society (1970) and Theory and Practice (1973), two of his less widely cited early works, can help us understand the democratic significance of Fish’s distinction between academic engagement and direct political action. Like proponents of activist scholarship and critical rhetoric, Habermas aims to address the disconnection between scholarly reflection and practical, political consequences. However, by “consequences,” he does not mean the effective political agency of scholars. Rather, what he seeks is the effective democratic agency of citizens. He frames the question of the relationship between scholarship and politics, or theory and practice, as a matter of “whether a productive body of knowledge is merely transmitted to men engaged in technical manipulation for purposes of control or is simultaneously appropriated as the linguistic possession of communicating individuals” (1970, 79). Simply having effects on public discourse is not the same thing as supplying conceptual resources for citizens engaged in democratic politics. Drawing on Vico, Habermas argues that “truths which are to have consequences require a consensus prudently attained: that is the ‘semblance’ of truth in the sensus communis of citizens participating in public discourse” (1973, 73). Moreover, for such consequences to be democratic, they need to be understood and adopted by citizens pursuing their own ends (1973, 277; 1970, 61, 75). For Habermas, reducing the potential consequences of scholarship to political ones risks a return to precisely what he is against, expert manipulation and control (1970, 75). His vision of “emancipation” is figured as something that citizens can only achieve for themselves (1973, 276). In contrast, McKerrow’s critical rhetoricians, McGee’s social surgeons, Fuller’s agents of justice, and Hartnett’s social justice scholars are “performers,” principal agents acting on the public from their academic bases of power with their own particular ends in view, pursued, in practice, as settled truths. In contrast, Habermas subordinates politics to democracy. The role of scholars in the context of democratic politics is to supply conceptual resources that citizens might appropriate in their own ways. For Habermas, it is the very acceptance of the antagonism between scholarship and politics that allows the products of expert inquiry to be democratically consequential. In his early critique of critical rhetoric, John Murphy approaches this conclusion in his argument that critical rhetoricians, in their insistence on being political performers, implicitly neglect the rhetorical tradition’s guiding pedagogical concern with supporting the political agency of citizens aiming to make wise decisions in diverse and unpredictable contexts (1995, 2). However, Habermas does not ultimately propose a kind of scholarship that could itself be more self-consciously structured by the irreducible antagonism between scholarly theory and political practice. The way he originally frames the problem of the relationship between theory and practice—as a question of how to redeem “the promise of practical politics,” understood as providing practical orientation about what is right and just in a given situation, without relinquishing “the rigor of scientific knowledge”—prevents him from coming to terms with the antagonism (1973, 74). Yet for this scientific knowledge to have practical consequences within public discourse, citizens would first need to achieve a “higher stage of reflection, a consciousness of acting human beings moving forward in the direction of emancipation” to fully grasp even journalistic “translations” of scholarly research (1973, 276; 1970, 79–80). Without a fundamental reeducation of society in research literacy of all kinds, a genuinely deliberate, democratic appropriation of expert knowledge would remain impossible. Dispiritingly, such nonmanipulative expert-citizen interaction “could be guaranteed only by the ideal conditions of general communication extending to the entire public free from domination” (1970, 75). Although Habermas makes a democratic case for recognizing the unavoidable distinctiveness of scholarship and citizenship while insisting that scholarship be relevant to citizenship, he does not propose a kind of theory or critique aimed at producing a rigorously pursued scholarly product more immediately suitable for use by citizens within public discourse as it is. C. Wright Mills’s The Sociological Imagination is remarkable in that it advances an argument for a mode of scholarly reflection that takes up precisely this challenge. Although scholars advancing a vision of scholarship as political participation justly cite Mills, particularly insofar as he does not shy away from academicizing politically sensitive subjects, from drawing conclusions in publicly accessible ways, and from allowing his impatience to show (Klumpp and Hollihan 1989, 89; Wander 1990, 144–45), he nevertheless jealously guards scholarly reflection as an activity irreducible to political participation. Rather than embed it within a particular political or partisan struggle, Mills seeks to rescue social science from its connection to the political agendas of governing state bureaucracies (2000, 180). This does not mean for Mills, however, that to be a scholar is to adopt an antistate posture as a kind of reflex. It also does not mean working alongside situated political advocacy groups aiming to substitute one governing state bureaucracy for another, an approach that has been recommended. Rather, he writes, the role of reason I have been outlining neither means nor requires that one hit the pavement, take the next plane to the scene of the current crisis, run for Congress, buy a newspaper plant, go among the poor, set up a soap box. Such actions are often admirable, and I can readily imagine occasions when I should personally find it impossible not to want to do them myself. But for the social scientist to take them up as his normal activities is merely to abdicate [their] role, and to display by his action a disbelief in the promise of social science and in the role of reason in human affairs. This role requires only that the social scientist get on with the work of social science and that he avoid furthering the bureaucratization of reason and discourse. (2000, 192) Mills comes to terms with the antagonism. He aims to make a distinctly scholarly difference. He also makes clear that while the scholarly subject position often takes up residence in a body that is also inhabited by the citizen subject position, scholars being citizens is not what he is talking about. If anything, rather, Mills describes citizens being scholars or politically embedded citizens who nevertheless embrace the scholarly split in their identity. Mills is especially interesting, however, because he also proposes a mode of scholarly production that explicitly aims to respond to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political action. What scholars concerned with democracy are urged to produce are concepts suitable for citizen appropriation within the “sociological imagination.” The sociological imagination is composed of the terminologies that people in “their everyday worlds” turn to in order to make sense of the “the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world.” Such terminologies should help citizens to “use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations” (2000, 4–5). They are, ideally, “intellectual pivots” that facilitate “the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world” (2000, 7). Rhetoricians will immediately recognize Mills’s concern to produce concepts for use within the sociological imagination as sympathetic to the rhetorical concern for articulating inventional resources for use by citizens within the public sphere. Furthermore, resisting the “the magisterial discourse about the ‘requirements of science’ being on the order of centuries rather than decades,” Mills argues that scholars should not so readily assume “a view of the social sciences as a strange building-block endeavor” in which studies “can be ‘added up’ or ‘fitted together’ to ‘build up’ a reliable and verified image of the whole” (2000, 65). Such a view perpetuates the idea that if only scholars could achieve the grand synthesis or, in Habermas’s (1996) language, a theoretical account balanced perfectly “between facts and norms” and citizens could understand and appreciate it, then true democratic emancipation could be achieved. In contrast, Mills’s emphasis on supplying concepts for use within the sociological imagination invites us to recognize that, as citizens, we cannot take all of the ingeniously linked details of any grand theoretical synthesis with us. Rather, no matter how much rigorous attention to detail goes into one’s theorizing, it is only the guiding metaphor to which the theory will inevitably be reduced that can have a life within the sociological imagination (2000, 71). Since it is only the shorthand heuristic derived from the theory that has the potential to engage the sociological imagination anyway, Mills recommends the direct, rigorous pursuit of such heuristics (2000, 48).

### Simulation

#### Political simulations access greater cognitive benefits and helps students understand the functions of the government, including its faults and issues

Sands and Shelton, 2010 (Sands is an Associate Professor of Government at Berry College and Shelton is a Professor in the International Affairs department at the University of Georgia (Eric C Sands and Allison Shelton, “Learning by Doing: A Simulation for Teaching How Congress Works”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol 43 No 1, Page 133)

Learning by Doing: A Simulation tor Teaching How Congress Works Eric C. Sands, fie,rp o?kt Allison Shelton. vn rlA’ of Geo,ia ABSTRACT Teachers of political science have increasingly recognized the utility of class room simulations to provide students with an active-learning experience to enhance learning outcomes. Our article builds off this growing trend by proposing a congressional simulation to help students understand the complexities and nuances of the lawmaking process. Specifically, the simulation aids students in identifying the deliberative aspects of congressional policymaking, appreciating the complicated process involved in a bill becoming a law, understanding the multifaceted ways in which self-interest guides the decisions of congressional actors, and challenging student cynicism about Congress as an institution. The use of simulations first became popular in the education community in the sç6os as educational psychologists recognized the limited ability of student-centered activities to enhance both the cog nitive and affective (relating to value judgments absorption of knowledge (Boocok and Schild tq68; Dewey iqb6; Molt 1967; smith and Smith igóbi Over the next 40 years, this recognition evolved into a general acceptance of interactive activeities as more effective teaching methodologies than standard didactic instruction (Bandura Greenblai 1973; Greenblat and Duke tç; l-leitzmann ‘974; Kolb 1984; Maxsort 19741. Scholars grounded this acceptance in an understanding that it was through the active engagement. processing, and constructing of material that students learned, not through the mere passive reception of information typical of a lecture hall (Bolles 1988; Klionsky aooi). This conceptualization of learning extended even beyond the study of education pedagogy, as it was adopted by brain research specialists who began studying “whole brain learn ing.” or the concept of teaching to the multiple intelligences of the brain (Gorovitz igRa). As a result of this extensive scholarship, the use of simulations has become an established practice in classrooms pursuing higher- order cognitive and affective objectives. In fact, the effectiveness of simulations has been so widely established that they have been adopted in academic, business, and military settings around the world (Asia 1982: Crookall iq; Rohn 1986). To be sure, political scientists have not ignored the value that simulations play in teaching students about politics. It has long been recognized (Walcott igHo; Dodge 2983) that simulations are a valuable tool in helping students to understand the com plex dynamics of institutions and political systems, and this lesson has been applied to many areas of the discipline, including comparative politics (Shellmann loot; Galatas 2006; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997), international relations (Jefferson 1q9; %Vin ham ¡qqs; Dougherty 2003), and American politics (I4cnsley 2993; Thomas ¿col; Enderaby and Webber 1995; Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000. In short, it has become increasingly accepted by teachers of political science that simulations ‘have the power to recreate complex, dynamic political processes in the classroom, allowing students to examine the motivations, behavioral con straints, resources and interactions among institutional actors .. after a simulation, participants have a deeper understanding of institutions, their successes and failures” (Smith and Boyer 1996, óqo). There is one particular area of teaching political science that continues to vex even the best of instructors—Congress. Lee Ham ilton, a former member of the House of Representatives and a current member of the president’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, explains the problem this way: “the lack of public understanding about the institution is huge -. [and this ignorance increases the public’s suspicions and cynicism about the Congress, weakens the relationship between voters and their representatives, makes it harder for public officials to govern, and prevents our representative democracy (from working the way it should” (Hamilton 2000, 757). To overcome this lack of knowledge about Congress, Hamilton recommends the use of teaching and instructional techniques that can help students to appreciate better the complexity of the legislative process, thereby helping reduce voter cynicism and strengthen the bonds between members of Congress and their constituents.

