# A2 Growth

## Growth Increasing Now

#### U.S. economy will grow at a steady and healthy pace --- speeding it up will create irrational exuberance and a damaging bust later

Amadeo, 6/13 (Kimberly – president of WorldMoneyWatch.com, “US Economic Outlook for 2018 and Beyond; Experts Forecast Steady Growth,” 2018, <https://www.thebalance.com/us-economic-outlook-3305669>)

The U.S. economic outlook is healthy according to the key economic indicators. The most critical indicator is the gross domestic product, which measures the nation's production output. The GDP growth rate is expected to remain between the 2 percent to 3 percent ideal range. Unemployment is forecast to continue at the natural rate. There isn't too much inflation or deflation. That's a Goldilocks economy. President Trump promised to increase economic growth to 4 percent. That's faster than is healthy. Growth at that pace leads to an overconfident irrational exuberance. That creates a boom that leads to a damaging bust. The factors that cause these changes in the business cycle are supply, demand, capital availability, and the market’s perception of the economic future.

#### Growth increasing now --- will break 3 percent

Domm, 6/14 (Patti – CNBC Markets Editor, responsible for news coverage of the markets and economy, “Trump's forecast of 4% GDP growth close to coming true as Americans spend tax-bill proceeds,” 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/14/trumps-forecast-of-4-percent-gdp-growth-close-to-coming-true-as-americans-spend-tax-bill-proceeds.html>)

Armed with new-found proceeds from the tax bill, American consumers went shopping in May, driving retail sales — and economic growth — sharply higher. The economy in the second quarter is tracking close to 4 percent growth — a level President Donald Trump raved about last December, just before the tax bill was approved. At the same time, he had also told reporters he was holding out for a doubling of growth to 6 percent. For now, his 4 percent forecast is close to coming true on a quarterly basis, after strong retail sales data pushed up tracking GDP growth for the second quarter to about double the first quarter's level. The economy grew by 2.2 percent in the first quarter. CNBC/Moody's Analytics Rapid GDP Update reported economists' estimates of tracking GDP show average growth at 3.8 percent, following Thursday's retail sales report. Their actual forecasts, which take into account economic reports yet to be released, is running at an average 3.6 percent. Retail sales in May were up 0.8 percent, double what some economists expected. Without autos, sales were up 0.9 percent. "On the heels of this data we now estimate real GDP is expanding at a 4.0% annual rate in Q2, up from our prior estimate of 2.75% and almost twice the 2.2% growth rate experienced in Q1," wrote JP Morgan chief U.S. economist Michael Feroli. If the economy hits that growth rate, it would be the best since the third quarter of 2014. "The primary source of the acceleration in growth this quarter is the consumer, which looks to be expanding real outlays at a 3.7% rate in Q2 following an anemic 1.0% pace last quarter," Feroli added. "We had looked for a rebound in Q2, as some temporary drags waned and the tax cut boosted disposable incomes. In any event, consumers wasted no time enjoying their tax windfall, as the Q2 saving rate looks like it will revisit the lows for the cycle." U.S. Quarterly GDP Growth **[graph omitted]** White House economic advisors last fall had expected just the corporate tax cuts to send growth to 3 percent to 5 percent annual pace within three years, and they could be hitting the low end of the range this year. In December, Trump was even more optimistic: "So we're at 3.3 percent GDP. I see no reason why we don't go to 4 percent, 5 percent, and even 6 percent," he said at the time. "Net, net, consumers are back in a big way and provide the rocket fuel that is powering the stronger 3 percent growth we are forecasting this quarter," wrote Chris Rupkey, chief financial economist at MUFG Union Bank. "This is exactly what we should expect to see when the economy is giving everyone a job and workers have their pockets stuffed with massive tax cuts cash." Jobless claims also surprised economists Thursday morning, falling 4,000 to a near 44½-year low of 218,000, signaling an economy at full employment. Jefferies chief financial economist Ward McCarthy said he sees quarterly growth averaging over 3.5 percent for the rest of this year, after the softish first quarter, and he expects annual growth breaking 3 percent to 3.1 percent. "I think it's a combination of things. Consumer spending tends to run hot and cold. It ran hot in Q3 and Q4 of last year, and it ran cold in Q1, and it looks like it's heating up again," he said. "I think people are finally starting to see what the tax cuts do for them. When you look at survey data, consumers feel pretty good about the world and confidence is running high. ... When you look at the effect of the tax cuts, it's real personal disposable income and that is on the rise again. Of all the economic indicators, it's the best indication of where spending is going and that is higher." Economists said the better retail sales could be the result of improved May weather, after poor weather in March and April. Building supply dealers saw a 2.4 percent surge and gasoline station sales were up 2 percent. Feroli noted that net exports are also helping GDP growth, adding around 1 percent this quarter. But the corporate boost is not as strong as some expected. "Business investment spending, which had been the star performer over the past year, actually looks close to flat this quarter, thereby chalking up its weakest performance in over a year," he wrote. McCarthy said he expects the higher level of economic activity to continue through next year. "The household tax cuts is somewhat of a temporary boost. The corporate tax cuts is really more of a longer-term phenomena. If we could get through these silly trade war issues without blowing ourselves up, this economy would really be cooking," McCarthy said. Rupkey said the cooling in first-quarter retail sales came after a strong fourth-quarter pace. "But with only one more month to go in the second quarter, retail sales have strengthened back to a 5.8% annual rate, ensuring that growth will indeed hit the Trump administration's target of 3.0%," he wrote. National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow said in April he believes U.S. gross domestic product could hit 5 percent for a time as economic growth moves back toward its long-term trend.

#### Economy growing faster than expected now

Kim, 6/15 (Tae – covers equities and financial markets for CNBC Pro, “Goldman Sachs model now points to 4% second-quarter GDP growth,” 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/goldman-sachs-model-now-points-to-4-percent-second-quarter-gdp-growth.html>)

The U.S. economy is likely growing faster than expected, according to an economic model from Goldman Sachs. The firm raised its second-quarter GDP tracking model growth forecast to 4 percent from 3.9 percent on Friday, citing strong manufacturing economic data. The model incorporates the latest monthly economic releases to produce a GDP growth estimate. "The Empire State manufacturing index unexpectedly strengthened in June, and the underlying composition similarly firmed with strength in all three key components," Goldman's chief economist, Jan Hatzius, said in a note to clients Friday. "In fact, given the firmer pace of utilities output, we boosted our Q2 GDP tracking estimate." Hatzius noted the Empire State manufacturing index rose by 4.9 points to 25 in June versus expectations for a "moderate decline." The tracking number is different from the firm's official economic forecast. The CNBC/Moody's Analytics Rapid GDP Update reported economists' estimates of tracking GDP show average growth of 3.8 percent after Thursday's retail sales report. Jobless claims also surprised economists Thursday, falling 4,000 to a near 44½-year low of 218,000, signaling an economy at full employment.

## Slow Growth Inevitable

#### The economy is at its growth limit now - depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization lock in slow growth

Sharma 17 (Ruchir Sharma, chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management) (“The Boom Was a Blip: Getting Used to Slow Growth”, Foreign Affairs; New York Vol. 96, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2017): 104-114., https://search.proquest.com/docview/1909733563?accountid=14667)

The global recovery from the Great Recession of 2009 has just entered its eighth year and shows few signs of fading. That should be cause for celebration. But this recovery has been an underwhelming one. Throughout this period, the global economy has grown at an average annual pace of just 2.5 percent-a record low when compared with economic rebounds that took place in the decades after World War II. Rather than rejoicing, then, many experts are now anxiously searching for a way to push the world economy out of its low-growth trap. Some economists and investors have placed their hopes on populists such as U.S. President Donald Trump, figuring that if they can make their countries’ economies grow quickly again, the rest of the world might follow along. Given how long the global economy has been in the doldrums, however, it’s worth asking whether the forces slowing growth are merely temporary. Although economists and business leaders complain that a 2.5 percent global growth rate is painfully slow, prior to the 1800s, the world’s economy never grew that fast for long; in fact, it never topped one percent for a sustained period. Even after the Industrial Revolution began in the late eighteenth century, the average global growth rate rarely exceeded 2.5 percent. It was only with the massive baby boom following World War II that the global economy grew at an average pace close to four percent for several decades. That period was an anomaly, however-and should be recognized as such. The causes of the current slowdown can be summed up as the Three Ds: depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization. Between the end of World War II and the financial crisis of 2008, the global economy was supercharged by explosive population growth, a debt boom that fueled investment and boosted productivity, and an astonishing increase in cross-border flows of goods, money, and people. Today, all three trends have begun to sharply decelerate: families are having fewer children than they did in the early postwar years, banks are not expanding their lending as they did before the global financial crisis, and countries are engaging in less crossborder trade. In an ideal world, political leaders would recognize this new reality and dial back their ambitions accordingly. Instead, many governments are still trying to push their economies to reach unrealistic growth targets. Their desperation is understandable, for few voters have accepted the new reality either. Indeed, many recent elections have punished establishment politicians for failing to do more, and some have brought to the fore populists who promise to bring back the good times. This growing disconnect between the political mood and the economic reality could prove dangerous. Anxious to please angry publics, a number of governments have launched radical policy experiments designed to revive economic growth and increase wages, or to at least spread the wealth more equitably-even though such plans are likely to fail, since they often rely on heavy spending that is liable to drive up deficits and spark inflation, leading to boom-and-bust swings. Even worse, some leaders are trying to use nationalism-by scapegoating foreigners or launching military adventures-to divert the public’s attention from the economy altogether. Depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization need not hurt everyone; in fact, they will benefit certain classes of countries, companies, and people. To respond properly to these trends, governments need to plan for them and to manage public expectations. So far, however, few leaders have shown the ability-or even the inclination-to recognize the new economic reality. MORE OR LESS The emergence of the Three Ds represents an epochal reversal in the story of global development, which for decades prior to the Great Recession was a tale of more: more people, more borrowing, and more goods crossing borders. To understand why the plot took such an unexpected turn, it’s helpful to consider the roots of each trend. Depopulation was already under way prior to the economic meltdown. During the postwar baby boom, the annual rate of growth in the global population of working-age people nearly doubled, from one percent in the mid-1950s to over two percent by 1980. This directly boosted economic growth, which is a simple function of how many people are joining the work force and how rapidly their productivity is increasing. By the 1980s, however, signs that the boom would fade had begun to appear, as women in many countries began to bear fewer children, in part because of the spread of contraception. As a result, the annual growth rate of the global working-age population started to fall in stages, with a sharp drop after 2005. By 2016, it had dropped all the way back to just one percent. In the United States, growth in the working-age population declined from 1.2 percent in the early years of this century to just 0.3 percent in 2016-the lowest rate since the un began recording this statistic in 1951. The UN now predicts that worldwide, population growth rates will continue to decline through 2025 and beyond. Such long-term forecasts, which are based on a relatively simple combination of birth and death rates, have an excellent track record. And the economic implications of that trend are clear: every percentage point decline in working age population growth shaves an equally large chunk off the gdf growth rate. In the 1950s and 1960s, the baby boom provided a massive boost to the global economy, as did increases in productivity rooted in large measure in technological advances. As productivity growth slowed in the subsequent decades, however, easy money started to take its place as an economic spur. Beginning in the early 1980s, central banks began to win the war on inflation, which allowed them to lower interest rates dramatically. Until that point, borrowing and economic growth had moved in tandem, as is the norm in a capitalist system; for decades, global debt had grown in line with global gdf. But as falling interest rates lowered the cost of borrowing to near zero, debt surged from 100 percent of global gdp in the late 1980s to 300 percent by 2008. Although some of this borrowed money was wasted on speculation, much of it went to fuel business activity and economic growth. Then came the global financial crisis. Regulations issued in its wake limited the risks that U.S. and European banks could take both in their domestic markets and overseas. In 2008, global capital flows-which are dominated by bank loans-stood at 16 percent of global GDP. Today, those flows hover at around two percent of global gdfback to where the abiiity or even the they were in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, inclination-to recognize many Private and lenders the new economic reality. have been paralyzed by “debt phobia,” \_\_ which has prevented new lending despite the fact that interest rates are at record lows. The only country where borrowing has continued to grow rapidly is China, which did not develop a fear of debt because it remained insulated from the financial crisis in 2008. But globally, since interest rates can hardly drop any further, a new debt boom is extremely unlikely. Globalization is not likely to revive quickly, either. The last time that cross-border flows of money and people slowed down was in 1914, at the onset of World War I. It took three decades for that decline to hit bottom, and then another three decades for flows to recover their prewar peaks. Then, in the early 1980s, many countries began to open their borders, and for the next three decades, the volume of cross-border trade doubled, from the equivalent of 30 percent of global gdf in 1980 to 60 percent in 2008. For many countries, export industries were by far the fastest-growing sector, lifting the overall growth rate of the economy. In the wake of the recession, however, consumers have cut back on spending, and governments have started erecting barriers to goods and services from overseas. Since 2008, according to the Centre for Economic Policy Research’s Global Trade Alert, the world’s major economies have imposed more than 6,000 barriers to protect themselves from foreign competition, including “stealth” measures designed to dodge trade agreements. Partly as a result of such policies, international trade has fallen back to the equivalent of 55 percent of global gdf. This trend is likely to continue as populists opposed to globalization move to further restrict the movement of goods and people. Witness, for example, one of Trump’s first moves in office: killing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tff), a 12- nation deal that was designed by Trump’s predecessor to assure that American-style free-market rules would govern trade in Asia. WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL Depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization have become potent obstacles to growth and should prompt policymakers in countries at all levels of development to redefine economic success, lowering the threshold for what counts as strong annual gdf growth by a full percentage point or two. Poorer countries tend to grow faster, because they start from a lower base. In countries with average annual incomes of less than $5,000, such as Indonesia, a gdf growth rate of more than seven percent has historically been considered strong, but that number should come down to five percent. For countries with average annual incomes of between $5,000 and $15,000, such as China, four percent gdf growth should be considered relatively robust. For developed nations such as the United States, with average annual incomes above $25,000, anything over 1.5 percent should be seen as healthy. This is the new reality of economic success. Yet few, if any, leaders understand or accept it. Given the constraints imposed by the Three Ds, the economies of China, India, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and the United States are all growing at what should be considered healthy rates. Yet few citizens or policymakers in those countries seem satisfied with the status quo. In India, where the economy is now growing at a pace between five and six percent, according to independent estimates, elites still fantasize about hitting eight or nine percent and becoming the next China. The actual China, meanwhile, is still taking on ever more debt in an effort to keep its growth rate above six percent. And in the United States, Trump has talked of somehow getting the already fully developed U.S. economy to grow at four, five, or even six percent a year. Such rhetoric is creating an expectations gap. No region of the world is growing as fast as it was before 2008, and none should expect to. In 2007, at the peak of the pre-crisis boom, the economies of 65 countries- including a number of large ones, such as Argentina, China, India, Nigeria, Russia, and Vietnam-grew at annual rates of seven percent or more. Today, just six economies are growing at that rate, and most of those are in small countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Laos. Yet the leaders of many emerging-market countries still see seven percent annual gdf growth as the benchmark for success.

