# 1ac

## Inherency

#### Anti-immigrant rhetoric combined with restrictions on employment visas is causing America to lose high-skilled workers to other countries crushing US technology leadership and innovation.

Sheng, 2018 (Ellen – writer and consultant on finance, wealth, and business, “Silicon Valley is fighting a brain-drain war with Trump that it may lose”, CNBC, April 9, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/trumps-war-on-immigration-causing-silicon-valley-brain-drain.html>, shae)

Although it is important to close some of the loopholes in the H-1B visa program, these actions could also have unintended consequences. Often lost in the political rhetoric is the fact that immigration is a critical issue for the U.S. economy and our nation's competitive position. The National Foundation for American Policy found that immigrants have started more than half of the country's billion-dollar start-up companies. Some of the more prominent examples include SpaceX and Tesla founder Elon Musk, from South Africa, and Google co-founder Sergey Brin, an immigrant from the former Soviet Union. The H-1B visa is the primary avenue for skilled immigrants to enter the United States. While it's well known that companies in Silicon Valley rely on H-1B visas, it is also used heavily by companies in New York, Texas and Washington, D.C. A recent Pew Research Center report revealed that between 2010 and 2016, almost a third of visas went to businesses in the New York City area. Increased restrictions and rejections of H-1B visas have companies worried. Recent reports suggest that restrictions on foreign-born workers could have outsized impact on the tech industry. A recent report from the Silicon Valley Competitiveness and Innovation Project found that the country's largest tech companies rely more on foreign-born workers than domestic ones. In Silicon Valley at least 57 percent of workers in science, tech, engineering and mathematics with a bachelor's degree or higher were born outside the United States, the report said. According to data from the U.S. Department of Labor, IBM applied for 12,381 H-1B visas last year, Microsoft 5,029 visas and Google 4,897. Brain drain begins For decades the United States has attracted some of the best and brightest. Now some are starting to see the reverse happen. Vivek Wadhwa, a distinguished fellow and adjunct professor at Carnegie Mellon University's College of Engineering and author of The Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent, said that in his current class at Carnegie Mellon, not one of the foreign students is looking to stay. Foreign students from India, China and elsewhere who used to stay are now returning to their home countries to start businesses. This is alarming because it will adversely impact U.S. innovation, Wadhwa said. "In the next five to 10 years, we're going to be competing with China and India and Singapore and many other countries all over the world for talent like never before," he said. The U.S. has seen its share of tech "unicorns" drop dramatically in recent years, according to data from CB Insights. Of the 214 unicorn start-ups globally, 41 percent are based in the United States compared to 75 percent in 2013. Meanwhile, the proliferation of tech unicorns from outside has been increasing, especially from China. China is now home to 36 percent of tech unicorns compared to 12 percent in 2014. If we keep going on the path we are on, China will have more tech unicorns than the United States. China is catching up to the United States in advanced technology on everything from artificial intelligence and gene editing to quantum computing, Wadhwa said, adding that once that happens, "China will be neck-to-neck with Silicon Valley, and then they're going to eat our lunch." Toughened immigration policies To be sure, U.S. immigration has been difficult for quite some time, but now Trump's executive orders and anti-immigration rhetoric has further accelerated the trend. Tahmina Watson, Seattle-based immigration attorney and author of The Startup Visa: Key to Job Growth & Economic Prosperity in America, said she's started to see extreme scrutiny of H-1B visa applications. Routine applications that were once commonly accepted are now sent back requiring more documentation. H-1B visa extensions are facing more scrutiny. Watson is also seeing a sudden spike in H-1B visa denials. While some of the scrutiny is an attempt to close loopholes in the H-1B program, the result is that talented, legitimate applicants are being turned away. Anti-immigration policies will likely hurt American workers, Watson said, noting that for every H-1B worker, five jobs are created. Another visa that would have been a boost to Silicon Valley's start-up scene has also been quashed. The international entrepreneur rule, or start-up visa, would have allowed qualified foreign entrepreneurs to stay in the United States to build businesses. It was set to go into effect last year but has been delayed and looks to be on the chopping block. "The shortsightedness will be felt in upcoming months and years. To make America great again, scrutinizing business visas is not the way to go," she said. Filling the void As the United States closes its borders, other countries are courting the world's best and brightest to come and start businesses. France introduced a new tech visa program last year, and French president Emmanuel Macron has said he aims to make France a "Startup Nation." Canada launched a program to fast-track visas and short-term work permits for highly skilled foreign workers. When the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services department said in June they would stop premium processing of H-1B visas for up to six months, Canada stepped up and said it would fast-track applications. India's commerce ministry and various government arms have created innovation labs and incubators in efforts to develop the country's start-up scene, while China has vowed to invest vigorously in artificial intelligence to create a $150 billion industry by 2030. "In the wake of our administration's policies, it's becoming easier for others to fill the void," said David Brown, a serial entrepreneur and founder of Techstars, which helps start-ups through accelerator programs and investment. Brown said that Techstar's Toronto program is reaping the benefit of entrepreneurs who are leaving the United States for Canada.

#### The perception of uncertainty deters skilled immigrants.

Smith, 2017 (Brad – president and chief legal officer of Microsoft, “The per-country limits on employment-based green cards are neither fair nor good for our country”, October 6, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/10/06/per-country-limits-employment-based-green-cards-neither-fair-good-country/>)

A vigorous and important debate is currently underway about various aspects of the U.S. immigration system. While many ideas are consistently part of these ongoing discussions, one area has not received enough attention: the extraordinary backlog in high-skilled green cards. The U.S. is fortunate to have talented, high-skilled immigrants from around the world who are contributing their substantial skills to our nation’s companies, paying taxes, investing in our economy and contributing to local communities. But despite sponsorship by their U.S. employers, some individuals face frustrating bureaucratic hurdles in the green card process, including lengthy backlogs of over a decade and uncertain futures. This backlog is the result of a woefully outdated employment-based green card system put in place back in 1990 – the year that “Ice Ice Baby” topped the Billboard Music Charts. Clearly, the world has changed. Unfortunately, our green card system has not. One would be hard-pressed to find any aspect of our immigration system less grounded in common sense than the so-called “per-country limits” applied to green cards. The rule is simple even if devoid of logic. It prohibits immigrants from any single country from receiving more than 7 percent of the total number of green cards each year. This limit means that immigrants from large countries like India and China, with populations of well over 1 billion people, have the same maximum number of green card allotments each year—only 9,800—as Liechtenstein, whose total population is less than 40,000 people. Because of per-country limits, the burden of today’s employment-based green card backlog unfairly falls only on immigrants from India, China and the Philippines. For most employees from India, it is expected to take well over a decade to make it through their country-specific backlog, even after their jobs and skills have been certified by the U.S. Department of Labor to merit green cards. Meanwhile, as of this month, there is no backlog this long for any other country. This isn’t fair, and it isn’t smart — not if we want the U.S. to be able to continue attracting top talent. The length of a person’s green card process might reasonably be based on a number of legitimate factors, but it shouldn’t be differentiated solely on the size of the population of a person’s country of birth. These backlogs have a real impact on our employees and their families. Employees worry about limitations to career changes and job growth that could impact their green card process. Their spouses are often unable to work. Despite having grown up in the U.S. and attended our schools, their dependent children may be left out if they reach adulthood before their application makes it through the backlog. This kind of uncertainty is not the way to attract the best talent in the world to U.S. companies. The solution is a modern green card system that allows high-skilled immigrants to stay and continue growing our country’s businesses and our economy. Beyond fixing the overall shortage of green cards, we should eliminate these per-country limits. Solutions to this problem have been proposed, like H.R. 392, the “Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act,” led by Rep. Kevin Yoder, R-Kansas, which has the overwhelming bipartisan support of 271 co-sponsors. Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah,introduced an identical measure in the Senate, S. 281, and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, has previously included the elimination of per-country limits in the “Immigration Innovation Act,” accompanied by reasonable increases in green card numbers to help address the backlog. We enthusiastically support these types of legislative fixes. It will be difficult for America to remain a leader in global innovation if we cannot put in place a more modern and common-sense based approach to green cards. We are committed to working with the administration and Congress to address lasting reform of our immigration system through meaningful bipartisan solutions that will help strengthen our economy, ensure protections for American workers and give the world’s top talent a reason to continue making a bet on this great nation.