### Demands

#### We’re not the law or state affirmation—making demands on the state challenges its legitimacy.

Newman, 2010 (Saul – Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)

There are two aspects that I would like o address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the states- say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing-is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereighnty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

## Perm

#### The perm solves – it’s impossible to define oppression in the status quo as monocausal – they might have a correct meta level thesis claim that oppression towards native americans is occurring, but the alt alone isn’t expansive enough to solve it.

**Bleiker 14** – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

## A2 Settler Innocence

#### Improvement shouldn’t be read as settler innocence – imminent critique of traditional institutions is desirable – this is also solvency for our networks perm argument

Keefer, 2007 (Tom – Editorial Committee of Upping the Anti, The Politics of Solidarity: Six Nations, Leadership, and the Settler Left, http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/04-the-politics-of-solidarity/

Learning from Black Liberation If the principle of “taking leadership” from Six Nations is deeply flawed, then what kind of model can guide the actions of non-native solidarity activists? I believe that one of the best parallels for understanding the situation can be found in the difficult relationship between the black liberation struggle and the radical white left in the US during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, the black liberation movement became a focal point for many different communities and political struggles. As black liberation moved from “non-violent” civil rights struggles to ghetto uprisings and revolutionary political formations like the Black Panther Party and the Black Liberation Army, white activists grappled with how they should relate to a clearly revolutionary struggle happening outside of their own communities.Significant theoretical elaboration of this dynamic occurred within the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an important civil rights organization that spearheaded voter registration drives in the US South. SNCC leader (and later honorary Black Panther Party Prime Minister) Stokely Carmichael wrote and spoke extensively about the relationship between white radicals and the black liberation struggle. Although written in a different political context, much of what he argued is of great relevance to the question of how non-native activists should relate to the struggle of indigenous people within the Canadian state. In a book Carmichael co-wrote with Charles Hamilton entitled Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America, they argued that black people must build their own organizations to represent their own interests. According to Carmichael, only once black people have their own “genuine power base” should they enter into coalition with white allies who, in turn, must also have their “own independent base of power.” Once each group had a power base and a political organization, they could come together in coalition to work for specific and identifiable goals. The people of Six Nations are clearly working to build and strengthen their own organizations and “genuine power bases” on their territory. That this process has been strengthened by the reclamation is clear by the growing level of community mobilization and the fact that the Canadian government has been forced to negotiate with the Six Nations Confederacy – a body that continues to gain support within the community. Unfortunately, a comparable process of radicalization and organization is not taking place in nearby non-native communities where the left remains fractured, tiny, or simply nonexistent. Carmichael and Hamilton were writing in a context of a significant upsurge of white radicalism. The problem was that, too often, the white left would ride on the coat-tails of black radicalism rather than confront sources of exploitation and oppression coming from within their own communities. As Carmichael and Hamilton noted: One of the most disturbing things about almost all white supporters has been that they are reluctant to go into their own communities – which is where the racism exists – and work to get rid of it. We are not now speaking of whites who have worked to get black people “accepted” on an individual basis, by the white society. Of these there have been many; their efforts are undoubtedly well intended and individually helpful. But too often these efforts are geared to the same false premises as integration; too often the society in which they seek acceptance of a few black people can afford to make the gesture. We are speaking, rather, of those whites who see the need for basic change and have hooked up with the black liberation movement because it seemed the most promising agent of such change.6 In the context of ongoing anti-native agitation against the Six Nations land reclamation within pre-dominantly white communities such as Caledonia, the failure of the white left to intervene has been nothing short of scandalous. Slick media savvy personalities like Gary McHale have organized dozens of rallies and public meetings based on David Duke-type arguments against “two-tiered justice” where they have effectively demanded “equal rights for whites” who are seen as oppressed because the Canadian state has not moved in to stop the “terroristic” natives. Dozens of open neo-Nazis have participated in public events organized by McHale. Despite this, the white left has not come up with a single meaningful response to the situation. While Toronto leftists tormented themselves with the question of whether or not it would be appropriate to organize in small communities where they have no pre-existing base, neo-Nazis and far right organizers plunged in, building networks and alliances that have successfully brought ever more pressure to bear on both Six Nations and the federal and provincial governments. By failing to organize within the predominantly white communities surrounding Six Nations, the white left has effectively ceded this terrain to racist demagogues and allowed McHale and his cronies to speak unopposed on behalf of the “average hard-working, taxpaying, middle-class Canadian” of the area. Despite the privilege historically enjoyed by US whites in relation to black people, Carmichael and Hamilton did not simply write them off. Unlike many leftists today, Carmichael and Hamilton did not consider white settlers incapable of leftist activity or unworthy of political organization. Not only did they view poor and working-class whites as potential allies to the black liberation struggle, they argued that even white middle-class communities needed to be organized: Across the country, smug white communities show a poverty of awareness, a poverty of humanity, indeed, a poverty of ability to act in a civilized manner toward non-Anglo human beings. The white middle-class suburbs need “freedom schools” as badly as the black communities. Anglo conformity is a dead weight on their necks too. All this is an educative role crying to be performed by those whites so inclined.8 While recognizing that white people can make certain important contributions to non-white struggles, Carmichael and Hamilton insisted that white people must not seek to live vicariously through the radical struggle of black people, but rather must take responsibility for their own communities and their role in their own liberation: It is our position that black organizations should be black-led and essentially black-staffed, with the policy being made by black people. White people can and do play very important supportive roles in these organizations. Where they come with specific skills and techniques, they will be evaluated in those terms. All too frequently, however, many young, middle-class, white Americans, like some sort of Pepsi generation, have wanted to “come alive” through the black community and black groups. They have wanted to be where the action is – and the action has been in those places. They have sought refuge among blacks from a sterile, meaningless, irrelevant life in middle-class America. They have been unable to deal with the stifling, racist, parochial, split-level mentality of their parents, teachers, preachers and friends. Carmichael and Hamilton’s words are of particular relevance to the white activists that came out to support the reclamation site during the tense period of the standoff when barricades blocked nearby highways and rail lines. For many white activists, this was the revolution, the high point of struggle, and they were living it by washing dishes or doing menial labour around the camp, or just by being there as physical or moral support. Very few of these activists made an attempt to understand why thousands of white people not so different from themselves were protesting against the reclamation site only a couple hundred yards away, or to figure out how this racism could be effectively combated. While cooking and cleaning did make a contribution to the camp, I believe that it was more effective in assuaging white guilt than it was in shifting the balance of forces arrayed against Six Nations. The focus on cooking and cleaning as the most appropriate expression of non-native solidarity flowed from the premise of “taking leadership” from Six Nations. When faced with dozens of (mostly) white hippie/punk youth with few camp-related skills and no prior contact with people at Six Nations, it is not surprising that Six Nations people directed them to do menial labour around the camp. Because this is what they were told to do, and because many of these white and/or middle-class activists were uncomfortable talking to white working-class Caledonians that they perceived as the enemy, food preparation was fetishized as the primary way for non-natives to contribute to the struggle. The possibilities of leftist non-natives intervening in the anti-native protests was never openly broached as a potential political strategy. Given that it was not safe for indigenous people to intervene in the Caledonia protests or to organize within the Caledonia community, and given that the indigenous activists at the reclamation site had their own community to organize, people from Six Nations stayed within the perimeter they had set up. Most white activists assumed that they should do the same. Like the rest of settler Canada, and like Six Nations, Caledonia is not monolithic. From the very beginning of the standoff, it was Caledonian business interests that organized resistance to the land reclamation and purported to speak on behalf of the whole community. The Caledonia Citizens Alliance was formed and funded by the Caledonia Chamber of Commerce and represents the bankers, lawyers, and realtors who stood to make vast profits from “developing” Six Nations land. Middle-class and business-oriented political organizations with deep ties to local government also played key roles in attacking Six Nations and providing support for individuals from outside of Caledonia like Gary McHale. There are certainly deep currents of anti-native racism within the community. Nevertheless, it would be truly shortsighted to label all Caledonians and settlers in the nearby area as racists or as people with interests objectively opposed to Six Nations people. First of all, there are people from Six Nations and various different ethnic groups living in Caledonia. Although they have tried for the most part to keep their heads down during the standoff, they form a potential base of support for anti-racist activity. There are also many white Caledonians who do not support the growing racism in their community and who would be willing to take action in support of Six Nations if they had a framework from within which to work. Unfortunately, because most of Caledonia’s “civil society” organizations are connected to the business interests that want to develop the Haldimand tract, such organizations must be built from the ground up. In the words of Carmichael and Hamilton: “this job cannot be left to the existing institutions and agencies, because those structures, for the most part, are reflections of institutional racism.”9 The unorganized and atomized people of Caledonia who support Six Nations include people with indigenous friends and family, church goers, high school youth, and people with no personal connection to the issue but who to varying degrees support Six Nations. Anti-native racism no doubt poses serious barriers to building solidarity with Six Nations. Nevertheless, we must recognize that white people in Caledonia are not intrinsically any more racist than white Canadians anywhere else. Caledonia is located in Ontario’s “golden horseshoe” – an area with one of the largest unionized populations per capita in North America. This concentration of trade unionists has influenced the nature of support for Six Nations. Not only have significant union organizations supported the reclamation by passing motions and sending donations, but the majority of solidarity activists involved in building groups like Community Friends are unionized workers even when they are not actively involved in the trade union movement. There are many possibilities for organizing in support of Six Nations in Caledonia and other metropolitan communities. Of particular importance are the large racialized communities in nearby cities like Hamilton, Kitchener Waterloo, and Toronto whose members experience many of the same kinds of racism and class oppression faced by the people of Six Nations. Especially because these groups live in such close proximity to one another (Six Nations is a one hour drive from each of these large population centers), it is a lot easier to build links and connections with Six Nations than with indigenous communities located thousands of miles away. In Carmichael and Hamilton’s analysis, various communities interested in working with each other should operate on the basis of developing political organizations rooted in each community that are able to work together as allies – not on the basis of one organized community providing a one-sided “leadership” to an another atomized and disorganized community: It is hoped that eventually there will be a coalition of poor blacks and poor whites. This is the only coalition which seems acceptable to us, and we see such a coalition as the major internal instrument of change in the American society. It is purely academic today to talk about bringing poor blacks and poor whites together, but the task of creating a poor white power bloc dedicated to the goals of the free open society – not one based on racism and subordination – must be attempted. The main responsibility for this task falls upon whites. Black and white can work together in the white community where possible; it is not possible, however, to go into a poor [white] southern town and talk about “integration,” or even desegregation [together]. Poor white people are becoming more hostile –not less – toward black people, partly because they see the nation’s attention focused on black poverty and few, if any, people coming to them.10 The situation today is analogous. Racism is growing in towns like Caledonia, and recent polls have suggested that non-native support for indigenous rights is decreasing as conflicts intensify. While some of this backlash clearly arises due to racism and fear that their own standard of living will inevitably decline if indigenous people gain rights, this erroneous position remains unchallenged precisely because there is so little anti-racist, anti-colonial, and anti-capitalist work taking place within non-native communities. Non-native people do not have to suffer in order for the rights of indigenous peoples to be respected, and the left needs to make the argument that the funds needed to pay reparations to native people should come from the coffers of the corporations that have profited from the plunder of native lands and the exploited labour of all workers. A radical approach to actualizing indigenous sovereignty requires both political and economic transformation – the full sovereignty of indigenous nations must be recognized and the capitalist economic system that exploits both non-natives and natives must be overturned. Organizing Our Own For non-native radicals, the fundamental question raised by the reclamation relates not only to how we organize as non-natives in solidarity with oppressed people, but also to our vision of a movement that can challenge the oppression facing the working class majority of Canadian settler society. This requires overcoming the dichotomy between two disparate positions that have long afflicted the radical left. One position holds that it is impossible to build a mass based radical movement among the (predominantly white) Canadian working class due to its relatively privileged status, while the other maintains a narrow and economistic focus on specific (white) working-class struggles without making links to the intersecting relations of race, sexuality and gender that concretely define the reality of class oppression. If we can transcend this dichotomy – that is, if we can accept that non-native North Americans can be mobilized around social and economic issues that are connected to a project of social liberation that we share with indigenous people – then new forms of solidarity and resistance can emerge. In the case of the Six Nations struggle, one urgent task is to organize among southern Ontario union activists who are supportive of the struggle for sovereignty and to build a grassroots organization that can advance indigenous and working class struggles. This strategy is not about abstractly “showing solidarity” with Six Nations. It is about building an independent and radical base in the union movement that can unite a wide range of anti-racist, anti-poverty, and class struggles which affect its members personally. Looking to organized labour for support for Six Nations is not a fantasy. In fact, some of the best and most sustained support for Six Nations has come from labour activists. One of the most notable examples of this support has come from United Steel Workers Local 1005 at the Hamilton Stelco plant which has not only conducted intensive and ongoing internal educationals on indigenous sovereignty and the Six Nations struggle, but has regularly sent dozens of their members to bolster protest lines at the reclamation site. In addition to providing financial assistance, members of the local have also regularly attended solidarity demonstrations in Hamilton to support Six Nations political prisoners and helped to organize a contingent of people from Six Nations to participate in the Hamilton Labor Day parade. Enthusiastic support and significant financial donations have come from CUPE locals 3903 and 3906, who have also been active in organizing demonstrations and activities in Toronto and Hamilton. Many other unions have sent delegations to the site to learn more about the Six Nations struggle. Rank-and-file trade unionist involvement continues to be central to the Caledonia-based Community Friends group, which benefits from the regular participation of workers belonging to more than a dozen different trade union locals. So, while there is obviously a disconnect between the press releases and sympathetic motions passed by the labour leadership and the need for committed and long term solidarity at the grassroots level, real connections between indigenous and labour struggles exist and they provide a basis upon which real solidarity can be built. Both Lindsay Hinshelwood (a rank and file factory worker at Ford with CAW 707) and Steve Watson (a CAW leader) have on separate occasions made the following observations about the connections between indigenous and trade union struggles: - Governments and the corporations they represent seek to exploit workers and regularly seek to roll back or disregard the collective agreements which are intended to safeguard workers’ rights. Like the contracts of unionized workers, indigenous people have treaties which outline their collective rights. Governments and corporations constantly disregard these treaties in their search for power and profits. - When workers feel like their contract isn’t being respected or needs to be improved and bargaining isn’t working, they set up a picket line, demand that no-one crosses, and are often required to use direct action (in contravention to the law) in order to win their demands. When indigenous people can’t get their rights respected they take similar direct action through organizing blockades or occupations of disputed land which similarly disrupt the economy. - One of the fundamental axioms of trade unionism is that “an injury to one is an injury to all” and unions have become increasingly concerned with issues that matter to all people – sexism, racism, the environment, queer rights, support for indigenous struggles, and resistance to capitalist globalization. The worldview of indigenous peoples rejects the commodification of land and labour and is similarly concerned with universal questions of human freedom and self expression in the context of harmony with the natural environment. Other parallels can be drawn. The European settlers who colonized most of North America, were themselves uprooted from the land through capitalist enclosure and the commodification of land and labour – a process later exported to the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the rest of the world. By becoming small farmers and independent commodity producers in the early stages of Canadian development, poor and working class settlers in North America clearly benefited from the theft of indigenous lands. However, over the past 100 years, capitalism has extended and intensified its reach. Non-native people have become increasingly concentrated in large cities (Canada has the most urbanized population per capita in the world) and have been integrated into the capitalist system as workers. Because of the inherently exploitative dynamics of capitalism, workers in North America have faced a decline in living standards since the neo-liberal offensive of the late 1970s. As William Robinson has argued, the contemporary resurgence of indigenous struggle in the Americas is happening as the few remaining autonomous indigenous communities are being forced into compliance with the demands of capitalist world market. This market seeks to commodify their labour and their land. At the same time, it seeks to drive down living standards and commodify the lives of non-native people as well.11 These pressures are just as evident on the Haldimand tract as they are in Canada’s far north, in the mountains of Chiapas, or in the jungles of the Amazon. Traditional indigenous resistance to enclosure and commodification is increasingly assuming a directly anti-capitalist character. When this resistance takes place in large urban areas where a relatively small proportion of settlers directly occupy the land in question, new opportunities for joint struggles arise. Doing this kind of work will not be easy. Building radical organizations and combating white racism within predominantly white communities, workplaces, and political organization will be particularly hard. But it remains necessary task as a pre-condition to building meaningful solidarity with indigenous struggles.