## Dedev

### Growth Unsustainable

#### Growth is unsustainable --- collapse is inevitable, but now is key.

Ahmed 14 - Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, and taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex (2014, Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The Guardian, “Scientists vindicate 'Limits to Growth' – urge investment in 'circular economy'”, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/04/scientists-limits-to-growth-vindicated-investment-transition-circular-economy> // SM)

According to a new peer-reviewed scientific report, industrial civilisation is likely to deplete its low-cost mineral resources within the next century, with debilitating impacts for the global economy and key infrastructures within the coming decade. The study, the 33rd report to the Club of Rome, is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the University of Florence's Earth Sciences Department, and includes contributions from a wide range of senior scientists across relevant disciplines. The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders. Its first report in 1972, The Limits to Growth, was conducted by a scientific team at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT), and warned that limited availability of natural resources relative to rising costs would undermine continued economic growth by around the second decade of the 21st century. Although widely ridiculed, recent scientific reviews confirm that the original report's projections in its 'base scenario' remain robust. In 2008, Australia's federal government scientific research agency CSIRO concluded that The Limits to Growth forecast of potential "global ecological and economic collapse coming up in the middle of the 21st Century" due to convergence of "peak oil, climate change, and food and water security", is "on-track." Actual current trends in these areas "resonate strongly with the overshoot and collapse displayed in the book's 'business-as-usual scenario.'" In 2009, American Scientist published similar findings by other scientists. That review, by leading systems ecologists Prof Charles Hall of State University of New York and Prof John W Day of Louisiana State University, concluded that while the limits-to-growth model's "predictions of extreme pollution and population decline have not come true", the model results are: "... almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008 (with a few appropriate assumptions)... it is important to recognise that its predictions have not been invalidated and in fact seem quite on target. We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span." The new Club of Rome report says that: "The phase of mining by humans is a spectacular but very brief episode in the geological history of the planet… The limits to mineral extraction are not limits of quantity; they are limits of energy. Extracting minerals takes energy, and the more dispersed the minerals are, the more energy is needed… Only conventional ores can be profitably mined with the amounts of energy we can produce today." The combination of mineral depletion, associated radioactive and heavy metal pollution, and the accumulation of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel exploitation is leaving our descendants the "heavy legacy" of a virtually terraformed world: "The Earth will never be the same; it is being transformed into a new and different planet." Drawing on the work of leading climate scientists including James Hansen, the former head of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, the report warns that a continuation of 'business as usual' exploitation of the world's fossil fuels could potentially trigger runaway global warming that, in several centuries or thousands of years, permanently destroy the planet's capacity to host life. Despite this verdict, the report argues that neither a "collapse" of the current structure of civilisation, nor the "extinction" of the human species are unavoidable. A fundamental reorganisation of the way societies produce, manage and consume resources could support a new high-technology civilisation, but this would entail a new "circular economy" premised on wide-scale practices of recycling across production and consumption chains, a wholesale shift to renewable energy, application of agro-ecological methods to food production, and with all that, very different types of social structures. In the absence of a major technological breakthrough in clean energy production such as nuclear fusion – which so far seems improbable - recycling, conservation and efficiency in the management of the planet's remaining accessible mineral resources will need to be undertaken carefully and cooperatively, with the assistance of cutting-edge science. Limits to economic growth, or even "degrowth", the report says, do not need to imply an end to prosperity, but rather require a conscious decision by societies to lower their environmental impacts, reduce wasteful consumption, and increase efficiency – changes which could in fact increase quality of life while lowering inequality. These findings of the new Club of Rome report have been confirmed by other major research projects. In January last year, a detailed scientific study by Anglia Ruskin University's Global Sustainability Institute commissioned by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, found "overwhelming" evidence for resource constraints: "... across a range of resources over the short (years) and medium (decades) term… Resource constraints will, at best, increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worse, trigger a long term decline in the global economy and civil unrest." The good news, though is that "If governments and economic agents anticipate resource constraints and act in a constructive manner, many of the worst affects can be avoided." According to Dr Aled Jones, lead author of the study and head of the Global Sustainability Institute: "Resource constraints will, at best, steadily increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worst, could represent financial disaster, with the assets of pension schemes effectively wiped out and pensions reduced to negligible levels." It is imperative to recognise that "dwindling resources raise the possibility of a limit to economic growth in the medium term." In his 2014 report to the Club of Rome, Prof Bardi takes a long-term view of the prospects for humanity, noting that the many technological achievements of industrial societies mean there is still a chance now to ensure the survival and prosperity of a future post-industrial civilization: "It is not easy to imagine the details of the society that will emerge on an Earth stripped of its mineral ores but still maintaining a high technological level. We can say, however, that most of the crucial technologies for our society can function without rare minerals or with very small amounts of them, although with modifications and at lower efficiency." Although expensive and environmentally intrusive industrial structures "like highways and plane travel" would become obsolete, technologies like "the Internet, computers, robotics, long-range communications, public transportation, comfortable homes, food security, and more" could remain attainable with the right approach - even if societies undergo disastrous crises in the short-run. Bardi is surprisingly matter-of-fact about the import of his study. "I am not a doomster," he told me. "Unfortunately, depletion is a fact of life, not unlike death and taxes. We cannot ignore depletion - just like it is not a good idea to ignore death and taxes… "If we insist in investing most of what remains for fossil fuels; then we are truly doomed. Yet I think that we still have time to manage the transition. To counter depletion, we must invest a substantial amount of the remaining resources in renewable energy and efficient recycling technologies - things which are not subjected to depletion. And we need to do that before is too late, that is before the energy return on investment of fossil fuels has declined so much that we have nothing left to invest."

### Mindset Shift

#### Yes, mindset shift

Loorbach, et al, 16—DRIFT, Erasmus University, Rotterdam (Derk, with Flor Avelino, DRIFT, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Alex Haxeltine, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Julia M. Wittmayer, DRIFT, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Tim O'Riordan, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Paul Weaver, LUCSUS, Lund University, and René Kemp, ICIS, Maastricht University, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” Ecology and Society 21(4):15, dml)

In this paper, we took a transition perspective to explore how the economic crisis might be understood in a broader societal context and what its implications might be. We showed how the economic crisis, having a clear factual basis, is also taken up through different perspectives in narratives about more fundamental changes (that are deemed necessary). Arguably, the economic crisis is mobilized through different discourses to **create space** for **more disruptive changes**. We also described two **empirical examples** of social innovations as part of a **wide diversity** of cases that clearly respond to the economic crisis and seek to put forward alternatives. Arguably such social innovations mobilize the economic crisis to **legitimize the solutions** they put forward and **increase their visibility** and **added value**. Our argument is therefore that the economic crisis is both helping to give rise to and to strengthen counternarratives or discourses, in that it helps to **accelerate** and **diffuse social innovations**. From a transition perspective, we can understand such dialectics as the coevolution between (perceived) landscape changes and emerging niches. Combined, these **increase pressures** on incumbent regimes that **already struggle** to deal with the economic crisis through optimization strategies. In this view, the current economic crisis might **turn into a game changer** in that it leads to a **fundamental change** in the **dominant economic paradigm** and **visible concrete alternatives** that will **trigger structural changes** at the regime level. These insights about such coevolving changes at different levels have been further conceptualized in terms of “five shades of change” (Avelino et al. 2014), but here we have mainly explored the concepts of game changers, narratives, and social innovation. Our interest lies in how qualitatively different types of change interrelate and interact. We do not presume a particular point of origin or causality, but rather see the different shades of change as a conceptual heuristic to guide our empirical and theoretical analysis of emergent deep change in society. In distinguishing between these different types of change, we focus on those processes that explicitly produce transformative alternative practices, structures, and cultures. In this way, we deepen the concept of landscape, which plays an important role in transition studies. So far, the landscape includes all those external macrofactors that influence the dynamics within a regime. We have alternatively conceptualized the economic crisis as a phenomenon internal to the system, coevolving with societal discourses and empowering transformative social innovation. In this way, the economic crisis is an example of a game changer: a macrophenomenon that pushes a complex societal system out of its dynamic equilibrium. To be a game changer, a macrodevelopment must thus change the dominant understandings, values, institutions, and social relationships through which society is organized and defined. This is likely to be a slow and gradual process, operating through narratives of change and developments on the ground. The economic crisis is a clear example of this, yet with quite uncertain consequences for the future course of development. Our contingency view on history prevents us from making predictions. We found, however, that the economic crises does offer scope for **progressive developments**, including (renewed debates about) a merging of the public, private, and civil spheres to support social innovation, opening up the possibility for all of these sectors to **work together** in creating/supporting social innovation based around **new economic models**. Under such conditions, the economic crisis in itself can be understood as **accelerating the convergence** of these developments and in this way becomes a **game changer**. However, empirical observations also suggest a more nuanced interpretation: whereas indeed the crisis has encouraged the search for alternatives, these seem still very diverse, fragmented, and small in scale to provide a full-scale solution. Although the legitimacy of capitalism has been questioned, this has **not as yet proven to be a fatal blow**. As Mark Fischer (2009) famously argued, it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. The same pressures (and power relations) that led to the economic crisis not being foreseen (and/or allowed to happen) may likely affect the way in which the game changer is understood and acted upon by society. Actors have developed certain (counter)narratives in response to the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the search for **new** and **adapted models** of capitalism as well as for **alternative**, **complementary**, and **blended approaches** to how societies meet their needs, has been **boosted** and **given added urgency** by the tensions and contradictions that the economic and financial **crises** have brought to the fore (Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). Our perspective implies a more nuanced understanding of complex societal crises not only as temporary periods of stress in society but as symptoms and accelerators of deeper underlying processes of change. But our perspective also might have practical implications. It could, for example, imply that social innovators can increase the transformative potential of their social innovations by smartly playing into the societal game changers of their times, while simultaneously connecting to political (calls for) system innovation, as well as linking up with multilayered narratives of change in both mainstream and grassroots movements. By anticipating game changers and the inevitable tensions in perceived crises, actors can prepare for strategically proposing systemic alternatives when key opportunities open up (Rotmans et al. 2001, Loorbach and Lijnis-Hueffenreuter 2013). An example is social innovators smartly playing into societal game changers of their times, while simultaneously connecting to political (calls for) system innovation, as well as linking up with multilayered narratives of change in both mainstream and grassroots movements. CONCLUSION This paper set out to explore how we can understand the economic crisis from a transitions perspective. The persistency of problems associated with our currently dominant economic regimes (e.g., unemployment, inequality, ecological degradation) seems evident and reason for concern and action. We summarized a variety of alternative perspectives or discourses from which the argument for more fundamental systemic change is made. These debates combined with the perceived effects of the crises **create space** and **agency** for **transformative social innovation**. We argued that there is an increasing convergence among the transformative discourses, narratives, and practices, but also that it is impossible to foresee or predict future developments. In exploring the economic crisis this way, we also sought to unpack the concept of landscape and further develop our conceptual understanding of interacting different types of change. From a transition perspective, we argue that the combination of such different types of changes (**crises** internal to the presently dominant economic system, **counternarratives**, and a **critical mass** of **concrete alternative practices** and **models**) are the ingredients for a **chaotic**, **nonlinear**, and **structural period** of **structural systemic change** (Loorbach 2014). Game changers such as the economic crisis tend to give rise to (or at least coincide with) emerging **social unrest**, **political debates**, **discussions** about the **dismantling**/**redefining** of the state, and **debates** about the **(re)scaling** of governance mechanisms. Social innovation initiatives, such as time banks and transition movement, often go **hand in hand** with narratives on (re)localization (Bailey et al. 2010) and self-governance and self-organization (Boonstra and Boelens 2011, Eriksson 2012, Meerkerk et al. 2012). A pertinent question is how these narratives on new forms of governance relate to the role(s) of governments and intergovernmental institutions such as the EU, and how (the interaction between) different types of governance responses and approaches influence the dynamics of transformative social innovation. With this paper, we hope to encourage further analysis into the economic crisis as a game changer and stimulate further work on understanding societal transitions.