#### US technological innovation relies on high-skilled immigrant workers.

Washington Post, 2017 (Samuel Granados, “How Today’s Visa Restrictions Might Impact Tomorrow’s America”, February 21, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/visas-impact/?noredirect=on>, shae)

Many tech companies and scholars have raised their voices against President Trump’s Jan. 27 executive order on immigration. The hundreds of researchers and high-skilled workers who could be affected by the travel ban are part of the larger U.S. innovation economy, a community that relies heavily on foreign talent and whose members now worry that legal immigration could be the next target. We asked three experts on innovation, competitiveness and the workforce on how broad immigration reform could affect the country. Nearly 100 Silicon Valley companies – including tech giants like Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter – filed an amicus brief opposing Trump’s immigration order nearly a week after it was implemented. The brief stated that the order disrupts business operations, threatens investment and “makes it more difficult and expensive for U.S. companies to recruit, hire, and retain some of the world’s best employees.” MIT, Harvard and six other universities in Massachusetts filed a request to the federal court of Boston against Trump’s executive order. The state of Washington, backed by other states such as Minnesota, claimed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit that the order harms their businesses and universities. The court eventually agreed with the states and temporarily blocked the travel ban. Although the visas issued to countries included in the executive order represent less than 1 percent of total visas, the impact on the U.S. talent force could be significant. Iran, which is included in the restricted list, ranked 10th in the number of U.S. doctorates awarded to noncitizens in 2015. At MIT alone, more than 100 students and scholars were affected by the travel ban. “You can’t build a border against ideas,” said Anthony P. Carnevale, director of the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce. “You are always moving along a cutting edge on innovation. The way to win on that is to be very open and competitive with respect to the talent. The fact that [the Trump administration] did this to seven countries raises a fear that it can extend to more countries.” A rising concern Many in the tech community worry the order could be the first step toward a deeper review of the entire legal immigration system. The reform of visa programs to hire high-skilled workers seems to be gaining momentum after several bills were presented in the past few weeks: Protect and Grow American Jobs Act, H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act, High-Skilled Integrity and Fairness Act, Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment Act. The last of these proposals does not focus on temporary work visas but on permanent residents, individuals who hold green cards. The bill aims to reduce the number of new visa issuances by 41 percent in the first year, and limit them by half in ten years. In a Fox News interview Cotton said: “Most of the people coming to our country are coming because they are distant relatives, under the outdated diversity lottery or as refugees. Obviously they don’t have the kind of high skills our economy needs.” Although both targets are two separate buckets, temporary visa holders and permanent green card holders are part of the same complex immigration system. High-skilled workers typically obtain green cards after they have held student and work visas. Here is a look at all the visas and green cards issued in 2015 and the potential scale of these proposals: [large graphic demonstrating the relative proportion of each visa-type] Where Trump stands on immigration policies “My administration will follow two simple rules: Buy American and hire American,” Trump said in his inauguration speech. During the 2016 campaign, then-candidate Trump repeatedly defended the need for stricter immigration policies, including those related to highly skilled workers. “Companies are importing low-wages workers on H1-B visas to take jobs from young, college-trained Americans,” Trump said during a rally in Columbus, Ohio, in October. “We will protect these jobs for all Americans.” But Trump has contradicted himself on this issue several times: “I’m changing. I’m changing. We need highly skilled people in this country, and if we can’t do it, we’ll get them in,” he said during a Republican debate in March on Fox News. This back-and-forth suggests Trump and his team might still be weighing the effect a strict “America First” policy may have in the long run. Traditionally, Republicans and Democrats have agreed on the need to continue welcoming high-skilled foreign workers. In the past two decades, all three U.S. presidents expanded visa caps for students or the highly skilled. Democrats have traditionally been more flexible when it comes to visas for workers’ families. Why are tech companies concerned? Amid increasing globalization in recent decades, the U.S. economy has relied on foreign labor for innovation. “There is a strong correlation between immigration and innovation,” said Manjari Raman, program director and senior researcher at the U.S. Competitiveness Project at Harvard Business School. “Tech companies in Silicon Valley rely on innovation as a competitive advantage, and they want access to large pools of talent.” A study by Georgetown’s Center on Education and the Workforce suggests that by 2020, 65 percent of all jobs will require postsecondary education and training, an increase from 28 percent in 1973. “Our undergrads are predominantly U.S.-born but frequently come from families who are first-generation. But our master’s and PhD programs are extremely global in nature,” said Fiona E. Murray, associate dean for innovation at MIT. “This is not about excluding American students, but actually recognizing the demand for advanced education — especially PhDs and beyond — is often more global and less local in nature. And so we have an opportunity to educate a very global community of young innovators.” H-1B visas for high-skilled workers, and H-4 visas for their immediate relatives, represent more than a third of the total visas related to employment. For tech and research industries, these seem essential: The number of these visas is capped — for 2017, the limit is 65,000 plus an extra 20,000 for those with a master’s. Demand has exceeded the cap in most recent years, so a lottery system decides who receives a visa. The Office of Foreign Labor Certification is responsible for deciding if there are any qualified and available U.S. workers in the area of intended employment. It also must ensure that the admission of a foreign worker will not impact on the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. These certifications, while they don’t reflect the final number of visas, provide the best indicator of the needs for different companies. Most of these jobs are in the areas of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM), according to a 2015 report from the certification office. But experts like Raman also note the need for these companies to do more. “In areas like STEM there is a shortage of high skill talent within the country,” she said. “Immigration is a great way to fill a gap, but there is an opportunity here for these companies to see what they can do more to create a pipeline of talent within the U.S.” At the same time, she said, “we should encourage students who come to the U.S. for higher studies, to stay back in the U.S. rather than send them back to their own countries. You need both.” It could impact U.S. competitiveness Some of the international economies where these researchers and workers are coming from are among U.S. competitors, although Raman clarified: “Competitiveness is not a win-lose game. When the U.S. becomes more competitive, everyone benefits. When China becomes more competitive, everyone benefits.” The four largest feeder countries for American companies are also among the top contributors to U.S. invention and research. Since 2008, more U.S. patents have been registered by non-U.S. citizens than those registered by Americans. Murray confirmed this trend: “In our MIT alumni survey, the rate of patenting is higher for foreign-born students (34 percent) than for U.S.-born students (30 percent).”

#### China is already making headway and can eventually overtake the U.S. – retaining high-skilled immigrants is key to reverse the tide.

Kennedy, 2018 (Andrew – senior lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, “OPINION: America Is Playing Defense vs China on Tech Innovation,”, May 29, <https://international.thenewslens.com/article/96664>)

The high-tech rivalry between the United States and China is getting ugly. So far in 2018, the Trump administration has blocked high-tech acquisitions by Chinese firms, complained about Chinese technology licensing practices at the World Trade Organization and threatened tariffs on Chinese high-tech imports. The administration has also banned U.S. companies from selling parts to Chinese phone maker ZTE, though the president has promised to revisit this decision. For its part, China has brandished its own tariffs while also making promises to protect foreign intellectual property and further open the Chinese economy. Bilateral talks remain underway. Trump would like the world to believe the U.S. government has finally taken the offensive against China. But it has not: China’s government is the one playing offense in the realm of high-tech innovation. With plenty of encouragement from Beijing, China has emerged as the world’s second-largest investor in research and development (R&D). It spent US$279 billion on R&D last year, with most of this investment coming from business. China is now poised to overtake the United States as the world’s top R&D spender within the next decade. China also makes great efforts to lure back high-tech talent from overseas. In recent years, the number of Chinese students returning to China from abroad has been around 80 percent of those going overseas – up from 31 percent in 2007. As a result of all this activity, China is putting points on the board. China’s score in the prestigious ‘Nature Index’, which tracks article publication in the leading science journals, jumped from 24 percent to 40 percent of the U.S. total from 2012 to 2016. In the corporate world, 376 Chinese firms were among the world’s top 2,500 R&D spenders in 2017. While China’s state-owned enterprises tend to be highly inefficient, other Chinese firms have emerged as leaders in areas from electric vehicles to e-commerce. China still has a long way to go, to be sure, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to exercise greater control over businesses and society more generally are a step backwards in this regard. But China’s overall progress to date is striking. In contrast, the U.S. government is playing defense. The measures the Trump administration has taken this year essentially represent an effort to prevent the U.S. technological lead over China from shrinking. This is a losing strategy. The United States and China are not playing a basketball game with one minute left on the clock. Instead, they are competing – and collaborating – in a relationship that will go on indefinitely. The United States cannot simply try to protect technologies it has already invented; it must work harder over the next several decades to extend its status as the world’s technological leader. U.S. political leaders should be much more focused on this latter challenge than they are. In a clear statement of its priorities, the Trump administration has sought to slash federal science and technology spending despite a history of bipartisan support for such expenditures. As a result, the president was a fuming bystander as the U.S. Congress chose to invest record sums in science and technology in the 2018 budget deal. There is much more the United States could and should do. Perhaps most important, it could easily compete more effectively for the world’s top brainpower. The Trump administration claims to support merit-based immigration, as do many Congressional leaders. If so, it is time to make this a priority. The United States educates more foreign students than any other country in the world, offers foreign graduates some opportunity for temporary employment, but then imposes per country caps that make it hard for those from China and India to receive permanent residency – effectively encouraging them to go home. Supporting high-tech start-ups is particularly important. Fortunately, the United States now has a start-up visa program to welcome promising foreign entrepreneurs who wish to found companies in the country: the international entrepreneur rule. Yet the Trump administration only implemented the rule because a federal judge ordered it to do so – and the administration is now preparing to rescind it. Even worse, the Trump administration’s repeal of net neutrality will make it harder for many start-ups to compete with more established firms. Congress can still overturn this decision, but whether it will do so remains unclear. There is nothing wrong with playing defense. But it’s only half the game, and China is discovering more and more ways to put points on the board in any case. If U.S. leaders truly wish to make America ‘great’, they need to make offense a priority as well.