## A2 “Structure Not Event”

#### The singular analytic of settler colonialism which relies upon the structure/event binary precludes an effective analysis of colonialism in its contingent production with other modes of oppression.

Vimalassery et al, 2016 (Manu – Term Assistant Professor of American Studies @ Barnard College, Juliana Hu Pegues – Assistant Professor of American Indian Studies and Asian American Studies @ the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, and Alyosha Goldstein – Associate Professor of American Studies @ the University of New Mexico, “Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing”, *Theory & Event* 19.4, shae)

Wolfe’s description of settler colonialism as a structure, and not an event, has by now achieved the status of a truism in analyses of settler colonialism.24 Wolfe’s work has been crucial in bringing further attention to the fact that colonialism is an ongoing fact of life for indigenous peoples more than fifty years after the advent of the so-called era of decolonization. His scholarship insightfully underscored historical continuities in the shifting regimes and policies of settler states in relation to indigenous peoples, and challenged a certain produced ignorance about the “post” colonial character of societies like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.25 Yet drawing an absolute distinction between structure and event, and as a result, discarding a focus on the historicity of settler colonialism, neglects some of the ways Wolfe distinguishes between the binary terms structure/event in the service of further analysis. For example, Wolfe emphasizes how settler colonialism is a “complex social formation” with “structural complexity” that emerges through process.26 When taken up as a modular analytic that travels without regard to the specificities of location or social and material relations, a categorical event/structure binary banishes deeply engaged historical knowledge from the landscape, turning away from historical materialism, devolving into a scholastic debate over identities and standpoints that are reduced to structural essences and divorced from politics or contingency. Emphasizing structure over event also limits the analysis of settler colonialism itself into a descriptive typology, orienting our vision narrowly within the technical perspective of colonial power (in the white Commonwealth countries), away from geographies from below, such as a hemispheric perspective of the Americas, with their multiple and distinct modes of colonialism, thus replicating the conditions of unknowing.27 Foregrounding structure against event might also divert attention away from imperialism. This binary perpetuates taking what Lisa Lowe calls the “colonial divisions of humanity” as given. Situating this compartmentalization as a consequence of imperial formations calls attention to how, as Lowe writes, “The operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity—settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds—are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct now as yet concluded.”28 If the analytic project is reduced to naming and delimiting settler colonialism as a distinct structure of power that exists in specific places, primarily the settler peripheries of Anglo imperium, we lose focus on the Caribbean and the Americas as the grounds of modern imperialism, abdicating the hard-won horizon of anti-imperialism. An emphasis on structure over event is symptomatic of the stabilization of colonial unknowing through binaries and schematic modes of thought. As Wolfe writes, “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”29 However, Wolfe’s cartographic model is that of the frontier, in which “the primary social division was encompassed in the relation between natives and invaders.”30 The frontier is a linear model, a binary opposition between civilization and savagery, reflecting both a colonizing subjectivity and its state form. What socio-spatial imaginaries, and concomitant critical models, might become visible if we thought from other spatial forms, such as circles or spirals, spatial forms that are often more relevant to indigenous epistemologies than straight lines? If we remapped the colonial condition through circular or spiraling forms, what new insights might we gain on the decolonial imperative? For one, we might be able to better grasp colonial, racial, and imperial simultaneities, as well as positions that do not easily fit into a settler/native binary. As Wolfe writes, “Settler-colonists came to stay. In the main, they did not send their children back to British schools or retire ‘home’ before old age could spoil the illusion of their superhumanity. National independence did not entail their departure.”31 Moreover, to inflect these insights through the lens of negritude produces a considerably more complex set of possibilities, where the verbs come and stay do not carry any simple or easily recoverable trace of agency or consent.32 As Iyko Day writes, “the logic of antiblackness complicates a settler colonial binary framed around a central Indigenous/settler opposition.”33 It may be useful to dissolve the implied divide between structure and event. How would our critical perspective open up if we began to understand (settler) colonialism as a structuring event, an ongoing elaboration of a structure, a suspension of time, tense, and timeliness? In order to interrogate settler colonialism as a unique structuring event or events in a structure of power, close attention to process and relationship, to structures of power as they transform in specific places and times, seems to be a useful approach for clarifying the stakes of decolonial possibility. Marx’s insights on the need for capital (and for individual capitalists) to perpetually reproduce the social relations of capitalism (on an expanding scale) and the vulnerable never given-in-advance character of that reproduction, could be relevant for contemplating settler colonialism as it constantly thwarts and undoes its own internal governing logics. To consider settler colonialism as a structure of failure seems a useful starting point for an intellectual project that proceeds from the impulse of decolonization.34 To bring the critique of imperialism back to the foreground in indigenous-centered critiques of colonialism is to bring back basic questions about the definitions of these terms, and their relation to each other. This is not about discarding analysis of settler colonialism for analysis of imperialism, but instead about entangling them in order to specify historically particular processes and structures.35 To the extent that a settler colonial analytic disavows relationships between settler and congruent modes of colonization, imperialism, and race, the field formation of settler colonial studies runs a risk of capture, breathing further life into shifting and mutable colonial sovereignty claims.