### Warming Impact

#### Collapse key to avoid macrodegree temperatures.

Siegel, 2009(Lee, Is Global Warming Unstoppable? Theory Also Says Energy Conservation Doesn't Help, 22 November 2009, http://www.unews.utah.edu/p/?r=112009-1)

In a provocative new study, a University of Utah scientist argues that rising carbon dioxide emissions - the major cause of global warming - cannot be stabilized unless the world's economy collapses or society builds the equivalent of one new nuclear power plant each day. "It looks unlikely that there will be any substantial near-term departure from recently observed acceleration in carbon dioxide emission rates," says the new paper by Tim Garrett, an associate professor of atmospheric sciences. Garrett's study was panned by some economists and rejected by several journals before acceptance by Climatic Change, a journal edited by renowned Stanford University climate scientist Stephen Schneider. The study will be published online this week. The study - which is based on the concept that physics can be used to characterize the evolution of civilization - indicates: •Energy conservation or efficiency doesn't really save energy, but instead spurs economic growth and accelerated energy consumption. •Throughout history, a simple physical "constant" - an unchanging mathematical value - links global energy use to the world's accumulated economic productivity, adjusted for inflation. So it isn't necessary to consider population growth and standard of living in predicting society's future energy consumption and resulting carbon dioxide emissions. •"Stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at current rates will require approximately 300 gigawatts of new non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power production capacity annually - approximately one new nuclear power plant (or equivalent) per day," Garrett says. "Physically, there are no other options without killing the economy." Getting Heat for Viewing Civilization as a "Heat Engine" Garrett says colleagues generally support his theory, while some economists are critical. One economist, who reviewed the study, wrote: "I am afraid the author will need to study harder before he can contribute." "I'm not an economist, and I am approaching the economy as a physics problem," Garrett says. "I end up with a global economic growth model different than they have." Garrett treats civilization like a "heat engine" that "consumes energy and does 'work' in the form of economic production, which then spurs it to consume more energy," he says. "If society consumed no energy, civilization would be worthless," he adds. "It is only by consuming energy that civilization is able to maintain the activities that give it economic value. This means that if we ever start to run out of energy, then the value of civilization is going to fall and even collapse absent discovery of new energy sources." Garrett says his study's key finding "is that accumulated economic production over the course of history has been tied to the rate of energy consumption at a global level through a constant factor." That "constant" is 9.7 (plus or minus 0.3) milliwatts per inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar. So if you look at economic and energy production at any specific time in history, "each inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar would be supported by 9.7 milliwatts of primary energy consumption," Garrett says. Garrett tested his theory and found this constant relationship between energy use and economic production at any given time by using United Nations statistics for global GDP (gross domestic product), U.S. Department of Energy data on global energy consumption during1970-2005, and previous studies that estimated global economic production as long as 2,000 years ago. Then he investigated the implications for carbon dioxide emissions. "Economists think you need population and standard of living to estimate productivity," he says. "In my model, all you need to know is how fast energy consumption is rising. The reason why is because there is this link between the economy and rates of energy consumption, and it's just a constant factor." Garrett adds: "By finding this constant factor, the problem of [forecasting] global economic growth is dramatically simpler. There is no need to consider population growth and changes in standard of living because they are marching to the tune of the availability of energy supplies." To Garrett, that means the acceleration of carbon dioxide emissions is unlikely to change soon because our energy use today is tied to society's past economic productivity. "Viewed from this perspective, civilization evolves in a spontaneous feedback loop maintained only by energy consumption and incorporation of environmental matter," Garrett says. It is like a child that "grows by consuming food, and when the child grows, it is able to consume more food, which enables it to grow more." Is Meaningful Energy Conservation Impossible? Perhaps the most provocative implication of Garrett's theory is that conserving energy doesn't reduce energy use, but spurs economic growth and more energy use. "Making civilization more energy efficient simply allows it to grow faster and consume more energy," says Garrett. He says the idea that resource conservation accelerates resource consumption - known as Jevons paradox - was proposed in the 1865 book "The Coal Question" by William Stanley Jevons, who noted that coal prices fell and coal consumption soared after improvements in steam engine efficiency. So is Garrett arguing that conserving energy doesn't matter? "I'm just saying it's not really possible to conserve energy in a meaningful way because the current rate of energy consumption is determined by the unchangeable past of economic production. If it feels good to conserve energy, that is fine, but there shouldn't be any pretense that it will make a difference." Yet, Garrett says his findings contradict his own previously held beliefs about conservation, and he continues to ride a bike or bus to work, line dry family clothing and use a push lawnmower. An Inevitable Future for Carbon Dioxide Emissions? Garrett says often-discussed strategies for slowing carbon dioxide emissions and global warming include mention increased energy efficiency, reduced population growth and a switch to power sources that don't emit carbon dioxide, including nuclear, wind and solar energy and underground storage of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning. Another strategy is rarely mentioned: a decreased standard of living, which would occur if energy supplies ran short and the economy collapsed, he adds. "Fundamentally, I believe the system is deterministic," says Garrett. "Changes in population and standard of living are only a function of the current energy efficiency. That leaves only switching to a non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power source as an available option." "The problem is that, in order to stabilize emissions, not even reduce them, we have to switch to non-carbonized energy sources at a rate about 2.1 percent per year. That comes out to almost one new nuclear power plant per day." "If society invests sufficient resources into alternative and new, non-carbon energy supplies, then perhaps it can continue growing without increasing global warming," Garrett says. Does Garrett fear global warming deniers will use his work to justify inaction? "No," he says. "Ultimately, it's not clear that policy decisions have the capacity to change the future course of civilization."

#### Extinction

Tickell, 2008 (8/11/08, Oliver Tickell – Climate Researcher, The Guardian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

### Agriculture Impact

#### Growth kills agricultural diversity

Chen 2000 (Professor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School (Jim, Globalization and Its Losers, Winter 2000, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157, Lexis,)

Like America, the impulse toward species conservation "was born in the country and moved to the city." 296 Our awareness of extinction began on the farm. The opening chapter of The Origin of Species explored variation in domesticated plants and animals. 297 As industrialization forced smaller farms to fold or consolidate, entire landraces, varieties, and breeds vanished. The biological crisis of Darwin's England has spread to the rest of the globe. Agriculture's shallow genetic pool is being drained at a breakneck pace "as human population and economic pressures [\*205] accelerate the pace of change in traditional agricultural systems." 298 Globalization portends dire consequences for agricultural biodiversity. Rural communities preserve rare animal breeds and plant varieties in situ. Over many generations, traditional foraging and agrarian communities have amassed volumes of ethnobiological knowledge. 299 The world's untapped ethnobiological knowledge, "if gathered and catalogued, would constitute a library of Alexandrian proportions." 300 Much of this knowledge, locked as it is in endangered languages, will be irretrievable if linguistic diversity continues to decline. 301

#### Extinction

Mulvany, 2001 (senior policy adviser at Practical Action. Chair of the UK Food Group. Has been a trustee of Oxfam, Action Aid and CIIR and adviser to many other international NGOs. He was a founder editorial board member of Development in Practice journal. Masters degree from Oxford University and is a chartered member of the Institute of Biology—AND—Rachel Berger—climate change Policy Advisor with Practical Action (Patrick, Agricultural Biodiversity: Farmers Sustaining the Web of Life, http://practicalaction.org/docs/advocacy/fwn\_bio-div\_briefing.pdf,)

Agricultural biodiversity embraces the living matter that produces food and other farm products, supports production and shapes agricultural landscapes. The variety of tastes, textures and colours in food is a product of agricultural biodiversity. This biodiversity is the result of the interaction by smallholder farmers, herders and artisanal fisherfolk with other species over millennia. Selecting and managing these for local nutritional, social and economic needs has produced the agricultural biodiversity on which humanity depends. Food production systems need to be rooted in sustaining agricultural biodiversity so that farmers everywhere can continue to provide food and livelihoods and maintain life on Earth. STRENGTH IN DIVERSITY At a time of unprecedented changes in society, population and the environment, agricultural biodiversity also provides some security against future adversity, be it from climate change, war, industrial developments, biotechnological calamities or ecosystem collapse. There is greater strength in diversity than in susceptible uniformity. A diversity of varieties, breeds and species will ensure that there will continue to be agricultural production whatever the threat, and hidden in the genetic code of today's crop plants and livestock are many invisible traits that may become useful in confronting future challenges.

### Poverty Impact

#### Growth causes poverty

Trainer, 2002 (Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO,)

Rich countries are taking most of the world’s resource production. Their per capita resource consumption is about 20 times the average of the poorest half of the world’s people. That they are consuming far more than their fair share is evident in many measures; for example, to provide a North American lifestyle requires approximately 12 ha of productive land, but the per capital average amount of productive land on the planet is only 1.2 ha. The rich squander resources on affluent living standards and frivolous luxuries while billions live in poverty. Many of these resources are drawn from the Third World. Much of the productive capacity of the Third World has been allocated to the production of commodities and manufactured goods for the benefit of the corporations and banks in the rich countries, who own the plantations and factories, and of the people who shop in rich world supermarkets. Very little of the benefit goes to the poor majority in the Third World. Shirt makers in Bangladesh are paid 15 cents an hour.2 In other words, the development that has taken place is almost totally inappropriate to the needs of most Third World people. It has been development in the interests of the rich. The crucial point about ‘development’ is to do with options foregone. It is easy to imagine forms of development that are far more likely to meet the needs of people, their society and their ecosystems but these are prohibited by conventional/ capitalist development. Needs would be most effectively met if people were able to apply their available resources of land, forest, fisheries, labour, skill and capital to the production of basic items such as food and shelter. This is precisely what normal conventional /capitalist development prevents, because it ensures that the available resources and the productive capacity are drawn into the most profitable ventures, which means mostly into producing relatively luxurious items for export to richer people. Compare the capacity of a worker to feed his family on the 15 cents an hour wage earned in a shirt factory, spent on food imported from a rich country, with the approximately four hours per week required by a home gardener to produce all the vegetables a family requires.3 The global economy is therefore an imperial system, one in which there is a net flow of resources and wealth from the poor to the rich and the resources the poor majority of people once had have been taken from them and now produce mostly for the benefit of the rich few. These unjust distributions and the inappropriate development are primarily due to the market mechanism. Economic activity and especially development are not determined by reference to the needs of humans, societies and ecosystems. In the present global economy they are determined mostly by market forces. The inevitable result is that the rich get almost all of the valuable resources (because they can pay most for them) and that almost all of the development that takes place is development of whatever rich people want (because that is most profitable, i.e. will return most on invested capital). It is in other words a capitalist economic system and such a system ensures that the few who own most of the capital (most is now owned by about 1% of the world’s people) will only invest it in ventures that are most likely to maximise profits, and therefore in ventures which produce for those people with most ‘effective demand’, i.e. rich people. No other forms of development are undertaken, hence much of the productive capacity of Tuvalu or Haiti lies idle because people with capital can make more money investing somewhere else. More importantly, no other forms of development are conceivable. The dominant ideology has ensured that ‘development’ cannot be thought of in any other way than as investing capital in order to increase the capacity to produce for sale in the market.4 Thus the possibility that development might be seen predominantly as improving the quality of life, security, the environment and social cohesion, or that these things might be achievable only if the goal of increasing the GDP is rejected, almost never occurs in the development literature, let alone in development practice. Development can only be thought of in terms of movement along the single dimension to greater levels of business turnover, sales, consumption, exporting, investing and GDP. Thus conventional development is only the kind of development that results when what is developed is left to be determined by whatever will most enrich those few with capital competing in a market situation. The inevitable result is development in the interests of the rich, i.e. those with the capital to invest and those with most purchasing power. The global economy now works well for perhaps less than 10% of the world’s people, i.e. the upper 40% of the people in rich counties, plus the tiny Third World elites. Conventional development is, in other words, a form of plunder. It takes most of the world’s wealth, especially its productive capacity and allocates it to the rich few, and it takes much of this from billions of people who are so seriously deprived that 1200 million people are malnourished and tens of thousands die every day. Again the core point is that there are far better options; it is possible to imagine other forms of development in which the resources and the productive capacity of Third World people are fully devoted to production by the people of the things they most urgently need.