#### Maintaining a strong influx of high-skilled workers is key to US growth and STEM innovation.

Conard, 17 --- master of business administration degree from Harvard Business School, adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he works on US economic policy (8/16/17, Edward, “America’s got talent, but not nearly enough; Trump is right to back skills-based immigration. But fewer green cards would defeat the purpose,” <https://www.aei.org/publication/americas-got-talent-but-not-nearly-enough/>)

President Trump has proposed cutting the number of green cards issued each year from one million to 500,000 and issuing them based on skill levels. This approach gets it half right. Increasing skills-based immigration would be good for the economy. But if America issues green cards based on skills, cutting the number would squander the best opportunity for economic growth. Without substantial immigration, the U.S. simply can’t produce enough growth to pay for retiring baby boomers without inflicting considerable damage on the economy—and, by extension, on national security. The Congressional Budget Office expects federal spending as a percentage of gross domestic product to increase by nine points as baby boomers retire over the next 30 years. Together with state and local spending, total government spending is projected to rise to 45% of GDP. A spending level that high, especially one largely driven by entitlement spending, will slow growth significantly. The notion that the younger electorate can outvote baby boomers to reduce their benefits significantly is highly doubtful. With the Chinese economy expected to surpass America’s in size within 10 to 15 years, the U.S. needs to do more than pay for retiring baby boomers. It needs to grow quickly enough to maintain a strong national defense. Boosting growth with high-skilled immigration is the only viable alternative. If innovation is the primary driver of growth, and the most productive workers are the primary drivers of innovation, doubling the number of workers who currently represent the top 5% of America’s talent could double the U.S. growth rate. America has 125 million full-time workers, so the top 5% is just over six million. The U.S. currently issues a million green cards a year. By targeting the most talented would-be immigrants, the U.S. could double its high-productivity pool in short order. To minimize competition with the domestic workforce, the U.S. could recruit and employ the rest of the world’s best engineers. The highest-scoring American students have increasingly moved away from STEM fields—science, technology, engineering and math—toward business and law. America’s success relative to Europe and Japan—both of which produce a greater share of STEM graduates—indicates that innovation requires a combination of STEM and commerce to succeed. The rest of the world is racing to educate more business majors but continues to graduate a disproportionate number of engineers. American companies already employ many of those engineers, who work remotely using tools like Skype. When companies employ these workers offshore, Americans don’t enjoy the benefit of the income-tax revenues they’d pay—for the top 20% of U.S. taxpayers, $50,000 a year more than the government services they consume. America needs that revenue. Nor does the rest of America’s workforce get the opportunity to teach their children, wait on their tables, or treat their medical needs. Growth can raise wages across all skill levels. It’s an error to suggest that a greater share of Americans could do these ultra-high-skilled jobs. Competition demands the highest-IQ problem solvers. Companies who need problem solvers like that can’t settle for less. They will continue to recruit these workers wherever they find them. Can America’s education system produce the necessary increase in ultra-high-skilled workers? Decades of effort have produced no significant increase in academic scores. A large share of high-scoring American students avoid the difficulty of STEM careers despite rising wages. And any educational improvement is likely to come gradually and suffuse into the workforce slowly. America needs growth now.

## Growth

#### Slow growth is coming --- aging populations are become less productive and labor force growth and wages remain low

Yueh, 6/6 (Linda – Adjunct Professor of Economics at London Business School, “Opinion: How the U.S. can avoid a slow-growth future; It’s not just a matter of adding new technology but how well it gets embedded into the job,” <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-us-can-avoid-a-slow-growth-future-2018-06-05>)

Recent productivity data have led to growing concerns over a slow-growth future. The technologies of today don’t seem to be greatly raising economic growth, and productivity growth has markedly slowed. Economic growth rates across major economies are weaker now than before the 2008 global financial crisis, and not just as a result of the crash. If companies are more nuanced about how they invest in technology and how they embed it into their operations, then a slow-growth future can be avoided. The United States, like the eurozone, Japan and the U.K., has been experiencing a slowdown in productivity growth since the mid-2000s. This has led to warnings that growth in these advanced economies has permanently slowed, in part because their aging populations will be less productive. Could these economies be facing what former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers describes as “secular stagnation”? This was a term first used by Alvin Hansen in the 1930s to describe slow growth due in part to aging societies, among other issues. Some of Japan’s economic stagnation is thought to be related to its demographics since its population is the oldest and fastest-aging in the world. Economic growth occurs when workers and capital are added to the economy, along with technology, a well-known result from growth models first developed by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Solow. But an aging population means fewer workers. Fewer workers require fewer office buildings and machinery, which depresses investment and therefore the economic outlook. Another wrinkle is that the U.S. has been suffering from stagnant median wage growth for decades. Low pay means that some companies hire workers instead of installing more units of capital, which further depresses investment. That means that two factors that drive growth are subdued. That point of where demographics hits growth seems to be approaching: U.S. labor-force growth has slowed to just 0.2% a year, down from 2.1% from the 1960s to 1980s. A slower growth rate is associated with lower interest rates, and this is seen in the yields of Treasury bonds along the yield curve. In other words, the expectation in bond markets is that the new neutral interest rate, or where the current rate rises will end up, will be lower than the previous average rate of 5%. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the think tank for rich countries, has looked at this issue and finds that weak output growth is a drag on productivity. That brings us full circle in that output per worker or machine can’t increase strongly if overall economic growth remains subdued. So how much is invested, including in raising the skills of existing workers, matters a great deal to boost growth. It also means that the new path of economic growth, whether it is fast or slow, is within the control of the government and firms as well as workers who can invest in their own human capital to be better equipped to use technology. It is not just the inevitable outcome of an aging society. But one challenge is that recent technological improvements, centered on information and communication technologies and the internet, do not seem to have raised productivity across the economy as expected. Solow’s 1987 observation that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” is known as the Solow paradox. He revisited this question decades later, but concluded that we still do not know whether computers have boosted productivity as the role of computing is still evolving. Where there have been periods of faster productivity growth, such as in the late 1990s, it seemed to be due to technology being better embedded into business practices. Embedded technology improves the productivity of workers, which increases capital accumulation by slowing down the diminishing returns to capital. Diminishing returns happen when a worker is given more than, say, one computer; that worker won’t produce as much with the second computer as compared with the first one unless he has the programming skills to run an algorithm that allows computing to be done without the worker using it all the time. If the digital age is to increase productivity and lead to a stronger phase of economic growth, it will require investment in not just R&D, but also peoples’ skills and firms’ practices to embed those technologies into how businesses operate. An example is law firms that are starting to use AI to conduct some aspects of due diligence, which frees up the time of junior associates to undertake other legal work. Although the Solow paradox is still with us, there are signs that technology is becoming better embedded, such as artificial intelligence that can do computing without a constant human presence. But to ensure that happens requires investment in more nuanced ways — notably in how to embed tech into the workplace. This will vary from firm to firm, but investing in this area, as well as in the well-understood areas of R&D/innovation, will likely generate returns. It could even lead to a virtuous circle of growth. Seeing higher output per worker could induce more investment by firms as the returns to capital are higher. And more investment in turn raises economic growth rates, and that could help us avoid a slow growth future. So, reassuringly, demography is not destiny. It is within our control to invest in ways that better embed technologies, which in turn would help us to avoid a slow growth future.