## Alt Fails

#### The alt’s moralizing can’t end settler colonialism.

Busbridge, 17

Rachel, "Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization," Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 15 Issue 1

The prescription for decolonization – that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonized and the overturning of colonial relationships of power ([Kohn and McBride, 2011](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544): 3) – is indeed one of the most counter-hegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to Israel-Palestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ ([Benford and Snow, 2000](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544): 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonization? As [Veracini (2007)](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonization (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonization. While [Veracini (2007)](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualization, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways **closes down possibilities of imagining** the type of social and political transformation **to which the notion of decolonization aspires**. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, **where the only solution to settler colonialism is** decolonization – which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to [Wolfe’s (2013a](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544): 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, **whereby such a logic is simply there**, omnipresent and manifest **even when** (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; **the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context**. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and the native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal [Hilal’s (1976)](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, **it does not offer** the same hopeful **vision of a liberated future**. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell – ‘either total victory or total failure’ ([Veracini, 2007](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544)). Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonization is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonize territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For [Veracini (2011](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263276416688544): 5), claims for decolonization from indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anti-colonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination … and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes, under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This **decolonisation** actually **enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples** … it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies. (2011: 6–7)

## DA’s to Alt

### Topography of Violence

#### Tying identity to land reinforces the topography of power—it essentializes identity and attaches it to discrete territorial units, repeating the very logic of the nation-state

Gupta and Ferguson 92 (Akhil, Department of Anthropology, Stanford University; James, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine; “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference”, Cultural Anthropology 7.1 page 6-7, JSTOR.)

Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably dependent on images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is based upon a seemingly unproblematic division of space, on the fact that they occupy "naturally" discontinuous spaces. The premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies. For example, the representation of the world as a collection of "countries," as in most world maps, sees it as an inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each "rooted" in its proper place (cf. Malkki, this issue). It is so taken for granted that each country embodies its own distinctive culture and society that the terms "society" and "culture" are routinely simply appended to the names of nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand "Indian culture" and "Indian society," or Thailand to experience "Thai culture," or the United States to get a whiff of "American culture." Of course, the geographical territories that cultures and societies are believed to map onto do not have to be nations. We do, for example, have ideas about culture-areas that overlap several nation-states, or of multicultural nations. On a smaller scale, perhaps, are our disciplinary assumptions about the association of culturally unitary groups (tribes or peoples) with "their" territories: thus, "the Nuer" live in "Nuerland" and so forth. The clearest illustration of this kind of thinking are the classic "ethnographic maps" that purported to display the spatial distribution of peoples, tribes, and cultures. But in all these cases, space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed. It is in this way that space functions as a central organizing principle in the social sciences at the same time that it disappears from analytical purview. This assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant problems. First, there is the issue of those who inhabit the border, that "narrow strip along steep edges" (Anzaldua 1987:3) of national boundaries. The fiction of cultures as discrete, object-like phenomena occupying discrete spaces becomes implausible for those who inhabit the borderlands. Related to border inhabitants are those who live a life of border crossings-migrant workers, nomads, and members of the transnational business and professional elite. What is "the culture" of farm workers who spend half a year in Mexico and half a year in the United States? Finally, there are those who cross borders more or less permanently- immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates. In their case, the disjuncture of place and culture is especially clear: Khmer refugees in the United States take "Khmer culture" with them in the same complicated way that Indian immigrants in England transport "Indian culture" to their new homeland. A second set of problems raised by the implicit mapping of cultures onto places is to account for cultural differences within a locality. "Multiculturalism" is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity. Similarly, the idea of "subcultures" attempts to preserve the idea of distinct "cultures" while acknowledging the relation of different cultures to a dominant culture within the same geographical and territorial space. Conventional accounts of ethnicity, even when used to describe cultural differences in settings where people from different regions live side by side, rely on an unproblematic link between identity and place.' Although such concepts are suggestive because they endeavor to stretch the naturalized association of culture with place, they fail to interrogate this assumption in a truly fundamental manner. We need to ask how to deal with cultural difference while abandoning received ideas of (localized) culture. Third, there is the important question of postcoloniality. To which places do the hybrid cultures of postcoloniality belong'! Does the colonial encounter create a "new culture" in both the colonized and colonizing country, or does it destabilize the notion that nations and cultures are isomorphic'! As discussed below, postcoloniality further problematizes the relationship between space and culture. Last, and most important, challenging the ruptured landscape of independent nations and autonomous cultures raises the question of understanding social change and cultural transformation as situated within interconnected spaces. The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully the topography of power. The inherently fragmented space assumed in the definition of anthropology as the study of cultures (in the plural) may have been one of the reasons behind the long-standing failure to write anthropology's history as the biography of imperialism. For if one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection. To illustrate, let us examine one powerful model of cultural change that attempts to relate dialectically the local to larger spatial arenas: articulation. Articulation models, whether they come from Marxist structuralism or from "moral economy," posit a primeval state of autonomy (usually labeled "precapitalist"), which is then violated by global capitalism. The result is that both local and larger spatial arenas are transformed, the local more than the global to be sure, but not necessarily in a redetermined direction. This notion of articulation allows one to explore the richly unintended consequences of, say, colonial capitalism, where loss occurs alongside invention. Yet, by taking a preexisting, localized "community" as a given starting point, it fails to examine sufficiently the processes (such as the structures of feeling that pervade the imagining of community) that go into the construction of space as place or locality in the first instance. In other words, instead of assuming the autonomy of the primeval community, we need to examine how it was formed as a community out of the interconnected space that always already existed. Colonialism, then, represents the displacement of one form of interconnection by another. This is not to deny that colonialism, or an expanding capitalism, does indeed have profoundly dislocating effects on existing societies. But by always foregrounding the spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations, we can better understand the process whereby a space achieves a distinctive identity as a place. Keeping in mind that notions of locality or community refer both to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction, we can see that the identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality

### Backlash

#### Returning land to natives causes a violent backlash from the majority and inter-racial fighting

Bradford, 2003 (William, LLM – Harvard Law School and Assistant Professor of Law – Indiana University, “"With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice”, American Indian Law Review, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1, Lexis)

Until the majority comes to accept not only the role of the United States and its laws in the deliberate destruction of Indian populations, property rights, and cultures but also the responsibility to repair the interdependent relationship between Indian self-determination and U.S. legitimacy, Indian reparations, a moral shibboleth through the shadow of which the dominant social group is unwilling to tread, will be viewed as nothing more than a underserved handout to the losers of a long-ago struggle for the continental landmass. **[612](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=e4b49a6253d6016e263713dfa1ea327e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=c84102d539d0c75c3d7e09b8a9b84382" \l "n612" \t "_self)** A destabilizing reallotment of the American economic and territorial pie on this basis is likely to provoke violent political backlash at flashpoints along a wide spectrum of self-interested white Americans, **[613](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=e4b49a6253d6016e263713dfa1ea327e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=c84102d539d0c75c3d7e09b8a9b84382" \l "n613" \t "_self)** as well as ethnic elbowing **[614](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=e4b49a6253d6016e263713dfa1ea327e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=c84102d539d0c75c3d7e09b8a9b84382" \l "n614" \t "_self)** from uncompensated and as-yet-aggrieved minority racial groups, including, inter alia, African-Americans and Hispanics. **[615](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=e4b49a6253d6016e263713dfa1ea327e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=c84102d539d0c75c3d7e09b8a9b84382" \l "n615" \t "_self)**

### Monolith

#### Theorizing settler colonialism as a totalizing structure is a disempowering gesture which ensures the perpetuation of colonial domination.