### A2 Innovation

#### Innovation is mathematically impossible – resource constraints prove

 Christopher Ketcham 17, writer for the Pacific Standard, among other publications, citing Joseph Tainter, a professor of sustainability at Utah State University, “The Fallacy of Endless Economic Growth,” 5/16/17, https://psmag.com/magazine/fallacy-of-endless-growth

Now, at the very moment that we need innovation to accelerate—to mount a viable response to climate change, to locate new resources and replace dwindling or despoiled ones—evidence suggests that the opposite is happening. Joseph Tainter, a professor of sustainability at Utah State University, examined innovation trends using 30 years of data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. What he found was troubling. Slightly more than half of all patents issued in this country are to foreign entities, so Tainter considered changes to the number of patents per applicant to be an accurate indicator of global productivity as expressed through invention. In the major technical fields he studied—drugs and chemicals, metallurgy, energy, biotechnology, information technology, and so on—he found that the number of researchers on each patent steadily increased between 1974 and 2005. This means more time and man-hours—and presumably more money invested—for a declining return. In his 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies—a kind of companion volume to Limits—Tainter makes the case that as civilizations grow they produce increasingly complex problems that demand increasingly complex solutions. Complexity demands more energy, requiring new technologies for energy extraction. But, as Tainter's study suggests, innovation may have its own limits. The concept of energy-return-on-investment, known as EROI, was originally coined in reference to fossil-fuel exploration, and is commonly used to compare the amount of energy required to extract, transport, and refine a particular resource with the amount of energy it ultimately provides. EROI for our master energy source happens to be plummeting, as discovery and extraction of fossil fuels becomes more difficult and costly. (The rising cost—which is to say complexity—of resource extraction and retrieval was one of Limits' broad projections that also turned out to be accurate.) EROI for global oil and gas production went from 30-to-1 in 1995 to 18-to-1 in 2006. In the U.S., the EROI for oil discovery in 1919 was an astonishing 1,000-to-1. By the 2010s, it was 5-to-1. In mining, multifactor productivity—which reflects the efficiency with which the inputs of capital, labor, materials, services, and energy generate a unit of mineral product—has been on a downward slope since 2002. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, it now takes 40 percent more inputs to dig up minerals in general, while the grain sizes and ore grades of what's being retrieved are declining. The Journal of Environmental Science and Engineering reported in 2013 that, "under the present paradigm of use," the world, within decades, will begin seeing "scarcity" of "most of the strategically important metals and materials that are fundamental to [the] running of our societies." According to the study's lead authors, a chemical engineering professor at Lund University in Sweden and an applied systems analyst at Stockholm University, "scarcity may lead [to] 'peak civilization,' unless urgent countermeasures are systematically undertaken." Even in the midst of substantial innovation, today's global economy has become more profligate and more wasteful, using more materials per unit of GDP than it did 20 years ago. According to a 2016 report from the International Resource Panel at the United Nations Environment Programme, the amount of virgin natural resource needed for a given amount of product has gone up 17 percent over a single decade. In 2000, it took an average 1.2 kilograms of materials to generate one dollar of global GDP. By 2010, it took 1.4 kilograms. The amount of primary materials extracted from the Earth globally rose from 22 billion tonnes in 1970 to 70 billion tonnes in 2010, with per capita global material use going from seven tonnes in 1970 to 10 tonnes over the same 40-year period. According to the report, there is "growing environmental pressure per unit of economic activity," not less. Optimists will undoubtedly look to renewable energy as a stay against declining EROI and rising seas. But they may be blindsided by the stark limits of wind, solar, and hydro. Researchers at Monash University, marshaling considerable data, concluded that the cheerful scenarios projecting renewables will supply most of the world's energy by mid-century "assume unrealistic technical potentials and implementation times." Which means we'll be stuck mostly with fossil fuels to keep the expansion machine running. Tim Jackson of the University of Surrey has calculated that, at current rates of carbon density—the amount of carbon released per unit of energy consumed—our greenhouse gas emissions will increase by more than 2 percent per year. At that rate, by 2050 carbon dioxide emissions would be more than double what they were in 2015. To achieve a tenfold reduction in global emissions by 2050, carbon density would have to decline on average 8.6 percent annually—almost 10 times the rate at which it has declined over the last 50 years and 50 times faster than in the past decade. In other words, we would have to innovate carbon-reduction strategies at rates never before seen, with technologies of immense effectiveness whose global-scale implementation would be entirely unprecedented.

## No War Impact

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Robb 12—Lieutenant, US Navy (Doug, Why the Age of Great Power War is Over, [www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over](http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over))

Whereas in years past, when nations allied with their neighbors in ephemeral bonds of convenience, today’s global politics are tempered by permanent international organizations, regional military alliances, and formal economic partnerships. Thanks in large part to the prevalence of liberal democracies, these groups are able to moderate international disputes and provide forums for nations to air grievances, assuage security concerns, and negotiate settlements—thereby making war a distant (and distasteful) option. As a result, China (and any other global power) has much to lose by flouting international opinion, as evidenced by its advocacy of the recent Syrian uprising, which has drawn widespread condemnation.¶ In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense.¶ Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.”¶ Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable.¶ In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.”¶ As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.”¶ Great-power war is not an end in itself, but rather a way for nations to achieve their strategic aims. In the current security environment, such a war is equal parts costly, counterproductive, archaic, and improbable.

#### Economic decline doesn’t lead to war

Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

# A2 Tech Leadership

## STEM High/Resilient

#### STEM shortage is a myth with no data *invented* by the industry – *only* empirical evidence goes neg

Smith 17 --- PhD, Prof at University of Leicester (Emma, “Shortage or surplus? A long‐term perspective on the supply of scientists and engineers in the USA and the UK,” Review of Education Volume: 5 Issue 2, online)

The arguments presented in this paper have been guided by five questions about the longevity of the science and engineering shortage debate in the UK and the USA and the role this has played in shaping science education policy over the long term. A number of key findings have emerged. First that concerns over shortages of suitably qualified scientists and engineers are nothing new and have existed since at least the time of the Second World War. Second that the levels of concern have risen and fallen in line with global events that have largely been related to issues of national security and economic growth such as the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the economic success of Japan in the early 1980s. Each cycle has been characterised by demands from employer organisations, government departments and the education sector for further investment in scientific education and training in order to meet projected shortfalls in the numbers of suitably qualified STEM workers. The reasons provided for these apparent shortages have remained remarkably similar over the period: insufficient numbers of young people studying key subjects at the highest levels, the poor quality of school science teaching and insufficient numbers of well‐qualified science teachers. Remedies have tended to involve requiring more young people to study science through compulsory study at school or initiatives intended to encourage participation in science and engineering education or careers, often at considerable expense to the taxpayer. A third finding shows there is no consensus view about the existence of a skills deficit. Ever since the time of Sputnik, claims of shortages by the sector have been matched by counterclaims by labour market economists and other analysts that there is little evidence of sustained and long‐term shortages in the sector. Finally we have seen that the shortage debate is underpinned by methodological and conceptual shortcomings that leave the veracity of the deficit claims in doubt. Although these shortage claims have frequently been challenged, the rhetoric contained in these accounts of a crisis in science and engineering recruitment is strong (see for example the language used in the A Nation at Risk report) and persistent and has succeeded in becoming the dominant political and public view. As a consequence, alternative accounts are largely absent from wider discussion, which, in turn, has served to ‘confuse serious thinking and to distort public policy’ (Teitelbaum, 2014, p. 26). As the economist Paul Krugman has argued: the purported skills gap is ‘a prime example of a zombie idea—an idea that should have been killed by evidence, but refuses to die’ (Krugman, 2014, p. A21). Discussion So what can we conclude from this discussion of the wider historical context of the science and engineering shortage debate? As summarised above, although the shortage debate has a long history, it is one that is characterised by poor quality data, methodological and conceptual challenges, but this is a debate that continues in the UK and the USA, as well as in many other countries (e.g. Gago et al., 2004; Shah & Burke, 2003), where concerns about the relative decline of science and engineering in their respective nations have tended to follow the same trajectories of ‘alarm, boom and bust’ (Teitelbaum, 2014) described here. Seven decades of a purported shortage crisis have resulted in repeated calls for action from influential national figures to increase the flow of, usually, graduates into science and engineering fields, but the evidence presented in this paper suggests that while there may have been short‐lived shortfalls in specialist areas (such as within the energy industry), there is no evidence in support of widespread and far reaching shortages as the rhetoric claims, and little to indicate that if there were any shortages that they have been sustained and far reaching (see also Weinstein, 2002). So why has this myth persisted for so long and with such potentially destabilising consequences for the sector? One of the answers lies in conflicting views of how the labour market operates and in particular how the term shortage is interpreted, whether it be a shortfall in numerical supply (i.e. enough people to do a job) or related to an employer's requirement for lower cost employees. These different conceptions of what constitutes a shortage have been central to many of the claims and counterclaims that have come to characterise this debate, but there are other reasons as well. Many of these are related to the often inadequately explained methods used to gather and interpret data on workforce supply and demand. Such analysis is not straightforward and difficulties with definitions and data have been central to shortage controversies in other areas such as the medical and the teaching profession. As this paper has shown, the use of different and often inadequate definitions of occupations and qualifications have often been combined with confusion over the relationship between the two. There has also been an over‐reliance on techniques that involve projecting past trends to the future and an uncritical acceptance of employer estimates of future shortages. All these problems have resulted seventy years on in there being still no widely accepted way of compiling reliable data on workforce supply and demand. Without wishing to stray into conspiracy theory, maintaining accounts of a ‘crisis’ in the supply of STEM workers has usually been in the interests of industry, the education sector and government, as well as the lobby groups that represent them. Concerns about a shortage have meant the allocation of significant additional resources to the sector whose representatives have, in turn, become powerful voices in advocating for further funds and further investment. Their arguments for increased investment and the reform of science and engineering education and training have tended to be as follows. First, as the potential for scientific discoveries is unlimited (which for many is a good thing), there should be a continuous increase in the supply of qualified personnel. Second, market forces are not able to deliver resources in sufficient quantity or quality to meet national needs and that as a consequence government should secure finances to provide the right number of scientists and engineers (Godin, 2002). To demand more scientists and engineers is, to some extent, in the interests of wider society as well. A larger pool of workers and more funding could mean further, faster and cheaper advances in medical, technological and other fields, but there are also human and ethical costs in using a shortage debate to encourage students to study science and engineering at undergraduate and graduate level (while incurring considerable debt) many of whom face little prospect of stable and rewarding careers in the field.