#### Expanding high-skilled immigration boosts total factor productivity --- allowing the U.S. to maintain 3 percent growth.

Griswold, 2017 --- senior research fellow and co-director of the Program on the American Economy and Globalization at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (October, Daniel, “Reforming the US Immigration System to Promote Growth,” <https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/griswold-immigration-reform-mercatus-research-v1.pdf>)

AMERICA NEEDS IMMIGRANTS TO GROW AND PROSPER Central to its economic agenda, the Trump administration seeks to boost the annual growth rate of real US gross domestic product from 2.1 percent (the average rate since 2010) to 3.0 percent or more. The fiscal targets contained in the administration’s fiscal year 2018 budget, released in May 2017, depend on the economy reaching 3.0 percent growth by 2020. Ramping up the underlying trend of US growth by a full percentage point or more will be more practicable if the administration’s economic policies include reforming and liberalizing the nation’s immigration system. The ability of a nation’s economy to grow is determined by its capital stock, the growth of its labor supply, and how efficiently labor and capital work together—what economists call “total factor productivity.” Immigration directly promotes the second and third while stimulating further investment. Specifically, immigration increases the total number of workers in the labor force while at the same time increasing the average productivity of workers across the economy, immigrant and native born alike. Without a modernization of the US immigration system, achieving 3.0 percent growth will be even more challenging. Immigration Offsets America’s Demographic Decline Immigration affects the economy most directly through growth of the labor supply. America in 2017 is undergoing an unprecedented period of demographic transition. The birth rate among native-born women has fallen below the replacement level. Starting around the year 2010, the huge cohort of baby boomers began to retire from the workforce. The growth of the civilian labor force has been falling steadily, from 1.2 percent per year in the 1990s to 0.7 percent per year in the 2000–2010 period to 0.5 percent per year in the current decade.4 The number of working-age Americans (age 25–64) born in the United States to US-born parents has already begun to decline and will shrink by more than 8 million from 2015 to 2035.5 Whatever growth the United States experiences in the workforce in the next two decades will be because of immigrants and the children of immigrants. Immigrants admitted to the United States each year tend to be younger than native-born Americans and are more inclined to participate in the labor force. According to data from the US Department of Homeland Security, the median age of permanent immigrants admitted to the United States in the past decade is 32.5,6 while the median age of all US residents (including immigrants) is 37.6.7 So the median age of those receiving lawful permanent resident (LPR) status is five years younger than the median age of all US residents. Immigrants are not only younger than their native-born counterparts but also more inclined to participate in the labor force. The latter is especially true of immigrant men. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor force participation rate of all foreign-born individuals was 65.2 percent in 2016, compared with the participation rate for the native born of 62.3 percent. For foreign-born men, the participation rate was 77.8 percent, a full 10 percentage points higher than the rate for native-born men, 67.5 percent. The participa­tion rate of foreign-born women was slightly lower than the rate of native-born women, 53.4 percent compared to 57.5 percent. The unemployment rate for foreign-born persons in the United States in 2016 was 4.3 percent, compared with an unemployment rate for native-born workers of 5.0 percent.8 Without a growing workforce, US companies will find it increasingly dif­ficult to hire the workers they need to meet domestic and global demand. Man­ufacturing, agriculture, construction, and high technology are among the sec­tors that are expected to suffer the most acute shortages of workers. A declining workforce would slow US growth potential and reduce the relative size of the US economy and US influence in the world. The continuing slowdown in the growth of the US workforce will also impose a growing strain on federal retirement programs. One measure of the country’s ability to fund retirement programs is the Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR)—the number of Americans who are 65 and older versus the number of Americans who are in their working years of 25 to 64. The OADR fluctuated within the range of 19 to 24 up until 2010, but with baby boomers now retiring in large numbers, the ratio is expected to climb above 40 by 2030 and reach 47.5 by 2065. If legal immigration were sharply curtailed, as has been proposed, the future OADR would rise even higher. If immigration were cut off immediately, the ratio would reach 55.9 by 2065.9 The smaller the future Old Age Dependency Ratio, the less strain there will be on federal retirement programs. A steady or increased inflow of immi­grant workers helps to spread the cost of funding old-age pension payments across a larger pool of workers, reducing the need to raise payroll taxes, cut benefits, or both. More Immigrants, More Output, More Jobs Immigration reform would allow the US economy to grow faster by increasing the number of workers in the labor force and the total number of hours worked per year. Because immigrants are more likely to be of working age than native-born Americans and are more likely to seek work, immigration can help to slow or even reverse the recent trend of declining labor force participation. An increase in the workforce driven by immigration does not lead to a gen­eral displacement of existing native-born workers. Although the US labor force has more than doubled in the past 50 years, there has been no upward trend in the unemployment rate because the economic activity enabled by the growth in workers has also stimulated demand for workers.10 As the workforce grows, so too does demand for all the goods and services that American households pur­chase, from groceries and cars to education and housing. This increased demand in turn stimulates more production, leading to more employment and the main­tenance of full employment. A growing workforce also stimulates investment by increasing the returns on capital. While immigration can put downward pressure on wages in certain indus­tries in the short run, the availability of more workers at competitive wages creates incentives for greater investment. And rising investment stimulates more demand for labor, increases productivity, and creates upward pressure on wages. The increased investment spurred by immigration means that, over time, the capital-to-labor ratio grows the same amount even if the number of immigrants increases.11 Immigrants Complement US Workers, Increasing Gains from Specialization Immigrants do more than increase the size of the labor force. Because immi­grants tend to have different skills than the typical native, they boost the growth of the US economy by filling niches in the labor market. Immigrants tend to be overrepresented at the higher and lower ends of the skill spectrum, while native-born Americans tend to be clustered in the middle skill levels. Immigrants make up 17 percent of the US workforce, but they account for more than one-third of workers in the United States with a PhD in the fields of science, technology, engi­neering, and math (STEM). On the other end of the skills spectrum, immigrants represent 40 percent of those in the workforce without a high school diploma.12 The complementary nature of immigration means that immigrants do not compete directly with the vast majority of Americans for employment. In fact, by providing skills that are in relatively short supply, immigrants enable US workers to be more productive. In the technology area, immigrants make up a disproportionate share of scientists, college professors, and technical work­ers. Native-born Americans are not earning qualifying degrees in numbers suf­ficient to fill the available positions in US industry. By filling those positions, high-skilled immigrants add to the “agglomeration effect” by creating a critical mass of workers in a particular region and industry where ideas can be shared more easily.13 Silicon Valley is the most notable example. Because of differences in English proficiency, immigrants tend to concen­trate in more technical occupations such as the job of computer specialist. This creates more opportunities for native-born workers, who are more concentrated among managers, sales personnel, and other occupations requiring more interac­tion with customers and subordinates.14 On the lower rungs of the skills ladder, immigrants fill jobs that fewer and fewer Americans are interested in, and they fill those positions at wage rates that allow their industries to remain competitive in the US market. Such jobs require only short-term, on-the-job training and include health service workers, personal service workers, farm laborers, cleaning service and food service workers, con­struction workers, textile machine operators, carpenters, and nonfarm laborers.15 Low-skilled immigrants also fill positions in the growing health and home care service sectors, such as home health aides, nursing aides, orderlies, attendants, personal and home care aides, medical assistants, and maids and housekeepers.16 Such jobs were filled in decades past by adult Americans without a high school diploma, but the number of native-born Americans in that category has been steadily shrinking. From 2000 to 2016, the number of native-born Ameri­cans 25 and older who had not completed high school fell by almost 7 million, from 20.5 million to 13.5 million. As a share of the adult native-born population, the share of high school dropouts has declined in that same period from 13.4 percent to 7.6 percent, and the share continues to decline.17 Contrary to popular belief, a large majority of native-born workers do not compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants. Studies show that immigration may have a modest negative effect on wages earned by the small and shrinking pool of adult Americans without a high school diploma,18 but the impact on the