Macoun, Researcher @ Indigenous Studies Research Network, 2013 (Alissa, The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory, Settler Colonial Studies, 3(3-4), pp. 426-443)

\*SCT=Settler Colonialism Theory

Despite these powerful contributions, we also identify some important issues associated with SCT in Australian academic debates about the NT intervention. The first is a direct consequence of one of SCT’s vital contributions, arising from the theory’s present tense iteration of settler colonialism. By emphasizing continuities in colonial relationships between the past and the present, SCT can depict colonization as structurally inevitable, and can be deployed in ways that re‐inscribe settler colonialism. We suggest that SCT’s struggle to narrate its own ending can be countered by approaching the theory as an account of settler desires which makes visible our own frames of reference. This in turn exposes a range of possibilities and political visions outside these frames. Such an approach is significant in countering potentially problematic misuses of SCT that erase its location as a settler discourse. Such erasures problematically empower academics to speak with neutral descriptive authority over both settler and Indigenous realities. Firstly, by disturbing settler colonialism’s narratives of progress, SCT attributes a peculiar suspended temporality to the settler project. This can portray settler colonialism as an inevitable structure likely to exist across time – the fact that the past persists in the present implies that this past will also persist in the future. Foundational scholar Patrick Wolfe has been labelled ‘very much a structuralist stuck in a poststructuralist world’.63 As we have outlined, this structuralism is particularly useful in identifying the operation of political hierarchies. However, it can also excuse us from human political action in the present by presenting this action as futile or already determined.64 The role of political activists is to wait for the structurally determined future, and at most to prepare others for its arrival. The particular challenge of SCT’s analysis is that it does not give an account of such a transformed future, or of the conditions for settler colonialism’s demise. This can lead to a theoretical and political impasse and result in a kind of colonial fatalism. Such fatalism can be deployed to imply a moral equivalence between different forms of settler political interaction with Indigenous people, and, at its worst, to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous resistances. Structuralist narratives are able to posit radical change, but only if this change is built into the structures they describe – for example because these structures are subject to internal contradictions or are inherently unstable. Settler colonial structures, however, appear as highly stable and ‘relatively impervious to regime change’.65 Therefore, at the same moment settler scholars finally see the depth and reach of settler colonialism in the present they feel unable to find ‘postsettler colonial passages’.66 This tendency is reinforced by SCT’s capacity to identify significant commonalities in the objectives of conservative and progressive policy approaches, as discussed above. It shows that traditional ‘decolonizing’ pathways such as treaty making, reconciliation and formal apologies may also serve colonial ends by absorbing and extinguishing Aboriginal political difference without disturbing the foundational structures of settler dominance. As Australian anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose notes, this makes it ‘difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project’.67 If every settler action is framed as always already colonizing, then individuals are excused from anti‐colonial action in the present and Indigenous people are destined to be victims of an unstoppable colonizing state.68 As bell hooks argues in relation to US race relations, this is useful to those in a position of dominance: ‘so many White people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something if it is perceived as immutable.’69 Is it possible that settlers are particularly attracted to SCT precisely because it gives us a sense of being intellectually committed to the end of colonialism while simultaneously unable to act against our own privilege? As a recent article concluded about the prospects for decolonization: I can only assess this with a degree of gloom. I am yet to be convinced that we can prevent indigenous disadvantage remaining structurally embedded in society and through the state even after any kind of ‘transition’ or ‘transformation’. At the same time, I fear decolonization. I am myself a settler, like several of my ancestors before me, and I have nowhere else to belong.70 SCT’s structuralism may serve these conflicted interests, in allowing us to feel we have done all we can while facing the ‘reality’ of an inevitable settler colonial future. This structuralism gives many within settler colonial studies a particular orientation towards Indigenous resistance and scholarship. Australian scholar Tim Rowse argues that critical settler perspectives on colonialism can ‘reproduce that sorrowing form of attention in which defeat and marginality are highlighted at the expense of understanding the nature and limits of the Indigenous agency that circumstances afforded’.71 He and others suggest that this sort of analysis caricatures Indigenous responses, presenting a false binary between resistance/sovereignty and co-optation in the colonizing process.72 This, they suggest, leads scholars to position one sort of Indigenous response as more valid and authentic than others, re‐performing the authority settlers have always claimed over definitions of Indigenous reality. Joanne Barker identifies a ‘troubled focus within settler colonial studies on structure to the erasure of Indigenous experiences and perspectives about colonialism even within analyses of the “logic of elimination” that fuels colonial processes of social formation.’73 SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences.74 Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency.75 Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.

## Impact Framing

### Extinction 1st

#### Extinction controls framing

Bostrom 13 (Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute in the Oxford Martin School (Nick, 2013, "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority," http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)

The maxipok rule Existential risk and uncertainty An existential risk is one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development (Bostrom, 2002). Although it is often difficult to assess the probability of existential risks, there are many reasons to suppose that the total such risk confronting humanity over the next few centuries is significant. Estimates of 10–20 per cent total existential risk in this century are fairly typical among those who have examined the issue, though inevitably such estimates rely heavily on subjective judgment.1 The most reasonable estimate might be substantially higher or lower. But perhaps the strongest reason for judging the total existential risk within the next few centuries to be significant is the extreme magnitude of the values at stake. Even a small probability of existential catastrophe could be highly practically significant (Bostrom, 2003; Matheny, 2007; Posner, 2004; Weitzman, 2009). Humanity has survived what we might call natural existential risks for hundreds of thousands of years; thus it is prima facie unlikely that any of them will do us in within the next hundred.2 This conclusion is buttressed when we analyse specific risks from nature, such as asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, earthquakes, gamma-ray bursts, and so forth: Empirical impact distributions and scientific models suggest that the likelihood of extinction because of these kinds of risk is extremely small on a time scale of a century or so.3 In contrast, our species is introducing entirely new kinds of existential risk—threats we have no track record of surviving. Our longevity as a species therefore offers no strong prior grounds for confident optimism. Consideration of specific existential-risk scenarios bears out the suspicion that the great bulk of existential risk in the foreseeable future consists of anthropogenic existential risks—that is, those arising from human activity. In particular, most of the biggest existential risks seem to be linked to potential future technological breakthroughs that may radically expand our ability to manipulate the external world or our own biology. As our powers expand, so will the scale of their potential consequences—intended and unintended, positive and negative. For example, there appear to be significant existential risks in some of the advanced forms of biotechnology, molecular nanotechnology, and machine intelligence that might be developed in the decades ahead. The bulk of existential risk over the next century may thus reside in rather speculative scenarios to which we cannot assign precise probabilities through any rigorous statistical or scientific method. But the fact that the probability of some risk is difficult to quantify does not imply that the risk is negligible. Probability can be understood in different senses. Most relevant here is the epistemic sense in which probability is construed as (something like) the credence that an ideally reasonable observer should assign to the risk’s materialising based on currently available evidence.4 If something cannot presently be known to be objectively safe, it is risky at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. An empty cave is unsafe in just this sense if you cannot tell whether or not it is home to a hungry lion. It would be rational for you to avoid the cave if you reasonably judge that the expected harm of entry outweighs the expected benefit. The uncertainty and error-proneness of our first-order assessments of risk is itself something we must factor into our all-things-considered probability assignments. This factor often dominates in low-probability, highconsequence risks—especially those involving poorly understood natural phenomena, complex social dynamics, or new technology, or that are difficult to assess for other reasons. Suppose that some scientific analysis A indicates that some catastrophe X has an extremely small probability P(X) of occurring. Then the probability that A has some hidden crucial flaw may easily be much greater than P(X).5 Furthermore, the conditional probability of X given that A is crucially flawed, P(X |!A), may be fairly high. We may then find that most of the risk of X resides in the uncertainty of our scientific assessment that P(X) was small (Figure 1) (Ord, Hillerbrand and Sandberg, 2010). Qualitative risk categories Since a risk is a prospect that is negatively evaluated, the seriousness of a risk—indeed, what is to be regarded as risky at all—depends on an evaluation. Before we can determine the seriousness of a risk, we must specify a standard of evaluation by which the negative value of a particular possible loss scenario is measured. There are several types of such evaluation standard. For example, one could use a utility function that represents some particular agent’s preferences over various outcomes. This might be appropriate when one’s duty is to give decision support to a particular decision maker. But here we will consider a normative evaluation, an ethically warranted assignment of value to various possible outcomes. This type of evaluation is more relevant when we are inquiring into what our society’s (or our own individual) risk-mitigation priorities ought to be. There are conflicting theories in moral philosophy about which normative evaluations are correct. I will not here attempt to adjudicate any foundational axiological disagreement. Instead, let us consider a simplified version of one important class of normative theories. Let us suppose that the lives of persons usually have some significant positive value and that this value is aggregative (in the sense that the value of two similar lives is twice that of one life). Let us also assume that, holding the quality and duration of a life constant, its value does not depend on when it occurs or on whether it already exists or is yet to be brought into existence as a result of future events and choices. These assumptions could be relaxed and complications could be introduced, but we will confine our discussion to the simplest case. Within this framework, then, we can roughly characterise a risk’s seriousness using three variables: scope (the size of the population at risk), severity (how badly this population would be affected), and probability (how likely the disaster is to occur, according to the most reasonable judgment, given currently available evidence). Using the first two of these variables, we can construct a qualitative diagram of different types of risk (Figure 2). (The probability dimension could be displayed along the z-axis.) The area marked ‘X’ in Figure 2 represents existential risks. This is the category of risks that have (at least) crushing severity and (at least) pan-generational scope.6 As noted, an existential risk is one that threatens to cause the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic failure of that life to realise its potential for desirable development. In other words, an existential risk jeopardises the entire future of ~~humankind~~[Humynkind]. Magnitude of expected loss in existential catastrophe Holding probability constant, risks become more serious as we move toward the upper-right region of Figure 2. For any fixed probability, existential risks are thus more serious than other risk categories. But just how much more serious might not be intuitively obvious. One might think we could get a grip on how bad an existential catastrophe would be by considering some of the worst historical disasters we can think of—such as the two world wars, the Spanish flu pandemic, or the Holocaust— and then imagining something just a bit worse. Yet if we look at global population statistics over time, we find that these horrible events of the past century fail to register (Figure 3). But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in Figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace. 2. A nuclear war that kills 99 per cent of the world’s existing population. 3. A nuclear war that kills 100 per cent. 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater. The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilisation began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilised human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second (Parfit, 1984, pp. 453–454). To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1016 human lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years.7 Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations) (Bostrom, 2003).8 If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilisations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realised.9 Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonisation and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 humanbrainemulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilisation a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion ~~human~~ [humyn] lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ‘ordinary’ good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.10 Maxipok These considerations suggest that the loss in expected value resulting from an existential catastrophe is so enormous that the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration whenever we act out of an impersonal concern for ~~humankind~~[Humynkind]. as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for such impersonal moral action: Maxipok Maximise the probability of an ‘OK outcome’, where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe. At best, maxipok is a rule of thumb or a prima facie suggestion. It is not a principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are moral ends other than the prevention of existential catastrophe. The principle’s usefulness is as an aid to prioritisation. Unrestricted altruism is not so common that we can afford to fritter it away on a plethora of feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy. If benefiting humanity by increasing existential safety achieves expected good on a scale many orders of magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we would do well to focus on this most efficient philanthropy. Note that maxipok differs from the popular maximin principle (‘Choose the action that has the best worstcase outcome’).11 Since we cannot completely eliminate existential risk—at any moment, we might be tossed into the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in some remote galaxy a billion years ago—the use of maximin in the present context would entail choosing the action that has the greatest benefit under the assumption of impending extinction. Maximin thus implies that we ought all to start partying as if there were no tomorrow. That implication, while perhaps tempting, is implausible.