#### STEM leadership and innovation resilient – no evidence of decline

Breiner 16 --- prof at U of Cincinnati, PhD Chemistry (Jonathon, “Do We Have a STEM Crisis in America?,” March 2, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssm.12167>)

Do we have a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) crisis in America? If so, are we adequately addressing it? Crisis is such a strong word. Starting with A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE), 1983) up to the present day, most of us reading this would opine that we do have a crisis, but I am not as sure as I once was. For the record, I believe there is more than enough room for educational improvements and there are huge gaps that need to be addressed, especially in regard to gender and race, but I do not believe there is a crisis. Further, the manufacturing of this “crisis” has sometimes allowed those best tasked with improving teaching in STEM to be placed under the guidance of competing interests with little understanding of educational processes and techniques. The goals for better STEM education and the reasons for the “crisis” are usually related to workforce development, specifically as it aligns with national security and global and economic competiveness (Breiner, Harkness, Johnson, & Koehler, 2012; Koehler, Binns, & Bloom, 2015). In a White House press release (2010), President Obama was quoted as saying, “Strengthening STEM education is vital to preparing our students to compete in the 21st century economy and we need to recruit and train math and science teachers to support our nation’s students.” Numerous times since President Obama has reiterated the need for training more and better-prepared teachers and creating a larger and better-prepared STEM workforce. The main piece of evidence for the crisis seems to be the testing performance of U.S. students on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), but I am not sure that this points to a crisis. There is only a supposed correlation to workforce development and it has not been established by research. Even though the U.S. underwhelming TIMSS performance has been roughly consistent, the U.S. Department of Commerce (2008) states that the country is more than 75% wealthier in terms of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita than it was three decades ago, which is attributable to productivity gains driven by innovation. While innovation is at best difficult to measure, there are no indications or data to suggest there is a decline. Even though the issues within our schools were made clear in 1983 (NCEE), and there has not been much change in our students’ performance relative to the rest of the world since then, we have still increased net wealth per capita quite markedly. It is possible these educational issues have always been there, but are not inhibiting the top line growth. The issue we need to address is probably not one of global economic competitiveness, but rather of the gap between higher and lower wage earners in the United States and the root causes. Many have argued that there is a crisis due to shortages in the STEM workforce in meeting current and future needs (e.g., Friedman, 2005; National Academy of Science (NAS), 2007; National Science Foundation (NSF), 2005). Closer examination of data suggests that this conclusion may not be completely accurate. Some recent data (e.g., Anft, 2013; Charette, 2013; Stevenson, 2014) suggests that in many areas of the STEM workforce there is an oversupply resulting in lower paying jobs. Thus many STEM educated workers leave STEM careers to gain better employment in other fields. Even the U.S. Department of Labor (2015) noted after a literature review that there is a significant heterogeneity in the STEM labor market: the academic sector is generally oversupplied, while the government sector and private industry have shortages, but only in specific areas. Researchers in the UK (Smith & Gorard, 2011) and Australia (Panizzon, Corrigan, Forgasz, & Hopkins, 2015) have made similar conclusions in their countries. So the issues are not general to STEM but rather to specific areas that have workforce shortages while others do not. Thus any efforts that are general and not specific to actual needs may be time and money wasted. Is the “crisis” even new? Jolly (2009) outlines the need for qualified and technically skilled personnel that has been ongoing since at least 1802 when West Point Graduates were used to build roads, railroads, and bridges to aid the early U.S. expansion. Additionally, Jolly (2009) notes the Morrill Act of 1862 that established the College School Science and Mathematics 113 Agriculture & Mechanical Arts system ultimately leading to the development of the University research system, and last century’s response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, and finally the more recent “crisis” to maintain global competitiveness. I argue this is not a current crisis but is an ongoing issue that will never be solved. It will continually flux between more and less critical. As our country evolves, the needs of the population evolve and we must constantly reinvent how we are solving this issue within its given era. The necessity for the United States to remain strong in the global economy will not go away, but the means to achieve it probably will require flexibility as our society continues to change. Finally, are we adequately addressing the issue? In some quarters the answer is yes and in others it is probably no. I do believe we are not adequately collaborating and utilizing all available resources. Different disciplines and stakeholders have different skills and knowledge useful to improving education, but too often we only act within our own sphere of knowledge. For example, how many STEM education programs encourage the structured development of spatial thinking? Uttal and Cohen (2012) document a correlation between students of low spatial abilities and both their low relative entry rate into STEM majors their high rate of drop out when they do enter. Further Uttal and Cohen (2012) note that there is a link between spatial thinking and performance in STEM even when controlling for verbal and mathematical reasoning (Wai, Lubinski, & Steiger, 2010) and that spatial skills respond positively to education interventions (Baenninger & Newcombe, 1989; Terlecki, Newcombe, & Little, 2008; Wright, Thompson, Ganis, Newcombe, & Kosslyn, 2008). They suggest testing and early intervention. Another example, are we using tools, curriculum, and outcomes that are developmentally appropriate, especially during the early and formative years? Recent research from Stanford’s School of Medicine (Qin et al., 2015) notes how brains work when performing math skills. Most of our brains change how we perform math during the rough ages of seven to nine years. This may suggest that we are not teaching developmentally appropriate math skills in the early grades where brain development varies widely between first and fourth grades. Those who underperform are labeled and often they struggle to break the label. I am sure there are other examples that are too numerous to mention in this short space. Ultimately, we all only know what we know and without more effective collaboration, this will be one of our biggest barriers to improving STEM education. I am aware that we have room to improve STEM Education and STEM workforce development, but it needs to be centered on creating real solutions to real problems. I am simply suggesting that we are not a nation at risk at the level we thought in 1802, 1957, 1983, or now. I am a proponent of more and better research and better evidence-based conclusions. The best teachers and researchers consistently, if not constantly reflect. I think we need to reflect on how we deal with the STEM crisis regardless of what it is called, and researchers need to lead the effort and not be led. In the December editorial in this journal, Johnson and Walton (2015) noted some issues with regard to the STEM pipeline and made a key point that is valid here and across all STEM, and that is that we need to conduct more research. We have too many important conclusions driving what we do, often with insufficient data to support the conclusions. Additionally, it is possible we are limited in our current approaches we are using to improve STEM education due to poor collaborations and utilization of knowledge from other fields. At least for now I know one thing: I will no longer perpetuate the myth of a STEM crisis, but simultaneously I will be working to improve whatever it is called.

## No Resource Wars

#### No resource wars

Bruno Tetrais 12, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique, former Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly, “The Demise of Ares,” 2012, csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf

The Unconvincing Case for ‘‘New Wars’’ ¶ Is the demise of war reversible? In recent years, the metaphor of a new ‘‘Dark Age’’ or ‘‘Middle Ages’’ has flourished. 57 The rise of political Islam, Western policies in the Middle East, the fast development of emerging countries, population growth, and climate change have led to fears of ‘‘civilization,’’ ‘‘resource,’’ and ‘‘environmental’’ wars. We have heard the New Middle Age theme before. In 1973, Italian writer Roberto Vacca famously suggested that mankind was about to enter an era of famine, nuclear war, and civilizational collapse. U.S. economist Robert Heilbroner made the same suggestion one year later. And in 1977, the great Australian political scientist Hedley Bull also heralded such an age. 58 But the case for ‘‘new wars’’ remains as flimsy as it was in the 1970s.¶ Admittedly, there is a stronger role of religion in civil conflicts. The proportion of internal wars with a religious dimension was about 25 percent between 1940 and 1960, but 43 percent in the first years of the 21st century. 59 This may be an effect of the demise of traditional territorial conflict, but as seen above, this has not increased the number or frequency of wars at the global level. Over the past decade, neither Western governments nor Arab/Muslim countries have fallen into the trap of the clash of civilizations into which Osama bin Laden wanted to plunge them. And ‘‘ancestral hatreds’’ are a reductionist and unsatisfactory approach to explaining collective violence. Professor Yahya Sadowski concluded his analysis of post-Cold War crises and wars, The Myth of Global Chaos, by stating, ‘‘most of the conflicts around the world are not rooted in thousands of years of history --- they are new and can be concluded as quickly as they started.’’ 60¶ Future resource wars are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwait, a nationwide bank robbery, may go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources.¶ China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.

#### Resources are resilient – conservation solves

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For over 150,000 years, the Earth had only 10 million people on it at any one time. But our astounding cerebral cortex gave rise to a few key developments like fire, the wheel and agriculture, and an astonishing frontal lobe allowed us to use them effectively. The population began to grow just before the beginning of the Common Era (CE), rising to 300 million during the Middle Ages and to a billion at the beginning of the Industrial Age. Then 2 billion in 1927, 3 billion in 1960, 4 billion in 1974, 5 billion in 1987, 6 billion in 1999 and 7 billion in 2011. This exponential rise is textbook for a bacterial colony in a petri dish, right before it dies from outpacing its food sources and generating too much waste. It’s also eerily analogous for us on the petri dish of Earth. Humans now comprise the largest mass of vertebrate matter on land. The rest is almost all our food and friends, mainly the animals we domesticated plus a bunch of xenobiotics we’ve transported far from their habitats (Cornell University). Hardly any vertebrate mass left on land is wild or natural (In These Times). Let that sink in for a minute. Most of what people see in National Geographic or on the Discovery Channel or in movies about animals, IS ALMOST ALL GONE. Humans have dammed a third of the world’s rivers, have covered, destroyed or altered half of the world’s land surface. We use up most of the fresh water faster than it can be replenished. And we extinct about 30,000 species every year. And this is all continuing apace. Globally, there is no slowing of these trends. From the original equilibrium of 10 million people to 10 billion people, Nature just can’t handle this density of humans. I hate to be optimistic, but there is still time to prevent the complete loss of wild Nature. We may be beyond the limits to growth, but the system is still resilient enough to respond to even a reasonable attempt at conservation and rehabilitation. The population will begin to fall back towards the end of this century. The birth rates are already changing in that direction. But it will take decades for that to translate into population reduction and we have to figure out how to keep us all alive without completely trashing the place. And that’s where energy comes in. The best birth control in history has been access to energy. At least 3,000 kWhs per person per year. Energy trends with many aspects of society (UN HDI), the most commonly discussed being fertility rates – a ten-fold increase in energy consumption results in a 3-fold decrease in fertility rates and a 3-fold decrease in unwanted pregnancies. Access to family planning and contraception increases with access to energy which leads to improved productivity and higher family incomes, increased savings and investment, overall reduced healthcare costs especially for women, and greatly improved education, infant mortality rates, life-span and general quality of life (www.geni.org). It’s why we need to increase all forms of energy worldwide as quickly as we can. And the most dense forms, like nuclear, are the best. Using large tracts of land for biofuels, wind farms and solar arrays cuts into the very land we need to protect. And fossil fuels can’t seem to reign in their environmental impacts. To provide 10 billion people with at least 3,000 kWhs per person per year using an all-of-the-above-mix will require about US$35 trillion of which about US$15 trillion would be direct investment in constructing energy systems. That is not a bad investment in a future that we want to live in.

## Innovation Bad

#### Tech innovation causes new industrial killing and destabilization.

Bishop and Parikka 15 (Ryan, Professor of Global Arts and Politics, and Jussi, Professor in Technological Culture and Aesthetics, The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, “The autonomous killing systems of the future are already here, they’re just not necessarily weapons – yet,” The Conversation, August 4, 2015, http://theconversation.com/the-autonomous-killing-systems-of-the-future-are-already-here-theyre-just-not-necessarily-weapons-yet-45453)//glen

When the discussion of **“autonomous weapons systems”** inevitably prompts comparisons to Terminator-esque killer robots it’s perhaps little surprise that a number of significant academics, technologists, and entrepreneurs including Stephen Hawking, Noam Chomsky, Elon Musk, Demis Hassabis of Google and Apple founder Steve Wozniak signed a letter calling for a ban on such systems. The signatories wrote of the dangers of autonomous weapons **becoming a widespread tool in** larger conflicts, or even in **“assassinations, destabilising nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic group”.** The letter concludes: The endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. It’s hard to quibble with such concerns. But it’s important not to reduce this to science-fiction Terminator imagery, narcissistically assuming that AI is out there to get us. The debate has more important human, political aspects that should be subjected to criticism. The problem is that this is not the endpoint, as they write; it is the starting point. The global artificial intelligence arms race has already begun. The most worrying dimension of which is that it doesn’t always look like one. The difference between offensive and defensive systems is blurred just as it was during the Cold War – where the doctrine of the pre-emptive strike, for example, that attack is the best defence, essentially merged the two. Autonomous systems can be reprogrammed to be one or the other with relative ease. Autonomous systems in the real world The Planetary Skin Institute and Hewlett-Packard’s Central Nervous System for the Earth (CeNSE) project are two approaches to creating a network of intelligent remote sensing systems that would provide early warning for such events as earthquakes or tidal waves – and automatically act on that information. Launched by NASA and Cisco Systems, the Planetary Skin Institute strives to build a platform for planetary eco-surveillance, capable of providing data for scientists but also for monitoring extreme weather, carbon stocks, actions that might break treaties, and for identifying all sorts of potential environmental risks. It’s a good idea – yet the hardware and software, design and principles for these autonomous sensor systems and for autonomous weapons is essentially the same. Technology is ambivalent to its use: the internet, GPS satellites and many other systems used widely today were military in origin. As an independent non-profit, the Planetary Skin Institute’s goal is to improve lives through its technology, claiming to provide a “platform to serve as a global public good” and to work with others to develop other innovations that could help in the process. What it doesn’t mention is the potential for the information it gathers to be immediately monetised, with real-time information from sensors automatically updating worldwide financial markets and triggering automatic buying and selling of shares. The Planetary Skin Institute’s system offers remote, automated sensing systems providing real-time, tele-tracking data worldwide – its slogan is “sense, predict, act” – the same sort of principle, in fact, on which an AI autonomous weapon systems would work. The letter describes AI as a “third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms”, but the capacity to build such AI weapons has been around since at least 2002, when **drones transitioned from remote-control aircraft to smart weapons, able to select and fire upon their own targets.** The future is now Instead of speculating about the future, we should deal with the legacy of autonomous systems from the Cold War, inherited from World War II and Cold War-era complexes between university, corporate and military research and development. DARPA, the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency is a legacy of the Cold War, founded in 1958 but still pursuing a very active high-risk, high-gain model for speculative research. Research and development innovation spreads to the private sector through funding schemes and competitions, essentially the continuation of Cold War schemes through private sector development. **The “security industry” is already tightly structurally tied to government policies, military planning and economic development.** To consider banning AI weaponry is to point out the wider questions around political and economic systems that focus on military technologies because they are economically lucrative.