wages of the other 92 percent of native-born Americans in the labor force is neutral to positive. On the high-skilled end of the spectrum, the impact of immi­gration on the wages of the native born is muted by the complementary nature of the immigrants’ skills. Matthew J. Slaughter, a former member of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, noted in a survey of immigration and productivity growth, “Skilled immigrants tend to complement, not substitute for, native-born workers in US companies. Companies that hire more skilled immigrants tend to hire more native-born workers as well.”19 A rising share of immigrants in the labor market also encourages Ameri­cans to upgrade their skills with more education and to shift into areas of employment where language skills are more important and tend to be rewarded. As immigrants enter the workforce, Americans tend to stay in school longer to upgrade their skills and their potential earning power. A 2012 study found that an increase in the presence of immigrants in the workforce increased the prob­ability that native-born Americans will stay in school and complete their high school education.20 Other research suggests that in states with a heavier concentration of less educated immigrants, native-born workers are more likely to shift to more com­munication-intensive occupations, where their language skills give them an advantage and where wages are typically higher than in manual jobs. This has the collective effect of raising the productivity of Americans in the workforce.21 Lower-skilled immigrants also boost productivity and output by supplying services that allow higher-skilled Americans to raise their productivity. The 2016 report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medi­cine (NASEM) noted that low-skilled immigrants reduce the price US households pay for immigrant-intensive services such as childcare, eating out, house cleaning and repair, landscaping and gardening, taxi rides, and construction. The affordability of such services allows native-born workers in higher-salaried jobs, especially women, to increase their paid work hours.22 Immigrants promote faster US economic growth because they are generally more flexible about when and where they will work. Immigrants have proven to be more geographically mobile. They are less likely to be rooted in one geographic location and are therefore more will­ing than natives to move to places where demand for their labor is higher than the supply.23 That can mean moving to urban centers of high-tech activity or to rural areas in need of specific kinds of labor, from agriculture to health­care. They are also more willing to work unusual hours, at nights and on weekends, which provides more labor for the economy in a way that is less likely to compete directly with US-born workers.24 Greater mobility serves the overall economy by reducing regional differences in employment and by allowing work to be spread out across time and space. In summary, immigrants do not ordinarily compete with Americans for a limited number of jobs; instead, they work with and for native-born workers in a cooperative way that lifts the general productivity and prosperity of the United States. Immigrants Spur Innovation, Patents, and Startups Immigrants create wealth in America by spurring innovation and founding new companies. Highly skilled immigrants are more likely to file patent applications than their native-born counterparts and are more likely to start new businesses, fueling entrepreneurial activity, providing new products and services, and creating employment opportunities for native-born workers, while raising overall productivity. The patenting and innovation spurred by immigrants allow the United States to shift beyond its production possibility frontier, which raises the speed limit for the economy’s long-run growth potential. The 2016 NASEM report found that “immigrants are more innovative than natives; more specifically, high-skilled immigrants raise patenting per capita, which is likely to boost productivity and per capita economic growth.” While immigrants account for 13 percent of the US population, they are responsible for one-third of all patent filings in the United States.25 The United States has been the world’s greatest beneficiary so far from the international mobility of skilled labor. The United States has attracted the largest net inflow of global inventors who have filed international patents. Based on data from the World Intellectual Property Organization from 2001 to 2010, a recent study determined that “the United States has received an enormous net surplus of inventors from abroad, while China and India have been major source countries.”26 Again, the prime example is Silicon Valley in California. The same study found that “more than half of the high-skilled technology workers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley are foreign-born.”27 Immigrants are also more likely to found new enterprises, from ethnic restaurants to billion-dollar technology companies.28 Some of the most famous and successful US companies today were founded or cofounded by first- or second- generation immigrants. According to a June 2017 report from the Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council, 40 percent of America’s Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants or the children of immigrants. A 2016 study by the National Foundation for American Policy found that more than half of the startup companies in the United States today that are valued at more than $1 billion, so-called “unicorns,” were started by immigrants. The 44 unicorn companies founded by immigrants each employed an average of 760 workers.29 As one study of global talent flows concluded, “The weight of the evidence points to high-skilled immigrants boosting innovation and productivity—mainly through increased quantity of skilled individuals pursuing innovative work.”30 “Immigration Surplus” Raises Income of Americans Immigrants fuel economic growth, wealth creation, and higher average incomes in the countries where they settle. The primary beneficiaries are the immigrants themselves, but native-born individuals are also net beneficiaries. The economies of scale of a larger domestic economy, the economic diversity and complementarities, and the ideas, innovation, and entrepreneurship that immigrants bring create a net gain in wealth for their native counterparts. Economists call this the “immigration surplus.” It is the net gain available to natives when the economic costs from immigration are subtracted from the benefits. The number is typically small compared to America’s huge economy, but while estimates vary, they are invariably positive. Under conventional assumptions, the annual immigration surplus from the current stock of US immigrants is estimated to be in the range of 0.1 to 0.4 percent of US gross domestic product.31 That translates into $19 billion to $74 billion in today’s economy in the total net benefits accrued to native-born Americans from current levels of immigration. In a comprehensive 2016 study of the economic impact of immigration on the economies of wealthier nations such as the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded, “Immigration significantly increases GDP per capita in advanced economies.” Specifically, the IMF study estimated that a one-percentage- point increase in the share of migrants in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2 percent in the long run, mainly through increased labor productivity.32 The IMF study found that immigration had no measurable impact on income distribution in advanced economies. It found that high-skilled immigration did have a larger benefit for the top 10 percent of earners, but the bottom 90 percent also benefited. Low- and medium-skilled immigration “equally increases income per capita for the bottom 90 percent and the top 10 percent.”33 Immigration also exerts a positive influence on US government finances. In general, immigrants tend to produce a fiscal surplus for the federal government, especially for its retirement programs, while imposing more immediate net costs on state and local governments, in particular because of education and incomesupport programs. High-skilled immigrants produce large fiscal surpluses for the government, while low-skilled immigrants tend to have a negative impact. The NASEM report concluded that an immigrant who arrives in the United States at age 25 with a four-year college education will, over his or her lifetime, contribute a net surplus of $504,000 to the finances of governments at all levels (net present value, 2012 dollars). An immigrant with an advanced degree will contribute almost twice that net amount, $972,000, in his or her lifetime. An immigrant with less than a high school education, in contrast, will impose a net cost of $109,000 over his or her lifetime.34 The IMF study notes that such direct, static analysis may underestimate the full fiscal impact of immigration. A more “dynamic scoring” approach would take into account the spillover impact of immigration on productivity and GDP growth for the entire economy, an effect that further boosts tax revenue.35 In its landmark 2016 study of the economic and fiscal consequences of immigration, NASEM concluded that immigration unambiguously contributes to US economic growth: Most obviously, immigration supplies workers, which increases GDP and has helped the United States avoid the fate of stagnant economies created by purely demographic forces—in particular, an aging (and, in the case of Japan, a shrinking) workforce. Perhaps even more important than the contribution to labor supply is the infusion by high-skilled immigration of human capital that has boosted the nation’s capacity for innovation and technological change. The contribution of immigrants to human and physical capital formation, entrepreneurship, and innovation are essential to long-run sustained economic growth. Innovation carried out by immigrants also has the potential to increase the productivity of natives, very likely raising economic growth per capita. In short, the prospects for long-run economic growth in the United States would be considerably dimmed without the contributions of high-skilled immigrants.36 Considering the economic and fiscal impacts of immigration, this evidence argues for a revised system that maintains or expands the current number of immigrants allowed while shifting the emphasis to employment-related skills rather than family relationships.