#### Extinction isn’t your only consideration, but it is important – it’s key to value to life and potential for future life – prereq to social progress

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(Furio “Humankind’s First Fundamental Right: Survival,” Constellations)

This article’s main thesis1 is that, **given the existence of** at least two **global threats**, nuclear weapons and climate change, **which endanger the life of humankind as a civ- ilized species**, its **right to survive should be asserted as its first** human or rather **fundamental right.** The sense of **this** assertion **is not just philosophical but legal as** **well**.¶ To substantiate this thesis, I shall go through six argumentative steps:¶ 1. Why begin with global threats.¶ 2. Why survival is the leading category in this field, and¶ how it interplays with justice.¶ 3. What interest humankind has in its survival, and why¶ it should be protected as a right.¶ 4. Why regard “humankind” rather than “all indi-¶ viduals” as a possible actor.¶ 5. Why speak of a fundamental rather than human¶ right, and how to constitutionalize this right.¶ 6. How two developments in international law after 1945 can contribute to support the argument I have¶ been sketching.¶ \*\*¶ 1. If philosophical thinking starts with being amazed at something in the world (Plato’s θαυμα ́ζειν), my in- terest in the present matter2 was first stimulated by the pre-philosophical amazement I always felt in seeing that in the now enormous human rights discourse (both in politics and academia) so much care is dedicated to the single individuals, and so wide-ranging designs of a cos- mopolis to come are based on their rights. Yet **nobody seems to take note that the life of all present and future individuals could be annihilated** by a nuclear war or up- set by catastrophic developments of climate change. **It is like insisting on first debating the rights of a ship’s** third- class **passengers** 3 **instead of taking action in the light of the fact that the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak** (climate change is already happening) and also risks to hit a mine that is floating around and would send it along with all passengers and crew straight to the ocean depths (by thinking and acting timely, leaks can be filled, mines detected and swept away, all ac- tions that would put the care for third-class passengers¶ on a firmer ground). **These dangers are philosophically significant because they tell something about human beings**, the only ones who have become able to destroy their own race, as well as about modernity: the possibil- ity of self-destruction sets an end to this era, opens a new one, which can only vaguely be termed post-modern,4 and requires an updated rewriting of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. It is also politically significant as it challenges present politics to restructure itself by ex- tending its attention to the far future, something which is not possible within the boundaries of modern politics because of its narrow time structure.5 In a more precise language, I term **challenges like nuclear weapons** (con- sidered in themselves, while nuclear proliferation is but a subphenomenon) **and climate change** global (in a very specific sense) because they are lethal and planet-wide, **can hit** approximately **everybody on earth and** can be reasonably addressed only by the near totality of coun- tries and peoples. They would not wipe out biologically humankind, although this cannot be excluded in case of an all-out nuclear war; but **they would destroy human civilization**:6 not a set of values, but the set of material and cultural tools (agriculture, communications, trans- portation and trade) that allow unspecialized animals like the humans to survive and to thrive.¶ It is clear that my thesis presupposes a revised scale of relevance among the issues requiring and stimulat- ing theoretical investigations: in my philosophical view global threats have a greater relevance and are intellec- tually more challenging than the issues suggested by the media’s headlines (present wars, terrorism, group and minority rights in the US, multiculturalism in Canada or Australia, immigrants in Europe, or, more recently, the crisis of the global economic system). As a reflection upon the deeper longue dure ́e determinants of hu[hu]man- ity’s fate, political philosophy should not necessarily espouse the agenda suggested by current politics and journalism and, instead, seek its own independent as- sessment of the state of the world as part of its business; this is a critical attitude that cannot be implemented without a philosophical view on history (not to be con- fused with a revival of the “grand narratives”). Besides, **the shifting of** most of Critical **Theory to pure normativity has favored** the emergence not just of worldviews based on the predominance of Sollen, but also of **an exclusive attention on intersubjectivity** and its troubles; **as if challenges to politics and civilization caused by systemic imperatives** (**such as the nuclear threat and**¶ **climate change)** **were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry**. What I am attempting in this article is to address an issue such as human rights that is typical of **the self- centered normative approach** mentioned and to show how it **should be restructured to address the challenges for humankind’s survival**.¶ In this attempt I am driven by the intent to debunk the layer of denial (or repression in pshychoanalyti- cal sense) that, more intensely after the end of the Cold War, has removed the nuclear threat from the philosoph- ical reflection on modernity and has later prevented cli- mate change from entering the main agenda of Critical Theory. There is also an epistemological aspect in this: a critical Zeitdiagnose, or an informed assessment of where history has taken us to in our post-modern times is not possible without first taking what hard science has to say about the threats for humankind very seriously.7 With rare exceptions, **critical theorists seem to be reluctant to address the philosophical issues raised by global challenges, not to mention their** **complete denial** beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno in the Fifties and Sixties (when Mutual Assured Destruction became a real possibility) **of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical Theory**, despite its claim to be a gen- eral assessment of our civilization, **had accepted a tacit division of labor in which its competence is restricted to social justice** (in continuation of its original being rooted in the Marxian critique of political economy) **and the “damaged”**8 **subjectivity**. The rest of the real world is left to a purely Hobbesian (and later Luhmannian) reading, or to the perception of side-figures such as Karl Jaspers or Gu ̈nther Anders.¶ A last epistemological remark: **starting from problems and threats that**, however socially generated, **come up as physical events and are accounted for by hard science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without first engaging in a complicate and doubt- ful theorizing about how the world should be reshaped** according to a general normative theory. This ad hoc theorizing shows the ability or inability of a philosoph- ical view to come to terms with problems that are of paramount importance to everybody, not just to the prac- titioners of Schulphilosophie.¶ 2. I have explained elsewhere9why survival rather than justice is the leading category of a philosophy of global threats. **The** now thriving **literature on justice and climate change misses the point** that before we look for ways to establish justice between generations, **we have to motivate our interest in** their **existence** and wellbeing, or rather in the existence and wellbeing of humankind.10 While survival of humankind is what best defines our problematic situation, when it comes to the normative aspect I believe that **we should assume responsibility for future generations** rather than do justice to them; talking responsibility I move from its most elementary¶ manifestation, the responsibility parents take on for their children. Justice as fairness comes in when we have to fight back “generational nepotism:” it is wrong for any generation to spoil the environment without regard to the consequences in the future, far that it may be, that is not just out of respect for those that may harm our children and children’s children. Out of elementary fairness, as expressed in the Golden Rule, we cannot deny parents of the, say, twenty-fifth century the chance to bear and educate their children in decent conditions.¶ Now, survival is a Hobbesian category, as such it sounds like an anathema to critical thinking, just as most categories stemming from the tradition of politi- cal realism do. Since under global threats present and future humankind is really endangered in its survival, it is however hard to see the rationale of denying the fact because the name comes from the enemy’s vocabu- lary. More importantly, there is an essential difference: Hobbes’ survival regards the individual and is there- fore self-centered and adversarial (in common parlance, mors tua vita mea), while humankind’s survival as a moral and political goal is by its own definition an uni- versalistic feature. More on this later.¶ A much talked-about issue in this context is the so- called identity problem, which I am however inclined to dismiss. If it means the doubtfulness of any engagement in favor of future generations because we do not know if they will exist (we could decide to stop procreating), the problem is surrounded by an air of futility: there is no imaginable decision process that could effectively lead to a total procreation stop. On the other hand, if only a few humans were alive in the far future, this would be enough of a reason for our engagement. Of course future humanity could never be born because meanwhile the planet may have been burnt out by an asteroid (natural precariousness of human life) or an all-out nuclear war ([hu]man-made precariousness). Neither type of precarious- ness can however be a reason not to endorse the interest of future generations in survival, because reducing that precariousness is exactly the engagement’s telos. The other aspect of the identity problem — the non-identity of posterity’s values and preferences with our own, or their indeterminacy — is not relevant to our case, be- cause the goal for whose attainment we are called to save or sacrifice something for their survival has to do with their sheer survival (in an indispensably civilized framework, as explained above) rather than with our own and the posterity’s moral configuration; in other words, there is no paternalistic attitude in it.¶ In a fairly different meaning, closer to social rather than moral (analytical) theory, identity comes up in an- other sense. Assuming responsibility for (or, for that matter, being fair to) future generations is not just an altruistic attitude. Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the¶ main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But **doing what we can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our individual life** (also seen in the context of our gen- eration’s) **is meaningful** beyond the limits of our own existence on earth, **because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity**.¶ 3. That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 More importantly, doubts may also arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right, that is to “juridify” it instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflict- ing parties. In general I share this preoccupation, and have misgivings at any inflationary expansion of the hu- man rights catalogue. On the other hand, moral rights that do not translate into legal rights12 are politically pointless or at least much less significant than the rights enshrined in a legal order. Also, our case is different, and the issues we are confronted with are more radi- cal than the worries with ‘juridification;’ this is all the truer, since the establishment of a right to survival for humankind would require a long and fierce political and intellectual battle in the first place.¶ First of all, does the right of humanity to survival qualify as a (basic or human) right? Before we proceed, let us note that humankind’s survival is not a good like civil liberties, which is completely at the disposal of human beings; instead, it can depend on the orbits of asteroids and other NEOs.13 The “right of humankind to survival” should therefore be read as a short for “the right of humankind, including future people, to have all previous generations doing their best to ensure their sur- vival and protect them from [hu]man-made threats.” In this version, we are clearly afar from the confusion between rights and goals criticized by Dworkin14 (§3.1 in the chapter on Difficult cases), the causation of the good at stake (survival) being elusive, or not completely nor (in the case of climate change) undoubtedly human; also¶ the content of the right is not a physical state, but rather the behavior influencing it. In a manifest way, this also identifies the right’s indispensable correlate, that is the duty of the relevant actors (individuals and institutions) to refrain from behaviors that are likely to cause harm to that good.