## A2 China

#### China doesn’t have the capability or will to challenge U.S. leadership

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Our previous article suggested that China may be committed to building a world order governed by the ancient Chinese concept of li (礼). Such an order regards propriety as the key means to conducting relationships; is based on a concentric zone structure; and is open. While this order is compatible with the current international system, the majority of the members will be China’s neighboring countries, as well as a small number of countries from other continents. By the time this order is fully established, will China have replaced the global leadership role currently held by the United States? This depends on two factors. First, does China have such a desire? Second, does China have such a capacity? Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have all clearly stated that “China will never seek hegemony.” Xi also further mentioned that China “is not willing to become the so-called ‘world police’, nor to replace anyone.” This can be taken to mean that China does not have the desire to replace the United States’ global role. Some may argue, however, that a country’s desires are volatile, and that capacity matters more – meaning that China will change its desires when its capacity rises. Is China’s capacity likely to exceed that of the United States, then? One country’s capacity could be divided into “hard power” and “soft power.” Hard power, particularly economic capacity and military strength, is the foundation of the United States’ global leading role after World War II. But a combination of hard and soft power is the necessary and sufficient condition for a global leader’s rise. The soft power of the United States is mainly embodied in the construction and leadership of the postwar international system, its cultural attributes, the development of science and technology and higher education, and the relatively loose immigration policy. At the end of WWII, the United States accounted for 60 percent of the global GDP and its industrial production capacity was half of that of the world. Its oil and steel production accounted for 70 percent and 64 percent of the world total, respectively, and the United States held 73.4 percent of the gold reserves of the entire capitalist world at the time. With this hard power as the base, in addition to the United States’ advanced production capacity and technological development, U.S. military strength at the end of the WWII surpassed that of the other victorious Allied powers. Thanks to these advantages, the United States has continuously been the world’s largest economy since WWII, and built a global alliance system and a network of global military bases at the same time. Unlike Great Britain, France, and other countries that exerted international influence through colonies, the United States preferred to govern the world by establishing a series of international systems: the United Nations and its affiliates for the political and security arena; the alliance system and military base network in the military arena; the Bretton Woods system for finance, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which later evolved into the WTO) for trade. The United States already ranked first in the world in terms of industrial output in 1894. However, it was not until after World War II that it surpassed European countries in terms of technology and higher education. Given the rapid development of the United States in the humanities and social sciences, as well as the influx of European intellectuals during WWII, the United States, by this stage, had replaced the European countries as the global center for scientific research and higher education, thereby attracted talents from all over the world. The United States’ relatively loose immigration policy also promoted this trend. As a result of gathering global talents, the United States gained an unrivalled capacity for innovation and became a universal home for capable peoples from different countries and civilizations. After WWII, the United States consequently contributed more than 50 percent of the Nobel Prize winners. This talent influx also boosted the U.S. global leadership role. The United States will keep its advantage in attracting high quality immigrants in the foreseeable future. WWII provided the United States an exceptional opportunity to become a world leader. Reconstructing the world order through war is hard to imagine in the era of nuclear weapons. Given that a peaceful rise is the only realistic choice for China at present, China can only surpass the United States in some specific aspects such as GDP, national defense expenditures, the number of international students, and so on. In terms of the number of allies, global military bases, influence on the United Nations and its affiliates, influence on the global finance sector and so forth, it is very difficult for China to rival the United States. In addition, cross-civilization governance costs dearly. While U.S. soft power was helped by a global familiarity with European cultural elements, as spread during colonialism, Chinese culture is a typical regional civilization – this significantly raises the cost of China’s global governance and limits China’s global appeal. Further, considering that it is difficult for China to attract global talents like the United States and become a new home for immigrants, China is highly unlikely to outperform the United States in higher education, scientific research, and innovation. In the process of its rise, China is likely to concentrate on building its own order or system. However, this will be largely limited to regional influence, and mainly reflected in nonmilitary aspects. China can be expected to establish international mechanisms confined to certain areas (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), but again, creating dominant international organizations like the United Nations will be impossible for China. All in all, China is unlikely to replace the United States’ global role after its rise.

#### China doesn’t want to displace U.S. leadership --- it benefits too much from it

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China is an authoritarian one-party state that denies its own people the kinds of basic freedoms that Americans and other Westerners take for granted. It's often thought of as a regional bully that provokes its neighbors and ignores the rulings of international tribunals. China routinely breaks the rules of international diplomatic courtesy and military good sense. This time last year it even stole a U.S. drone submarine. None of that speaks well for China. China is a growing threat to its neighbors, particularly democratic Taiwan (vilified as a renegade province by China), U.S. treaty ally the Philippines, and China's communist rival, Vietnam. But is it a threat to the United States? The Trump administration certainly thinks so. In its first National Security Strategy (NSS), released Monday, China is paired with Russia as a revisionist power that uses "technology, propaganda, and coercion to shape a world antithetical to [U.S.] interests and values." What a change an administration makes. The Obama administration in its 2015 National Security Strategy welcomed "the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China." Obama criticized China for failing to "uphold international rules and norms" but emphasized that "the scope of [U.S.] cooperation with China is unprecedented." The strange thing about the change of tone is that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping seem to get along quite well. Trump needs Xi's cooperation on North Korea, and he seems to be getting it. Russia means trouble, certainly. But is China really so bad? The view from Beijing While the international press has jumped all over Trump's condemnation of China, the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, shrugged it off. They reported on the NSS but didn't even mention that China had been criticized. That's a far cry from the shrill counterattacks that are China's usual stock-in-trade. Why is China so complacent in the face of the Trump administration's accusations? It could be because China knows that, unlike smaller countries, the U.S. can't be bullied. Still, that didn't stop China from bullying the Obama administration. More likely, it's because China doesn't really see itself as a rival to the United States. Most of China's foreign policy establishment was educated in the United States and many of them have internalized American viewpoints as their own. They are ambitious to increase China's power and influence in the world, certainly, but for many of them the whole idea that China could take on the United States is ludicrous. Remember that more than 300,000 Chinese students are currently studying in the United States, and several million more are alumni of U.S. universities, including the children of many of China's top Communist Party officials. Xi Jinping's own daughter studied at Harvard. Perhaps as many as 100,000 Chinese mothers travel to the U.S. every year to give birth in American hospitals so that their children will become U.S. citizens (no one knows the exact number). Meanwhile nearly everyone in China uses a mobile phone that runs either iOS or Android. They drink their coffee at Starbucks and learn English by watching The Big Bang Theory. China's elite are not people who dream of conquering America. They are people who dream of succeeding in America's world. Not really a threat, not quite a partner The accusations leveled at China in the Trump's 2017 NSS seem fair enough. It is almost certain that China does steal the intellectual property of American companies. China almost certainly does seek to realign the Indo-Pacific region in its favor. China really is investing billions in infrastructure development around the world. But none of this seriously threatens the security of the United States. On the other side of the balance sheet, China seems to be cooperating with the U.S. on North Korea, China has declined to endorse Russia's annexation of Crimea, and China repeatedly stresses its desire to cooperate with the United States in international affairs. That's not a lot to go on, but it's a much better record than Russia's. It doesn't seem to mark China out as an irreconcilable opponent. All in all, China's leaders partner with the United States when it is in their interest to do so and push back against the United States when they can. They would love to detach American allies from the U.S. side, and are willing to use both bribery and intimidation to do so. But unlike Russia's leaders, China's leaders want to succeed in the American world-system, not overthrow it. When it comes time to send their kids to college, China's elites will take the Ivy League over Moscow State University every time.

# A2 Deterrence

## Heg Bad

### Unsustainable

#### Fiscal and military overstretch render US retrenchment obsolete – the aff temporarily relieves those pressures which makes later collapse more violent.

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**AN ERA OF** CONSTRAINED RESOURCES Strategic crises are common and they rarely result in enduring shifts of power. The systemic elements of the international system—geography, the allocation of wealth, the mobilization of military capabilities, perceptions of political legitimacy, and routines of behavior—are generally more resilient than the pressures of a particular moment, even a major war. For this reason, American international predominance has continued with remarkable consistency across the last six decades, despite repeated policy miscalculations and misallocations of resources. American strategic leadership has been mediocre, at best, but American strategic predominance has remained largely invulnerable. Many observers expect this trend to continue with the new energy resources emerging from North America, expansion of global markets for commerce, increased demands for political participation across the globe, and rising political-economic turmoil around East Asia and Europe—the only two regions capable of producing a strategic peer to the United States in the foreseeable future. According to this analysis, American predominance will continue even if America fails to adapt its national security strategy to a changing world. This is a comforting and humbling prediction, echoing German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s contemptuous nineteenth century comment that “God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Perhaps America’s luck is finally running out. There is reason to believe that the mediocrity of American strategic leadership is now imperiling the country’s inherited strategic advantages. The crises facing the United States today are not new, but they appear to be reaching a historical tipping point because of the accumulated costs of past decisions, the density of current challenges, and, above all, the stagnation of American policy-making. Simply stated, the United States is operating in an incredibly difficult international environment with extensive commitments but limited reserves, and even more limited readiness at home to adjust to these circumstances. These pressures are not transitory, but the consequence of long-term trends that are unlikely to reverse themselves in the near future. The accumulated and current pressures on the United States do not make a strategic tip inevitable, but they make a serious consideration of new policy options and assumptions imperative. That is the motivation for this book. The United States remains a wealthy and dynamic society that can spend more on its security than any of its peers. The United States also continues to support a more powerful military than most of its competitors combined. American military and communications technologies are, in many cases, at least one and often two generations ahead of others. The United States consistently deploys more advanced weapons in larger numbers and with the better-trained operators than our adversaries. That will not change in coming years. American military expenditures are high in absolute terms, but remain at a historically sustainable level of about five percent of gross national product. The trouble is not that the United States spends too little on the military, but that it may have too many commitments both at home and abroad. There are a dizzying number of latent demands on American force across the globe; and while political realities make it unlikely that American military spending will rise dramatically in the foreseeable future, no conceivably sustainable military budget could ensure that all American commitments are simultaneously protected. American ships patrol all the major waterways of the world, American bases constitute what one scholar calls a global “archipelago” of facilities, and American aircraft fly daily missions (manned and unmanned) above virtually all terrain. Basic American military operations are ubiquitous, they are labor intensive, and they are expensive. Within a political climate that demands an “all-volunteer” force, there is little available capacity in the incredibly large American military for multiplying regional conflicts that demand additional personnel and capacities. For all its extraordinary size and skill, the American military can easily become overstretched. It might have reached that point already. In conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan—and now a new war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as well as other terrorist groups—US armed forces quickly find themselves spread too thin to accomplish strategic aims. The civilians who direct American policy—including the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the national security advisor—find themselves in perpetual crisis mode, reacting to new demands rather than thinking systematically about strategic priorities. Another inherited burden on resources is demographic. As Cindy Williams argues, although the United States does not confront population decline (as in Europe and East Asia), the country faces ballooning health and retirement obligations that are crowding out other investments. After a half-century when the United States has fielded the largest peacetime military force in its history, it is now obligated to finance higher economic transfer payments to veterans than ever before. An all-volunteer military compounds these problems because volunteers demand more long-term benefits for retention. These expenses are threatening to break the Pentagon’s budget, just as they are producing exorbitant national debt obligations. The American military, like other major civilian institutions, is asked to address a growing number of current commitments and crises while it must devote a higher proportion of its resources than ever before to personnel who are no longer active. We may be at a tipping point where inherited costs undermine current investments. Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta both articulated these urgent points, as they called for more restraint in American military commitments and serious reform in health and retirement entitlements. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen made the clearest public statement about these resource challenges. In September 2011, on the eve of another recurring budget battle in Congress, he told a group of business executives that the “biggest threat to our national security is our debt.” Mullen focused on the higher costs for capital equipment and “increases in pay, and especially increases in the cost of health care.” Mullen closed his candid statement with a clear call for greater restraint in American military commitments and more attention to the prudent reallocation of resources: “We must consider the world as it is -- the threats as we see them -- not wishing away the danger nor blowing it out of proportion,” Mullen said. “Pragmatism and practicality must be our watchwords moving forward,” he added, “[and] strategy must become our acumen.” Despite the enormous influence of Gates, Panetta, and Mullen, these figures failed to make serious headway on reform. American policy-makers in the Bush and Obama administrations were more cautious about intervening in foreign conflicts after long frustrating months of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not shown any serious willingness to reduce costly inherited commitments around the world. If anything, the “Asian pivot” has created a new obligation to increase the American land, sea, and air presence in Asia, while maintaining military hegemony in the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and all major waterways around the globe. Civil wars and territorial disputes throughout East and South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East threaten to suck in further American military forces, based on security guarantees that the United States has inherited, in some cases, from the early years of the Cold War. Resource pressures demand some degree of American retrenchment, but political calculations push policy-makers to avoid all the difficult trade-offs. Without attention to tradeoffs, there can be no coherent strategy. Perversely, the across-the-board sequester budget cuts of 2013 reinforced the resource problem because they exclude reductions to entitlements, they leave inherited obligations in place, and they are accompanied by the increasing demands on American security forces around Syria, North Korea, Libya, Somalia, and other international trouble-spots. The sequester simply asks the American military, and all other government agencies, to do more with less. This is a recipe for even greater overstretch and under-achievement in American foreign policy. This is also a recipe for more strategic blunders like the Iraq War of 2003, where ambitious policy aims were accompanied by clearly insufficient resource commitments. Observing the widening mismatch between ambitions and resources, numerous commentators have focused on the dysfunctional elements of American domestic politics. Neither partisanship nor politicization of foreign policy are new, but the heightened elements of both phenomena press dangerously on current resource vulnerabilities. It looks, at times (especially during the government shutdown and threatened default of October 2013), like a perfect storm. The political posturing of American international dominance is blowing hard against the weakened walls of available American capabilities and domestic support. American military personnel, diplomats, and other officials are now spread so thin that one must question whether they can continue to perform basic functions with the competence citizens expect. High standards of quality usually decline when personnel are asked to do more with less. The natural tendency is to cover-up seemingly small holes in capabilities until they are exposed in disastrous fashion. There is an accompanying urge to silence warnings about potential shortfalls in fulfilling required missions. This has been the experience for other government agencies under similar conditions in the past.