#### Slow growth causes diversionary war with China

Ross, 17 --- Senior Fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (7/10/17, John, “Trump's economy - cyclical upturn and long term slow growth,” <http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2017/07/trumps-economy-cyclical-upturn-and-long-term-slow-growth.html>)

Conclusion The economic and domestic US political conclusions of the trends shown in the latest US data are therefore clear US economic growth in 2016 at 1.6% was so depressed below even its long term average that some moderate upturn in 2017 is likely. President Trump’s administration may of course claim ‘credit’ for the likely short-term acceleration in US growth in 2017 but any such short-term shift is merely a normal statistical process and would not represent any acceleration in underlying US growth. Only if growth continued sufficiently strongly and for a sufficiently long period to raise the medium/long term rate average could it be considered that any substantial increase in underlying US economic growth was occurring. This fall of US per capita GDP growth to a low level clearly has major political implications within the US and underlies recent domestic political events. Very low US per capita growth, accompanied by increasing economic inequality, has resulted in US median wages remaining below their 1999 level – this prolonged stagnation of US incomes explaining recent intense political disturbances in the US around the sweeping aside of the Republican Party establishment by Trump, the strong support given to a candidate for president declaring himself to be a socialist Sanders, current sharp clashes among the US political establishment etc. Even a short-term cyclical upturn in the US economy, however, is likely to be translated into increased economic confidence by US voters. This may give some protection to Trump despite current sharp political clashes in the US with numerous Congressional investigations of President related issues and virtually open campaigns by mass media such as the New York Times and CNN to remove the President. The latest opinion poll for the Wall Street Journal showed that men believed the economy had improved since the Presidential election by 74% to 25%, while women believed by 49% to 48% that the economic situation had not improved. In terms of geopolitical consequences affecting China: The short term moderate cyclical upturn in the US economy which is likely in 2017 will aid China’s short term economic growth – particularly as it is likely to by synchronised with a moderate cyclical upturn in the EU. Both trends aid China’s exports Nevertheless, due to the very low medium and long-term US growth rate the US will not be able to play the role of economic locomotive of the G20. In addition to economic fundamentals IMF projections are that in the next five years China’s contribution to world growth will be substantially higher than the US. It is therefore crucial China continues to push for economic progress via the G20 and China has the objective possibility to play a leading role in this. Very slow growth in the US in the medium and longer term creates a permanent temptation to the US political establishment to attempt to divert attention from this by reckless military action or ‘China bashing’. China’s foreign policy initiatives to seek the best possible relations with the US are extremely correct but the risks from such negative trends in the US situation, and therefore of sharp turns in US foreign policy, must also be assessed.

## Deterrence

#### Tech superiority shores up US power deterring and solving for conflict.

England, 17 --- former secretary of the Navy and deputy secretary of Defense and currently the chairman of the National Academy of Engineering (12/6/17, Gordon, “US is losing ground on technology superiority,” <http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/363621-us-is-losing-ground-on-technology-superiority>)

A long-held military maxim is to take the high ground and hold it. That may be outdated in today’s electronic and high-tech battlefields, but that notion still holds true for scientific research and engineering. Research is the foundation for engineering invention, and that leadership in engineering underpins our national security and economy. Retaining the high ground in research and engineering is necessary to deter future conflicts, win future wars and maintain our standard of living. Modern research started about 500 years ago with the development of the printing press. Based on prior approaches, Gutenberg’s printing press made the accumulation and spread of knowledge possible. His printing press enabled widespread learning and the dissemination of new data, thereby providing the foundation for new discoveries. This same process continues today but with a more organized and funded research structure. For the U.S., the federal commitment to research was made after World War II and housed in the Department of Defense. This decision was largely driven by the need to confront a new enemy — the USSR. That federal commitment to research and engineering generated U.S. military and economic superiority, helping to seal victory in the Cold War. It also led to early-generation microelectronics, nuclear power, GPS and the internet, among dozens more transformational discoveries and many with both military and commercial applications. How did all this happen? The department recognized the need to stay technically ahead of the enemy. The answer was a network of research laboratories that carried out critical research to advance military technology, much of it also fueling the domestic economy. The department still has this structure but it is now part of a much larger government research and innovation ecosystem that is in partnership with commercial sector research. In addition to the Defense Department, out of necessity to be globally competitive, the research effort now includes the Department of Energy, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, university and philanthropy-funded research and a myriad of technology-based companies. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis indicated the need for this broad inter-agency and commercial research effort in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. “New commercial technologies will change society, and ultimately, they will change the character of war,” Mattis said. We must carry out research, “recognize its military potential, and develop new capabilities.” Yet, we’re seemingly not doing enough to keep the research high ground. The Heritage Foundation recently released its index of military strength. After analyzing various essential components, Heritage ranked the capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines as “marginal” and the U.S. Navy as “weak.” Reviews of our nation’s research capability — by Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and the American Academy of Arts & Science — likewise show that we’re losing ground. Assessments like these are always problematic, but they all indicate a common troubling finding: The U.S. is on a downward trend. What this means is that our federal laboratories and research institutions aren’t aggressive enough and that the Defense Department is not reaping the rewards of the larger and more competitive commercial sector. Without the competition in the commercial sector that drives rapid innovation and engineering application, the government programs lack urgency. Agencies relying on up-to-date technology and innovation all need bolder and more urgent research plans, and Defense Department needs to more quickly convert the research results into engineering applications to deter, and when necessary, win future conflicts. Equally important, all these agencies need to break through the barrier of accessing research from the commercial sector. Token steps have been taken but a necessary first step to attract the commercial sector is to dramatically reduce bureaucracy. For the Defense Department that means shaving the voluminous pages of acquisition regulations. There are very few eureka moments when it comes to scientific breakthroughs. Rather, like Gutenberg’s printing press, scientific advances rely on prior knowledge. As knowledge accumulates, new knowledge is uncovered ever faster. But with this acceleration comes the need for ever more sophisticated equipment, highly educated and experienced researchers and a complex infrastructure of support. All this takes money, but equally important it requires a predicable source of funding over multiple years. And here the White House and the Congress can be helpful — or not. Funding disruptions, common now at the federal level, cause havoc in the scientific community. It is detrimental to the economy and a disservice to the men and women who serve in the military and to all the nation’s research institutions. The U.S. military and economy are based on technology superiority and that superiority is underpinned by being the best in the world in research and engineering innovation. Other nations understand this all too well, and they are accelerating their research programs while we seemingly stumble and falter. We do so at our peril.

#### This prevents great power conflict.

The Economist, 2018 ( “The Next War; The growing danger of great-power conflict; How shifts in technology and geopolitics are renewing the threat,” January 25, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/25/the-growing-danger-of-great-power-conflict>)