¶ Whether or not this claim can translate into a right should be investigated from two points of view, those of its structure (a) and its bearer (b).¶ a. As for structure, three of Feinberg’s15 four crite- ria for being a right are already met (to have a content, a holder and an addressee). The fourth, the ‘source of validation,’ gradually emerges from the argument I am unfolding. Frydman and Haarscher also list four condi- tions, of which three are already present (titulaire, objet, opposabilite ́) – even if more remains to be said about the first one; while the fourth condition (sanction) shall be discussed below in the framework of the constitu- tionalization problem.16 Finally, let us look at the stan- dard distinction of negative and positive rights, which Shue rightly believes to be substantially untenable. This is also true in our case, because the ‘behavior’ of in- dividuals and institutions, which humanity is entitled to expect, according to the new right, can be imple- mented either by abstaining in single cases from using or possessing nuclear weapons and emitting excessive GHGs or by establishing new institutions (a global En- vironmental Protection Agency, say) and strategies (for example, technology transfer from advanced to develop- ing countries to help the latter rein in global warming). What would be acknowledged would be the right, not the policies that according to time and circumstances are devised for its realization.¶ Does this new right share with the other fundamental or human rights the need to be founded in a conception of the human, such as those focused by Donnelly on dignity, by Meyers on moral agency and by Frydman and Haarscher on autonomy?17 Not properly, or not di- rectly. Humanity’s right to survival is a meta-right rather than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for- mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human: **acknowledging this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible**. It is their Bedingung der Mo ̈glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that **human rights can only apply to a living humankind, but not to a ”republic of insects and grass”** (Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large nuclear war19). **The meta-right as a pre-condition has** rather **to be un- derstood in the moral sense: no foundation of morality** or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter) **makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental rights of those** (poor populations al- ready affected by global warming, future generations¶ as victims of nuclear war or extreme climate change) **harmed by our acts and omissions**. Here I mean moral- ity at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two **global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the** business-as-**usual attitude in moral and political theory**; I mean the attitude to think of the foundations of moral- ity and polity as if the [hu]man-made (modern) world in which they operate had not been substantially altered by humankind’s newly achieved capability to destroy itself and/or the planet.¶ Let us make a further step on the road that leads to uncouple, as far as it goes, the foundation of a new right of paramount importance from a substantive conception of the human – an effort aimed at protecting it from the uncertain or frail fate of such conceptions. On the one hand, as a meta-right to individual-only human rights, the right to survival does not imply a choice among substantive values; this right does not refer to a partic- ular conception of what is good for future generations, as it only wants to ensure for them existential condi- tions that are an indispensable basis for their members to pursue whatever idea of the good, of liberty and self- realization they may choose. On the other hand, survival is indeed referred not to the mere biological fact, but to the survival of humankind in decent, civilized condi- tions, taking civilization in the meaning explained in §1. Alone, as I explained above, this qualification is not an added axiological component (civilization as a sys- tem of values), as it rather relies on the analytical view that some technical and cultural features of civilization are essential to the life of the human species.¶ There is a last aspect to be examined with regard to the structure or nature of this right: its emergence not from a shift in the doctrine of human rights, but as a response to a new situation in world history, in which survival goods (a livable atmosphere in the first place) that were so far tacitly taken for granted turn out to be no longer guaranteed, but more and more endangered. As such, this new right reconnects to what we know about individual human rights, that is that they come up as a response to “perceived threats” and build an “evolving whole”.20¶ b. Let us now come to the question of the right’s bearer. It is humankind, defined as the generality of the living individuals along with those who will be born. There are three possible objections to this proposition.¶ First, it seems to be self-evident that the notion of a human right for the so defined humankind cannot be subject to the classical liberal objection that bearers of such rights are individuals, not groups.21 Humankind is not an exclusive and self-contained group opposed to others (at least until we do not have our first contact with¶ dwellers of other regions of the universe), nor is it meant here to represent particular sets of values. Between the two meanings of “humanity” — as species (Artbegriff) and as regulative notion of a community cemented by shared values and goals (Zielbegriff)22 — I am referring to the first one; it is now becoming philosophically sig- nificant because not even its biological existence can be taken for granted under [hu]man-made threats. Humankind is not a hypostasis detached from the individuals, as in the case of ‘the community’ or ‘das Volk,’ as it rather means the totality of the living individuals of any given generation including (a) their potential to generate fur- ther human beings and generations and (b) their knowl- edge that the latter will exist and probably suffer. This reflexive notion of humankind raises a problem, but remains open to different ethical choices: indifference towards future generations, responsibility for them, and obligations assumed in their favor.¶ 4. A second question is: why should we speak of humankind instead of limiting ourselves to the more sober expression “all present and future individuals?” There is first a lexicological advantage, in as much as we thus use one word instead of connecting two by an “and.” This better conveys the sense that the bond of solidarity based on the responsibility for the elementary living conditions of posterity makes present and future individuals one community – in this sole, thin sense in- deed, which does not try to conceal the deep fractures existing between contemporaries within the present and the successive generations of this community. The very inclusion of future people into humankind is not an act of inclusive kindness towards them, but is rather made compelling by the lethal threats that past and present people have projected into the life of posterity, in an amount unprecedented in history. Lastly, introducing humankind as a bearer of rights highlights that the right of the individuals to be alive and free can be enjoyed only in the middle of a larger community, which makes the claim of human rights possible and helps to im- plement them. In times of economic globalization and global threats, we have come to know that this com- munity is the whole humankind, not just nations. All this however does not alter the truth that who is entitled to vindicate the right to survival is not humanity as a hypostasis, but every individual either living or not yet born – very much like what happens with individual human rights, whose constitutional formulation makes them enjoyable for every citizen who will in the future be born under the same Constitution.¶ Third comes the standard objection: it does not make sense to endorse obligation towards future people, since, if men and women agree to stop reproduction, those people might never be born. I have already dismissed this as a futile mental experiment. It could further be argued, though, that future generations might turn out¶ to have moral standards totally different from ours. Yet, the possibility that posterity will be not amenable to our moral world is not huge enough to release us from any responsibility towards them. We can still under- stand, and to an extent share, the moral problems raised by the Bible or the Greek classical tragedy of millen- nia ago and should not easily assume that our fellow humans of the year 3000, dwellers of a planet spoiled by global warming, will be morally so hugely different from us.¶ Finally, let me anticipate here one of the legal con- siderations that will be developed later on. Any right- establishing text (but I am now referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR 1948) works with the basic formula “everyone has the right to etc.”23 The validity of the claims is limited only by the spatial ex- tension of the law: a right established by the French Constitution may be thought to be valid universally, but is legally protected only on French territory, while the rights mentioned in the UDHR apply by definition to the entire world where humans live. This can be dubbed spa- tial universalism, while establishing a right of present and future humanity to survive is tantamount to adding a time universalism. In other words, this makes explicit that the right of everyone to a just international order (UDHR 1948, Art. 28; more below) also holds for the ‘everyones’ of the year 3000. This may have always been tacitly intended by the law, the only time limit ly- ing in the possibility that the law is at some point in the future dismissed by another law canceling or expand- ing those rights. In a present like ours, in which it has become known that the future is no longer guaranteed to be essentially homogeneous (with no radical change in the physical and anthropological life conditions) to the present and the past, it has become necessary to openly establish a linkage between our obligations and the rights of future generations, as far as existential issues are concerned; a link that will likewise apply to them as soon as they become the present generation.¶ So far, I have clarified the moral and, to a lesser extent, legal reasons for introducing the notion of hu- mankind as right bearer. I will now stress that the hu- mankind discourse in this article remains political rather than moral.¶ It is not necessary here to rerun the history of the humankind/humanity notion; it is enough to remember that its denial has been a stronghold in the battle of value nihilists (Nietzsche) and realist thinkers (Oswald Spen- gler, who dismissed it as a “zoological notion,” and more extensively Carl Schmitt in Schmitt 1976, particularly §6). As self-contained units (such as the Westphalian system states) were deemed to be the only sustainable and legitimate polities, any reference to humanity was seen as toothless or manipulative, as a noble universalis- tic alibi for particularistic interests.24 Setting aside this¶ sort of criticism, which mistakes the ideological use of the term for its very substance, we know that humanity, as a good-will aspiration of philosophers, poets and re- ligious men, could not be regarded as a political notion because only non-voluntaristic communities can be re- garded as political. They alone allow for binding and effective decisions, whereas any partner can at any time and according to its convenience withdraw from mem- bership in “humanity” or other large associations based on just good will.¶ This can now be expected to change, because **planetary lethal threats such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change have the potential strength to forge all relevant political actors into one community**, not unlike Hobbes’ individuals, **who received the push to unite from the threats to their life and limbs**: first **because they are all put in danger, and** second **because they have to act jointly** if they really want to fight back those dangers. **This is a possibility, not an** actual and **inevitable process**, as there are enough counter-forces that impede those ‘Hobbesian’ threats to fully make hu- mankind one political community: fear, the protecting passion, does no longer work as smoothly as in Hobbes’ model of Leviathan.25 Nor is the potential contained in global challenges supposed to generate a world state as its only outcome: practicing survival policies, who- ever the actors may be, is more important than a uni- fied state-like structure in charge of doing so. Nonethe- less **all this is enough to use ‘humankind’ in a political sense**, as something that is a potential constituency rather than a fragmented multiplicity of individuals and states.