#### Heg is unsustainable under Trump AND causes nuclear war.

**TT 18** – Turkish national news service, Turkish Telegraph, “Trump's hegemonic strategy triggers nuclear tension”, written 2/18/18, <http://www.turkeytelegraph.com/world/trump-s-hegemonic-strategy-triggers-nuclear-tension-h15804.html>, accessed 7/3/18)

The time of hugs is over. If for decades presidents of United States encouraged respect for treaties and non-proliferation, with Donald Trump first power has put finger on nuclear trigger again. And this time, it does not target only Russia, China or North Korea. In its new strategy, White House unexpectedly expands spectrum of enemies, bets on development of weapons of "low intensity" and gives president power to respond with atomic whip to threats as diffuse as cyber. **With Trump, nuclear escalation has been reactivated.** It is a turn of enormous repercussion, though calculated not to unleash panic. The so-called Nuclear posture Review, document that replaces strategy designed by Barack Obama in 2010, maintains limitation of using maximum weapon only in "extreme circumstances" and bets, like previous administration, to modernize Triad (missiles launched from submarines, bases and bombers) within framework of Treaties. That's all normal. But document, following feet Juntillas Trump's hegemonic Weltanschauung, goes one step furr. "It incorporates a much more aggressive and impetuous nuclear concept, and in key sections it breaks efforts to reduce role and number of nuclear warheads in world," says expert of Arms Control Association Kingston Reif. The novelty that has generated most concern refers to use of nuclear button. So far president's response is circumscribing to eventual episodes of nuclear and chemical or biological mass destruction. **With new plan, "strategic non-nuclear attacks" are added. A concept that includes cyber. Wher nuclear operation, civilian population or infrastructure such as electricity grid and air control. This formulation extends military focus**. The enemy no longer has to be a country with atomic weapons. What's more, it's not even a country. By its very nature, a cyberattack can be diluted in hundreds, thousands, millions of fronts. It's not a missile heading to Washington. There's no president on or side of red phone. Not even his authorship is clear. This dizzying decline in nuclear response threshold has unleashed controversy. "It seems very unintelligent, with military power that United States has, to respond with atomic weapons to a non-nuclear attack. Imagine that Russia or China launch a cyberattack against US. Is it possible to think that a president will answer with an offensive that involves a nuclear counterattack? "asks Steven Pifer, an expert in arms control at Brookings Institution. The Pentagon has avoided going into details about magnitude of a cyberattack to generate a nuclear response. But notion is developed in a little-known report by Directorate of National Intelligence, agency that brings toger espionage agencies, and that puts this threat ahead of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. "The potential for a surprise attack is going to increase in coming years to extent that billions of digital devices will continue to connect to a low-security network and that both nations and malignant actors have increased ir ability to use Cybernetic tools. There is refore a growing risk that certain adversaries will launch against United States a cyberattack (eir of data destruction or a localized and temporary disruption of critical infrastructures) and to open a crisis without need to declare war, " Indicates report. Among potential enemies, National Intelligence Directorate points to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, whose "trials are increasingly aggressive." As evil actors it points to terrorist groups and criminal organizations, although it admits that borders tend to be erased: "The divide between criminal activity and that of States will be increasingly diffuse to extent that certain nations may want Use first ones in ir operations. " In this scenario of liquid risks and multiplied enemies, Trump's strategy adds anor twist. With Obama, as expert Steven Pifer points out, effort was directed at reducing number of atomic weapons to lessen ir weight on national security and end up confinándolasing space of pure deterrence. The White House has broken this precept and has raised development of what it calls "tactical weapons." Bombs of less than 20 kilotons, as lethal as those that swept Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but considered small compared to ones currently available in United States. Unlike strategic weapons, designed to raze populations, se artifacts would target enemy troops. The result is doubtfully reassuring: in event of conflict, before annihilation of cities, strategists would face a scenario of "limited nuclear war." To justify this step, White House alleges that Russia has already deployed tactical weapons and that it has an advantage. In event of a crisis, Pentagon argues, US does not currently have a proportional response. "That is why our strategy will ensure that Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons, although limited, is unacceptable," document says, devoting a pulse of unforeseeable consequences. "It opens up an escalation that, as it does not touch strategic weapons, may seem acceptable. But it would be more accurate to do just opposite, increase threshold and make it clear to potential adversaries that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, no matter what size it has. The use of any nuclear weapon changes rules of game and opens a box of unpredictable, undesirable and potentially catastrophic Pandora, "said Pifer. It's strategy of fear. Once again. The objectives are broadened, development of new weapons is open and an unmistakable signal is sent to world. The United States is not looking for a tie. It's not going with anyone. 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"It is accelerating global nuclear escalation and thus risk of an atomic conflict," warns expert Kingston Reif. In this comeback, Russia is not only target. The nuclear agreement with Iran is now on tightrope. In May, president has to decide wher to keep him alive. Its rupture would end with bolt preventing Tehran from building an atomic weapon and could trigger an escalation in Middle East. Even more unstable is relationship with North Korea. The impoverished Asian country has undertaken, in hands of bloody Kim Jong-un, a frantic arms race that targets US. Although US response has focused, with support from China, on economic suffocation, it has also made use of incendiary rhetoric, typical of prewar times. Trump has threatened Pyongyang with a wave of "fire and fury as he has never seen world" and has made public his willingness to "totally destroy" his enemy.

### Causes War

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## Impact Defense

### No War

#### Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### Decades of economic & military failures prove there’s no impact to US Hegemony.

Reich et. Al 17 – Simon Reich is a Professor in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University. Richard Ned Ledbow is a Professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College. James O. Freedman is President Emeritus of Dartmouth College. Published January 2017. Accessed 7/6/18. (“Influence and Hegemony: Shifting Patterns of Material and Social Power in World Politics,” *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 6(1) pp. 17-47; EG)