IN THE past 25 years war has claimed too many lives. Yet even as civil and religious strife have raged in Syria, central Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq, a devastating clash between the world’s great powers has remained almost unimaginable. No longer. Last week the Pentagon issued a new national defence strategy that put China and Russia above jihadism as the main threat to America. This week the chief of Britain’s general staff warned of a Russian attack. Even now America and North Korea are perilously close to a conflict that risks dragging in China or escalating into nuclear catastrophe. As our special report this week on the future of war argues, powerful, long-term shifts in geopolitics and the proliferation of new technologies are eroding the extraordinary military dominance that America and its allies have enjoyed. Conflict on a scale and intensity not seen since the second world war is once again plausible. The world is not prepared. The pity of war The pressing danger is of war on the Korean peninsula, perhaps this year. Donald Trump has vowed to prevent Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, from being able to strike America with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, a capability that recent tests suggest he may have within months, if not already. Among many contingency plans, the Pentagon is considering a disabling pre-emptive strike against the North’s nuclear sites. Despite low confidence in the success of such a strike, it must be prepared to carry out the president’s order should he give it. Even a limited attack could trigger all-out war. Analysts reckon that North Korean artillery can bombard Seoul, the South Korean capital, with 10,000 rounds a minute. Drones, midget submarines and tunnelling commandos could deploy biological, chemical and even nuclear weapons. Tens of thousands of people would perish; many more if nukes were used. This newspaper has argued that the prospect of such horror means that, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be contained and deterred instead. Although we stand by our argument, war is a real possibility (see article). Mr Trump and his advisers may conclude that a nuclear North would be so reckless, and so likely to cause nuclear proliferation, that it is better to risk war on the Korean peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow. Even if China stays out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering into a renewal of great-power competition with the West. Their ambitions will be even harder to deal with than North Korea’s. Three decades of unprecedented economic growth have provided China with the wealth to transform its armed forces, and given its leaders the sense that their moment has come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to assert itself now because it is in long-term decline. Its leaders have spent heavily to restore Russia’s hard power, and they are willing to take risks to prove they deserve respect and a seat at the table. Both countries have benefited from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated. For China, that means East Asia; for Russia, eastern Europe and Central Asia. Neither China nor Russia wants a direct military confrontation with America that they would surely lose. But they are using their growing hard power in other ways, in particular by exploiting a “grey zone” where aggression and coercion work just below the level that would risk military confrontation with the West. In Ukraine Russia has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar and economic blackmail in ways that democratic societies cannot copy and find hard to rebuff. China is more cautious, but it has claimed, occupied and garrisoned reefs and shoals in disputed waters. China and Russia have harnessed military technologies invented by America, such as long-range precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the cost of intervention against them dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to create “anti-access/area denial” networks. China aims to push American naval forces far out into the Pacific where they can no longer safely project power into the East and South China Seas. Russia wants the world to know that, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, it can call on greater firepower than its foes—and that it will not hesitate to do so. If America allows China and Russia to establish regional hegemonies, either consciously or because its politics are too dysfunctional to muster a response, it will have given them a green light to pursue their interests by brute force. When that was last tried, the result was the first world war. Nuclear weapons, largely a source of stability since 1945, may add to the danger. Their command-and-control systems are becoming vulnerable to hacking by new cyber-weapons or “blinding” of the satellites they depend on. A country under such an attack could find itself under pressure to choose between losing control of its nuclear weapons or using them. Vain citadels What should America do? Almost 20 years of strategic drift has played into the hands of Russia and China. George W. Bush’s unsuccessful wars were a distraction and sapped support at home for America’s global role. Barack Obama pursued a foreign policy of retrenchment, and was openly sceptical about the value of hard power. Today, Mr Trump says he wants to make America great again, but is going about it in exactly the wrong way. He shuns multilateral organisations, treats alliances as unwanted baggage and openly admires the authoritarian leaders of America’s adversaries. It is as if Mr Trump wants America to give up defending the system it created and to join Russia and China as just another truculent revisionist power instead. America needs to accept that it is a prime beneficiary of the international system and that it is the only power with the ability and the resources to protect it from sustained attack. The soft power of patient and consistent diplomacy is vital, but must be backed by the hard power that China and Russia respect. America retains plenty of that hard power, but it is fast losing the edge in military technology that inspired confidence in its allies and fear in its foes. To match its diplomacy, America needs to invest in new systems based on robotics, artificial intelligence, big data and directed-energy weapons. Belatedly, Mr Obama realised that America required a concerted effort to regain its technological lead, yet there is no guarantee that it will be the first to innovate. Mr Trump and his successors need to redouble the effort. The best guarantor of world peace is a strong America. Fortunately, it still enjoys advantages. It has rich and capable allies, still by far the world’s most powerful armed forces, unrivalled war-fighting experience, the best systems engineers and the world’s leading tech firms. Yet those advantages could all too easily be squandered. Without America’s commitment to the international order and the hard power to defend it against determined and able challengers, the dangers will grow. If they do, the future of war could be closer than you think.

#### Global crises are inevitable – failure to preserve deterrence risks escalation and nuclear war

Traverton, 2017 (Gregory – former president of the Pacific Council on International Policy, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,” January 2017, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>)

These global trends, challenging governance and changing the nature of power, will drive major consequences over the next five years. They will raise tensions across all regions and types of governments, both within and between countries. These near-term conditions will contribute to the expanding threat from terrorism and leave the future of international order in the balance. Within countries, tensions are rising because citizens are raising basic questions about what they can expect from their governments in a constantly changing world. Publics are pushing governments to provide peace and prosperity more broadly and reliably at home when what happens abroad is increasingly shaping those conditions. In turn, these dynamics are increasing tensions between countries—heightening the risk of interstate conflict during the next five years. A hobbled Europe, uncertainty about America’s role in the world, and weakened norms for conflict-prevention and human rights create openings for China and Russia. The combination will also embolden regional and nonstate aggressors—breathing new life into regional rivalries, such as between Riyadh and Tehran, Islamabad and New Delhi, and on the Korean Peninsula. Governance shortfalls also will drive threat perceptions and insecurity in countries such as Pakistan and North Korea. Economic interdependence among major powers remains a check on aggressive behavior but might be insufficient in itself to prevent a future conflict. Major and middle powers alike will search for ways to reduce the types of interdependence that leaves them vulnerable to economic coercion and financial sanctions, potentially providing them more freedom of action to aggressively pursue their interests. Meanwhile, the threat from terrorism is likely to expand as the ability of states, groups, and individuals to impose harm diversifies. The net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system. Europe. Europe’s sharpening tensions and doubts about its future cohesion stem from institutions mismatched to its economic and security challenges. EU institutions set monetary policy for Eurozone states, but state capitals retain fiscal and security responsibilities—leaving poorer members saddled with debt and diminished growth prospects and each state determining its own approach to security. Public frustration with immigration, slow growth, and unemployment will fuel nativism and a preference for national solutions to continental problems. Outlook: Europe is likely to face additional shocks—banks remain unevenly capitalized and regulated, migration within and into Europe will continue, and Brexit will encourage regional and separatist movements in other European countries. Europe’s aging population will undermine economic output, shift consumption toward services—like health care—and away from goods and investment. A shortage of younger workers will reduce tax revenues, fueling debates over immigration to bolster the workforce. The EU’s future will hinge on its ability to reform its institutions, create jobs and growth, restore trust in elites, and address public concerns that immigration will radically alter national cultures. United States. The next five years will test US resilience. As in Europe, tough economic times have brought out societal and class divisions. Stagnant wages and rising income inequality are fueling doubts about global economic integration and the “American Dream” of upward mobility. The share of American men age 25- 54 not seeking work is at the highest level since the Great Depression. Median incomes rose by 5 percent in 2015, however, and there are signs of renewal in some communities where real estate is affordable, returns on foreign and domestic investment are high, leveraging of immigrant talent is the norm, and expectations of federal assistance are low, according to contemporary observers. Outlook: Despite signs of economic improvement, challenges will be significant, with public trust in leaders and institutions sagging, politics highly polarized, and government revenue constrained by modest growth and rising entitlement outlays. Moreover, advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are likely to further disrupt labor markets. Meanwhile, uncertainty is high around the world regarding Washington’s global leadership role. The United States has rebounded from troubled times before, however, such as when the period of angst in the 1970s was followed by a stronger economic recovery and global role in the world. Innovation at the state and local level, flexible financial markets, tolerance for risk-taking, and a demographic profile more balanced than most large countries offer upside potential. Finally, America is distinct because it was founded on an inclusive ideal—the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness for all, however imperfectly realized—rather than a race or ethnicity. This legacy remains a critical advantage for managing divisions. Central and South America. Although state weakness and drug trafficking have and will continue to beset Central America, South America has been more stable than most regions of the world and has had many democratic advances—including recovery from populist waves from the right and the left. However, government efforts to provide greater economic and social stability are running up against budget and debt constraints. Weakened international demand for commodities has slowed growth. The expectations associated with new entrants to the middle class will strain public coffers, fuel political discontent, and possibly jeopardize the region’s significant progress against poverty and inequality. Activist civil society organizations are likely to fuel social tensions by increasing awareness of elite corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and mismanagement. Some incumbents facing possible rejection by their publics are seeking to protect their power, which could lead to a period of intense political competition and democratic backsliding in some countries. Violence is particularly rampant in northern Central America, as gangs and organized criminal groups have undermined basic governance by regimes that lack capacity to provide many basic public goods and services. Outlook: Central and South America are likely to see more frequent changes in governments that are mismanaging the economy and beleaguered by widespread corruption. Leftist administrations already have lost power in places like Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru and are on the defensive in Venezuela, although new leaders will not have much time to show they can improve conditions. The success or failure of Mexico’s high-profile reforms might affect the willingness of other countries in the region to take similar political risks. The OECD accession process may be an opportunity—and incentive— for some countries to improve economic policies in a region with fairly balanced age demographics, significant energy resources, and well-established economic links to Asia, Europe, and the United States. An Inward West? Among the industrial democracies of North America, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, leaders will search for ways to restore a sense of middle class wellbeing while some attempt to temper populist and nativist impulses. The result could be a more inwardly focused West than we have experienced in decades, which will seek to avoid costly foreign adventures while experimenting with domestic schemes to address fiscal limits, demographic problems, and wealth concentrations. This inward view will be far more pronounced in the European Union, which is absorbed by questions of EU governance and domestic challenges, than elsewhere. The European Union’s internal divisions, demographic woes, and moribund economic performance threaten its own status as a global player. For the coming five years at least, the need to restructure European relations in light of the UK’s decision to leave the EU will undermine the region’s international clout and could weaken transatlantic cooperation, while anti-immigration sentiments among the region’s populations will undermine domestic political support for Europe’s political leaders. Questions about the United States’ role in the world center on what the country can afford and what its public will support in backing allies, managing conflict, and overcoming its own divisions. Foreign publics and governments will be watching Washington for signs of compromise and cooperation, focusing especially on global trade, tax reform, workforce preparedness for advanced technologies, race relations, and its openness to experimentation at the state and local levels. Lack of domestic progress would signal a shift toward retrenchment, a weaker middle class, and potentially further global drift into disorder and regional spheres of influence. Yet, America’s capital, both human and security, is immense. Much of the world’s best talent seeks to live and work in the United States, and domestic and global hope for a competent and constructive foreign policy remain high. China. China faces a daunting test—with its political stability in the balance. After three decades of historic economic growth and social change, Beijing, amid slower growth and the aftereffects of a debt binge, is transitioning from an investment-driven, export-based economy to one fueled by domestic consumption. Satisfying the demands of its new middle classes for clean air, affordable houses, improved services, and continued opportunities will be essential for the government to maintain legitimacy and political order. President Xi’s consolidation of power could threaten an established system of stable succession, while Chinese nationalism—a force Beijing occasionally encourages for support when facing foreign friction—may prove hard to control. Outlook: Beijing probably has ample resources to prop up growth while efforts to spur private consumption take hold. Nonetheless, the more it “doubles down” on state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, the more it will be at greater risk of financial shocks that cast doubt on its ability to manage the economy. Automation and competition from lowcost producers elsewhere in Asia and even Africa will put pressure on wages for unskilled workers. The country’s rapidly shrinking working-age population will act as a strong headwind to growth. Russia. Russia’s aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber rattling, and foreign engagements abroad. Yet, at home, it faces increasing constraints as its stagnant economy heads into a third consecutive year of recession. Moscow prizes stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and pluralism. Moscow’s ability to retain a role on the global stage—even through disruption—has also become a source of regime power and popularity at home. Russian nationalism features strongly in this story, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism. Putin is personally popular, but approval ratings of 35 percent for the ruling party reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power. Outlook: If the Kremlin’s tactics falter, Russia will become vulnerable to domestic instability driven by dissatisfied elites— even as a decline in status suggests more aggressive international action. Russia’s demographic picture has improved somewhat since the 1990s but remains bleak. Life expectancy among males is the lowest of the industrial world, and its population will continue to decline. The longer Moscow delays diversifying its economy, the more the government will stoke nationalism and sacrifice personal freedoms and pluralism to maintain control. An Increasingly Assertive China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in temporary competitive advantages and to right what they charge are historical wrongs before economic and demographic headwinds further slow their material progress and the West regains its footing. Both China and Russia maintain worldviews in which they are rightfully dominant in their regions and able to shape regional politics and economics to suit their security and material interests. Both have moved aggressively in recent years to exert greater influence in their regions, to contest the US geopolitically, and to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the United States has historically opposed. For example, China views the continuing presence of the US Navy in the Western Pacific, the centrality of US alliances in the region, and US protection of Taiwan as outdated and representative of the continuation of China’s “100 years of humiliation.” Recent Sino-Russian cooperation has been tactical, however, and is likely to return to competition if Beijing jeopardizes Russian interests in Central Asia and as Beijing enjoys more options for cheap energy supply beyond Russia. Moreover, it is not clear whether there is a mutually acceptable border between what China and Russia consider their natural spheres of influence. Meanwhile, India’s growing economic power and profile in the region will further complicate these calculations, as New Delhi navigates relations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to protect its own expanding interests. Russian assertiveness will harden anti-Russian views in the Baltics and other parts of Europe, escalating the risk of conflict. Russia will seek, and sometimes feign, international cooperation, while openly challenging norms and rules it perceives as counter to its interests and providing support for leaders of fellow “managed democracies” that encourage resistance to American policies and preferences. Moscow has little stake in the rules of the global economy and can be counted on to take actions that weaken US and European institutional advantages. Moscow will test NATO and European resolve, seeking to undermine Western credibility; it will try to exploit splits between Europe’s north and south and east and west, and to drive a wedge between the United States and the EU. Similarly, Moscow will become more active in the Middle East and those parts of the world in which it believes it can check US influence. Finally, Russia will remain committed to nuclear weapons as a deterrent and as a counter to stronger conventional military forces, as well as its ticket to superpower status. Russian military doctrine purportedly includes the limited use of nuclear weapons in a situation where Russia’s vital interests are at stake to “deescalate” a conflict by demonstrating that continued conventional conflict risks escalating the crisis to a large scale nuclear exchange.