¶ 5. Why a fundamental rather than a human right? The distinction between human and fundamental is not univocally worked out in the literature.26 In the vocab- ulary I am using here, human rights are seen as a philo- sophical concept and a moral (deontological) precept, while fundamental rights are those positively acknowl- edged in a legal order, entrusted to political and institu- tional processes for their implementation, and claimable in courts – this last feature being more problematic. Putting on humankind’s survival the label of a funda- mental right avoids leaving it in a philosophical limbo as a regulative idea,27 and gives it a better defined political and legal nature; this is more adequate to the character- istic of survival as something endangered by political decisions (or the lack thereof) and requesting a political solution by a given deadline (the next few years if we want to try to keep the temperature increase expected by 2100 under two degrees).¶ If humankind’s survival is acknowledged as a funda- mental right, it follows that it should be constitutional- ized, that is inserted in new and old (and aptly modified) Constitutions as well as in a new version of the Univer- sal Declaration of Human Rights; as such, it could be referred to as highest guidance in international treaties aimed at implementing it – rather than being enshrined in a specific ‘survival’ treaty. In constitutional law, a development in this sense is already taking place, in as much as either the rights of future generations to a safe environment or our responsibility towards them in this regard or the imperative to preserve the environ- ment (without mention of the future generations, but implicitly to their benefit) have been affirmed in consti- tutional amendments of the last two decades in countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, but also Burkina Faso and Burundi. Having rights or being protected by the legally defined responsibility of the previous gener- ations is however not the same thing, and with regard to humankind’s survival I would point at its stronger formulation as a right: it is more binding, while the ob- jections against endowing future generations with rights can be easily argued against. Just because it is conceived in favor of those who cannot yet uphold their interest, this right should be protected against cancellation by a sort of Ewigkeitsklausel as in Art. 79.3 of the German Grundgesetz.28 A right to survival is more specific and more stringent than the right to a safe environment be- cause it derives from lethal and global challenges that affect the very core of the polity, protection, rather than from a generic care for a balanced relationship to na- ture or from a diffuse feeling of benevolence for the posterity.¶ In national or regional Constitutions, the acknowl- edgment of this right could be accompanied by the establishment of corresponding institutions, promoting the implementation of the new right; it could be for example an ombudsman29 for future generation as a (countermajoritarian)30 authority protecting their inter- ests against damages resulting from new legislation, and endowed with the power to send it back to the legislative rather than to veto it straight away.31 Not to be underes- timated are the difficulties that would arise in striking a very delicate balance on two levels: in general between the interests of present and future generations,32 but also between parliaments or executives, which act under the pressure of their constituencies, and the members of the ombudsman authority, who remain nonetheless contem- poraries of the former rather than being appointed by the latter – for all too natural reasons.¶ The same difficulty would affect the national courts in which the new fundamental right, as jus cogens principle, should be made claimable at the initiative of institutions such as the ombudsman or of advocacy groups representing a significative number of citizens in a referendum-like counting procedure. In international courts,33 the interest of future generations should be represented by an ombudsman to be established at the UN as well as at regional associations of states such as the EU or Mercosur. A point however that remains¶ open to further discussion has been raised in the de- bate on socio-economic or solidarity rights, which may have some affinity with the right to survival: theoreti- cally, Frank Michelman has made clear that the status of a norm as constitutional law ought not to be con- flated with the question of its availability for judicial enforcement.34 In practice, conflicts are easily possi- ble between the courts sentencing on the states’ failure to implement those rights and “the vain or overbearing nature of these sentences” on a matter that is political rather than judicial. 35 This is true in our case as well: the attainment of a new international order without national possession of nuclear arms or a carbon-free reordering of the world economy are goals for policy-making, not something that can be attained in courts. In this frame- work, however, courts are not jobless: sentencing the nuclear-armed states for their failure in implementing art.VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 or the US of the Bush years for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and failing to cut emissions is a typical judicial matter, as the two cases would regard the break of treaty obligations or the failure to cease doing some- thing harmful, not to bring about something good.37¶ Finally, two more fundamental objections could be raised against the idea of a legal protection of the inter- est of future generations. It could be argued that what would be represented (in a time-universalistic mode) is not the interest of future generations, but rather the interest of a particular fraction of the present ones, dis- guising itself as standard bearer of those people to come. On the one hand this should be taken into account as critical point of view in the public debate on those inter- ests. On the other hand, this criticism, strictly speaking, would also delegitimize such an ancient principle of Roman and Western law as the protection of the child. In morality it would affirm a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of slipping into another person’s clothes and acting from a non-egoistic stance. This can be obviously upheld, but at the price of the disappear- ance of morality as well as of the polity, which is – in any case and among other things – a solidaristic association.¶ A second problem, which is more difficult to deal with, is that we do not know as a general piece of knowl- edge what the interest of future generations is; whereas in the case of legal protection of the child we share a generally accepted knowledge of his or her future in- terest (to remain healthy, to get sufficient education, to be free to make the best of him/herself). What the real life conditions and the presumable vital interests of fu- ture generations will be can only be tentatively argued from what the several branches of natural and economic (e.g. demography) science are able to tell us about what is likely to remain constant in physical and cultural anthropology and what is likely to be most endangered.¶ As such, it is important that moral and political theory renew their relationship to the natural sciences after a time of reciprocal disdain between the two. While sci- ence cannot by itself draw an encompassing picture of future life under global threats, philosophy should learn from science what those future problems are likely to be and elaborate on them, instead of reflecting on the future of humanity by just moving from the doctrines of past philosophers or relying on the hearsay about it based on media reports or the philosopher’s personal divinations.¶ 6. My philosophical proposal to fill a hole in human rights discourse and legislation by introducing a first or meta-fundamental right of humankind to survival and positivizing it in national, international and world law38 resonates with two legal developments. The first related to ‘humanity’, the second to ‘human rights.’ The latter resonates with the novelties in constitutional law men- tioned in §5.¶ The first one began in 1970 as the UN General As- sembly adopted Resolution 2749, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, con- taining the notion of a “common heritage of mankind”; it was originally introduced to protect the seabed and ocean floor and later the “moon and other celestial bod- ies” from exploitation by powerful countries against the interest of the developing ones.39 In the 1990s, the competing and “thinner” concept of “common concern of mankind” emerged, as in the Convention on Bio- diversity of 1992; nonetheless it can be said that hu- mankind has become a notion contained in binding in- ternational law and referred to indivisible (climate) and divisible (seabed, ocean floor, moon) objects, and that this has happened as an answer to problems and chances generated by huge technological advancement.¶ In another corner of legal development, it could be argued that the logical structure, so to speak the norma- tive algorithm of the UDHR norms — the aforemen- tioned ‘everyone has the right . . . ’ — implies that hu- mankind, not just single individuals, is to be the bearer of those rights, even if the collective singular is not used. Turning to a more substantive level, we could go as far as to say that the legal protection of humankind’s survival was implicitly enshrined as early as 1948 in the UDHR and later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the In- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966. Art. 28 UDHR (“ev- eryone has the right to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla- ration can be fully realized”) could be rethought in the direction of institutions bound to implement for every- one, now and in the future, the right to life (Art.3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR), the right to an adequate standard of liv- ing incl. adequate food (Art.11 ICESRC)40 as well as¶ the right of the family to be protected (Art.10 ICESRC), a right that would be denied to families of the posterity bound to live under insufferable environmental condi- tions (cf. above the notion of a transgenerational chain of parents). While the different binding strength of the several **legal formulations** (treaty, covenant, convention, declaration) **cannot be ignored**, it remains clear that le- gal documents do not advance by themselves the cause of humankind’s survival, except if they can be effec- tively referred to in a court of justice; but **they create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring about a change, that is educational and political struggles,** the former aiming at a change in the political culture.¶ To sum up, (**hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by philosophers** and theologians, whose presence in international law was merely philo- sophical, if not rhetorical, as in the Preamble to the UN Charter of 1945. Though not explicitly endowed with rights in the documents quoted above, the humankind of the “common heritage” doctrine is an important prece- dent in the direction, suggested by this article, of in- troducing this new legal actor. When looking at the implementation of the rights that can be attributed to it, the other legal novelty of the “common but dif- ferentiated responsibility”41 of individual actors, such as countries, should also be brought to bear. This is important when it comes to distributing the burden of the duties corresponding to those rights – which is in- deed one of the major issues in the debate following the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change of 2009. In any case, the legal acknowledgment of a “common responsibility” for the global commons is a further step in designing humankind as a juridical notion.¶ This article is policy-oriented in the peculiar sense of a constitutional policy that will require decades, if ever, to become the subject of debate and even longer to be legally implemented. Impulses in this direction are cer- tainly not be expected from the world of politics, but rather from the scientific community (provided a now utopian sounding collaboration of physics, philosophy and legal theory materializes) or from scattered sen- tences of national and international courts, particularly in environmental matter.42 **Support from civil society would help**.¶ Finally, the author’s suggestion as to how to read this proposal: it has a clearly cosmopolitan (or better: cosmopolitical) character, not however in the sense of cosmopolitanism as a general doctrine of government/ governance. It is rather generated by tools coming from realist thought: new threats as source of new rights, and lethal and planetary threats to the survival of hu- mankind’s civilization as drivers towards a new level of legal protection.