US hegemony was a short-lived postwar phenomenon. Imre Latakos famously asserted that waning theories built auxiliary hypotheses when presented with important evidence with which they are irreconcilable.26 Liberals and realists appear to have been revising both history and theory through this means in an effort to substantiate their continued research program on American hegemony. Admittedly, they go through cycles where they assert, in the famous words of Samuel Huntington, either American “decline or renewal.” 27 Although this scholarship recognizes the cycles and challenges to American hegemony, there is little dissent from the view among these scholars that unipolarity continues unabated. Certainly, the political science and historical literatures are replete with warnings about imperial overstretch, ranging from Robert Gilpin’s seminal War and Change in World Politics to Paul Kennedy‘s historical tome The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.28 Yet the debate appears to replay, dating from the 1980s, without a consensus being agreed about any terminative date. Robert Keohane for example, published his seminal book After Hegemony in 1984. Charles Kindleberger, who coined the term “stabilizer,” and on whose analysis liberals and realists are so reliant, declared American hegemony dead even earlier - by the end of the 1970s.29 Then the rise of Japan created the specter of a power transition. Yet the end of the Cold War and the implosion of Japan’s economy provided both liberals and realists with the opportunity to resurrect the notion of continued American hegemony. A brazen arrogance led to military adventurism in Iraq – what Richard Haass famously referred to as a war of choice.30 Most recently, the current debate over China clearly echoes that about Japan two decades ago, as less distinguished, anxiety-generating books with titles like Hegemon: China’s Plan to dominate Asia and the World clearly attest. Even these sensationalist books find their counterparts in mainstream academia, with titles like those of Aaron L. Freidberg’s, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia.31 The content of the latter may be sober and reflective, but the answer is based on a similar set of assumptions: the US is hegemonic, it is in decline, and the key question is when the lines with China will cross, in the process of power transition. Yet liberals and realists are still today resolved to maintain a view of the US as hegemonic. Even now, approximately three decades after Kindleberger’s and Keohane’s declarations that hegemony had ended, Ikenberry describes the current crisis as one “of authority within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” As a result, “the character of rule in world politics has been thrown into question.”32 Although American leadership is being challenged, the liberal international order remains resilient. “As an organizational logic of world politics,” it is, however, a victim of its own success suggests Ikenberry. A new bargain needs to be struck between the US and emergent actors. It will still rest on a unipolar distribution of power, and with it, “constituencies that support a continued -- if renegotiated -- American hegemonic role” within a liberal hegemonic order. Under such a new arrangement, the US would still qualify as a hegemon.33 Comparably, as evidence of the continued pervasiveness of comparable assumptions in the policy world, the introduction to a 2012 Rand report on the US’ global defense posture commissioned for the Air Force reflexively opened with declaration that the US is a global hegemon.34 In influential scholarship and policy work, the myth thus lives on. Part of the problem in evaluating this claim is that there appears to have been few systematic attempts to codify, operationalize and measure the six indicators of being a “stabilizer” that Kindleberger outlined in his original work, Simon Reich‘s 2015 study with Carla Norrlof being the exception.35 This omission has left many Liberals and Realists to claim America was a hegemon during the Cold War, when they were the dominant economy for at least a large part of that period, even though military power was clearly bipolar. It then allowed them to make the same claim after 1991 when military power was (and is) unipolar but the US clearly no longer served as the lender of last resort or stabilizer. A more dispassionate view suggests that American hegemony was very short lived and quickly eroded. By any serious economic measure, it stopped serving as the world’s economic hegemon decades ago. In 1944, the US GDP peaked at 35 percent of the world total, a figure that had dropped to 25 by 1960 and 20 percent by 1980.36 Today, by way of comparison, it has fluctuated in recent years at around 25%, never approximating its peak. The US ran significant deficits during the Viet Nam war and delinked the dollar from the gold standard in 1971.37 In the 1980s, the US ran up budget deficits and systematically reneged on its own liberal trading rules by introducing a variety of tariffs and quotas under the Reagan administration instead of bearing the costs of economic adjustments.38 Contemporary policymakers have done the same to China.39 More specific figures support this general picture. Until the end of the 1960s, the US current account balance ran at zero or a small surplus. That position dramatically eroded in the 1980s, and the US current account deficit peaked at 6% in 2006, just before the financial crisis.40 This took place at a time when there was a consistent decline in net US public and private savings.41 American policies had the effect of making the US government and consumers increasingly reliant on foreign capital to finance their expenditures. Over-expenditure by individual Americans and their government -- reflected in low personal savings rates coupled with increased government deficits -- became important causes of global imbalances.42 The growth in American personal debt has been unmistakable: from a peak of 14.6% in 1975, and an average of around 9% in the 1980s, the American net savings rate declined to around zero by the turn of the century. It reached a low of -0.5% in 2005, a statistic not seen since during the Great Depression in 1933.43 As savings plummeted, debt increased. By 2005, total U.S. household debt, including mortgage loans and consumer debt, stood at $11.4 trillion.44 A decade later, despite the salutary lessons of the Great Recession, it had increased $12.07 trillion.45 The US federal budget deficit grew in a similar fashion. Since the end of second Clinton Administration, the debt of the US government has increased annually. It went from $186.2bn inflation-adjusted dollars in 2002 to over $16.8 trillion by April of 2013.46 The National Clock then calculated a figure: an average of nearly $53,500 owed per citizen.47 It ballooned during the Obama administration.48 Figures for the US trade deficit are just as illuminating. According to the US Census Bureau, the US has run a trade deficit in goods and services every year since 1969, with the exception of 1973 and 1975. Comparable to the budget deficit, these figures have worsened over time and have also ballooned since the turn of the century, peaking in 2006 on the eve of the financial crisis.49 Liberals and realists thus consistently ignore a wealth of economic data in proclaiming American postwar hegemony. The same is true in terms of its military capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Triumph over Germany and Italy in World War II, the invention and use of nuclear weapons to end the war with Japan, and America’s nuclear arsenal all consolidated Americans’ sense of themselves as hegemonic. The Cold War victory consolidated that view. Yet military failures like MacArthur’s push north in the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam, and more recently, failed interventions in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, were reconceived of as “victories” (Korea), inconsequential (the Bay of Pigs) or part and parcel of strategies that were, or will be, successful in the longer-term. Bush “hawks,” for example, in revisionist fashion, hailed the Iraq invasion as the necessary prelude to the now-aborted Arab Spring years later, despite its unprecedented cost, while Afghanistan – America’s longest serving war – is reputed to have been a key component of a successful campaign to defeat al Qaeda.50 For all of America’s unprecedented military capacity, it is hard to reconcile this long list of questionable military interventions with the dominance that unipolarity and hegemony implies. Yet realists and liberals continue to apply these terms despite America’s failures to achieved its prescribed policy goals stretching back over the last five decades. More recently, liberals -- and to a lesser extent realists -- have convinced themselves that the role of this military is to ensure the global system’s stability. Often this has been inaccurate if stability is equated with the absence of war. If we calculate ‘war years’ as a simple function of each war multiplied by its longevity, since 1945, the US has fought more war years than any other country in the world, with the possible exception of the UK and France.51 A proportion of these wars have been justified by American policymakers as preventative interventions (such as the invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan) or humanitarian ones (such as the invasion of Grenada) and thus validated by a “just war” doctrine. Critics, however, claim it is hard to reconcile starting wars with maintaining stability, suggesting that these are merely a pretext for imperialism.52 Even more mainstream pillars of the establishment – such as Richard Haass, who served in the Bush White House and is currently president of the Council on Foreign Relations – have written approvingly at times of the idea of an imperial US foreign policy.53 Thus, by either the measure of starting wars or of winning them, American military capacity cannot be equated with hegemony. Its short preeminence has, nonetheless, been erringly rewritten as the longue durée. 4. Power versus Influence So why has the US, if it is so powerful, failed to achieve its policy goals? Proponents of American hegemony still overwhelmingly rely on a materialist view of power. As noted earlier, many liberals do note, en passant, the importance of norms and rules. Joseph Nye Jr. have gone much further in focusing on the significance of soft power, although the concept itself is impossible to operationalize and only obtusely linked to foreign policy choices.54 Yet material power is often neither fungible nor the basis for achieving desired foreign policy goals, claims substantiated by the failed American interventions spanning from Korea in the 1950s to Afghanistan and Iraq today. So many failures to explain outcomes or to achieve prescribed policy goals logically suggest that Liberals and Realists need to rethink their position on the significance of power. Conversely, constructivists have erred by focusing exclusively on what Barnett and Duval characterize as social forms of power: framing, argumentation and persuasion.55 We argue that the concept of “influence,” rather than that of power, is key. Influence is composed of two aspects: one is material power, defines as economic and military resources. The other is social, derived from the legitimacy of the actor and the linkage between the actor‘s claim and universalistic values and principles, promoted through processes of persuasion and argumentation.56 Some Constructivists have recognized that social and material forms of power are related.57 Peter Katzenstein, in recalling the perspective of Hedley Bull on the importance of norms, for example, states that “the international system is a society in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in public and customary international law.” 58 Yet, in practice, Constructivists largely remain agnostic on the dynamics of the relationship between social and material power. They prefer to focus on the significance of social power in isolation from material power.59 We recognize different kinds of power and the diverse ways in which power might be translated into influence. In practice, material capabilities and power are related in indirect, complex and often problematic ways. Material capabilities are a principal source of power, but critical choices must be made about which capabilities to develop and how to use them. The Cold War demonstrated the irrelevance of certain raw forms of power. The USSR and US developed impressive nuclear arsenals and diverse delivery systems for them. These weapons were all but unusable. The principal purpose for which they were designed – all-out superpower war – would have constituted mutual, if not global, suicide. Intended to deter the other side, nuclear weapons and forward deployments of their delivery systems became a principal cause of superpower conflict and greatly extended the Cold War.60 In contrast to most IR theorists, we stress the dynamic interaction between material and social forms of power. Both state and non-state actors use combinations of material and social power in attempting to influence other actors in differing configurations and with differing degrees of success. In its most simple conception and formulation, countries can enjoy relatively high degrees of both forms of power and are thus relatively influential. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, is a country that has established high degrees of material and social power in its post-Nazi process of rehabilitation. In global public opinion polls, it consistently scores among the most admired countries in the world and its economy is among the largest and most productive.61 While its military capacities are limited, they are consistent with the foreign policy objectives of German government. As a result, theGermans have become increasingly influential, within the European Union, beyond the Eastern borders of the EU, in a variety of multilateral forums, and even in the halls of power in Beijing, Moscow and Washington.62 Alternatively, Iran is an example of a country whose leadership lacks much by way of material or social power, which may in part explain its sustained efforts to develop a nuclear capability for a decade, even as its economy was ravaged by the effects of sanctions. Despite the conclusion of a nuclear agreement, Teheran’s comments and actions remain distrusted by all but a handful of allies (who themselves often lack credibility).63 In comparable global opinion polls, for example, it has consistently been regarded among the ranks of the more dangerous countries in the world although that sentiment has been mitigated in many countries by the signing of the agreement.64 The same is true of North Korea, an impoverished country that lacks even Iran’s oil.65 Other countries invariably link social and material power to different degrees and in different ways. Norway, for example, is a small country with significant social power because of its consistent, vocal and material support for civilian protection campaigns in multilateral forums. Yet it has a limited material capacity. Qatar is another country that clearly attempts to use its limited material and social resources in tandem to enhance its influence through judicious investment practices (such as buying major sports teams in France and Spain), providing aid and participating in multilateral alliances as it attempts to build legitimacy. The People’s Republic of China is an example of a country with growing material power (both military and economic). It seeks to use its economic power to generate influence through its investment in US Treasuries, European government bonds and African aid. Yet despite its efforts at Sinicization, its social power is relatively limited, given the distrust of many other countries in the region.66 Endemic to the concept of influence is a recognition that legitimacy is foundational for social power. Scholars working within America’s broadly defined hegemony research program either discount the importance of legitimacy (the most evident example being the work of structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz) or they assume American legitimacy and often declare it to be the case.67 Ikenberry, for example, proclaims that “American global authority was built on a Hobbesian contract -- that is, other countries, particularly in Western Europe and later in East Asia, handed the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes‘ individuals in the state of nature voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.”68 An alternative formulation, and to our way of thinking, a more sophisticated one, conceives of hegemony as the result of legitimacy as well as power.69 Drawing on Gramsci, Roger Simon describes hegemony as a relation “not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership.”70 Theorists differ about whether consent is a function of self-interest – it is better to bandwagon than oppose the dominant power – or legitimacy -- the hegemon protects and advances shared norms, values and policies.71 Realists John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne emphasize material interests because they see power at the core of all international relations.72 Scholars who, in contrast, stress the normative aspects of hegemony note that great power and hegemonic status rest on the recognition of rights and duties and are therefore quasi-judicial categories. In practice, powerful states, like Russia, that have not met their responsibilities in the eyes of other actors and who transgressed international law through the annexation of Crimea, are often denied the standing and respect conferred by great power status.73 Persuasion is founded on the bedrock of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a long run, low cost, means of social control as compliance becomes habitual when values are internalized. Where an actor accepts a rule because it is perceived as legitimate, that rule assumes an authoritative quality. The rule is then in some sense hierarchically superior to the actor, and partly determinate of its behavior. Over time, it contributes to the actor’s definition of its own interests. An organization that is perceived as a legitimate rule maker has authority vis-à-vis its members. The character of power accordingly changes when it is exercised within a framework of legitimate relations and institutions. The concepts of power and legitimacy might be said to come together in the exercise of “authority.”74 Ancient Greeks understood this distinction well, describing what Realists (to a greater degree) and Liberals (to a lesser degree) think of as power as archē. In contrast, a combination of legitimacy and material capability was described as hegēmonia. Hēgemonia described an honorific status conferred on a leading power because of the services it has provided to the community. It confers a right to lead, based on the expectation that this leadership will continue to benefit the community as a whole. Hēgemonia represents a clientalist approach to politics: the powerful gain honor in return for providing practical benefits to the weak. The latter willingly accept their inferior status in return for economic and security benefits and the constraints such an arrangement imposes on the powerful. Attempts to translate power directly into influence rest on carrots and sticks. Such exercises, even when successful, consume resources and work only so long as the requisite bribes and threats are available and effective. More effective influence rests on persuasion, which manages to convince others that it is their interest to do what you want them to do. Persuasion depends on shared values and accepted practices, and when it works, helps to build common identities that can make cooperation and persuasion more likely in the future. Influence of this kind also benefits from material capabilities but is limited to shared goals and requires considerable political skills. Power is also relevant to influence of this kind. But it is most effective when enacted by skilled leaders and diplomats, enabled by shared discourses, used to advance policies that build on precedent, and exploits existing penchants for cooperation and convinces others that they are active contributors to these policies and their implementation. America has sorely failed in several of these dimensions, raising the question of how power is reflected in the current global system.

### No Deterrence

#### **Hegemony doesn’t solve deterrence – it only exacerbates tensions and counter balancing.**

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The United States maintains a veritable empire of military bases throughout the world—about 800 of them in more than 70 countries. This forward-deployed military posture incurs substantial costs and disadvantages, exposing the United States to vulnerabilities and unintended consequences. The strategic justifications for overseas bases—that they deter adversaries, reassure allies, and enable rapid deployment operations—have lost much of their value and relevance in the contemporary security environment. **Deterrence is usually achieved by means other than nearby U.S. military bases, and a forward-deployed presence frequently exacerbates international tensions by causing fear and counterbalancing efforts by adversaries**. In an era of reduced global threats, reassurance is not as important as it was during the early years of the Cold War, and most U.S. allies are wealthy and powerful enough to provide for their own defense. Furthermore, overseas bases are not necessary to retain long-range capabilities for most military interventions, thanks to revolutions in technology that have reduced travel times. Finally, forward bases and the rapid deployment capabilities they enable tempt policymakers to take military action for bad reasons, or in pursuit of counterterrorism goals that are not well served by the deployment of ground forces. In the absence of a major peer competitor, and in an era of low security threats, the policy of maintaining a constant worldwide overseas military presence is unwise. The United States should withdraw its permanent peacetime military presence abroad and abandon its forward deployed posture in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.