## Plan

#### The United States federal government should eliminate the annual limit for employment-based immigrants, eliminate the per-country limits for employment-based immigrants, and exempt the dependents of sponsored immigrants and individuals with graduate degrees in science and engineering fields from the numerical limit.

#### Plan solves by allowing the U.S. to attract sufficient number of permanent skilled immigrants to meet technological needs

Anderson, 5/21/18 --- executive director of the National Foundation for American Policy, a non-partisan public policy research organization focusing on trade, immigration and related issues, former Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning and Counselor to the Commissioner at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Stuart, “Will Congress Ever Solve The Long Wait For Green Cards?” <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/05/21/will-congress-ever-solve-the-long-wait-for-green-cards/#34b77973763c>, accessed on 6/7/18, JMP)

If Congress fails to pass new legislation, some of the most highly skilled professionals in America will be forced to leave the country or wait decades for employment-based green cards. How did America become mired in such a mess and what can be done to fix the problem? The Origins of the Problem Back in 1990, when the Immigration Act of 1990 was passed, Congress had a chance to secure America’s future as a magnet for top talent from all over the world. It failed in this mission. First, Congress changed the existing H-1 temporary visa category to H-1B, added new requirements and set an annual limit of 65,000. Employers reached this limit within 6 years – and have also reached it every year for the past 16 fiscal years, encouraging companies to place more workers outside the U.S. Second, Congress set an annual limit of 140,000 on employment-based green cards (for permanent residence). More than 20,000 of the green cards each year are devoted to immigrant investors, workers for jobs that don’t require a college degree, religious workers and others. More importantly, dependents (spouses and children) count against the 140,000 annual limit, accounting for about half of the total each year. Third, the Immigration Act of 1990 unwisely retained per-country limits on employment-based immigrants. This continues to make no sense. It would be discrimination if a company said it will only hire a certain number of people of Chinese origin this year, yet collectively U.S. employers are only allowed to gain permanent residence for a limited number of people from any one country. Companies should not care where a person was born and neither should Congress. Due to the combination of the per-country limit and 140,000 employment-based green card allotment, the National Foundation for American Policy estimates an Indian-born professional in the third preference (EB-3) can wait 10 to 25 years or longer for an employment-based green card. I have met dozens of individuals who have already waited more than 10 years for a green card. Congress Misses the Technological Revolution A key reason members of Congress failed in setting workable employment-based immigration limits in 1990 is they lacked imagination – or any sense of our technological future. In short, new technologies created a demand for people with technical skills well beyond the annual limits on H-1B visas and employment-based green cards established in the Immigration Act of 1990. Back in 1990, the World Wide Web did not exist on a global basis for individuals and nobody knew that e-commerce would become a key aspect of economic life for many consumers. Streaming video? Streaming music? Social media? Online multiplayer video games? Those who set our immigration limits could not have anticipated any of these developments. Establishing flexible or market-based limits, instead of fixing in place rigid caps, would have made a great difference. Consumer devices, most notably the smartphone, have spawned new industries. Just like Netflix couldn’t have sent bulky videotapes through the mail before the invention of DVDs, Uber and Lyft could not exist without smartphones. New advances continue to fuel the demand for skilled labor in the U.S. And this comes at a time when only about 20% of the full-time graduate students at U.S. universities in computer science and electrical engineering are U.S. citizens (or permanent residents). “Emerging technologies, such as driverless vehicles, may also be increasing the demand for people with high levels of technical skill, including foreign-born researchers,” noted a recent National Foundation for American Policy report. “Tesla (207 approved new H-1B petitions in FY 2017), Uber (158) and General Motors (179) all employ individuals in H-1B status.” The Solution This is actually an easy problem to fix. Congress needs to take three steps. First, to alleviate the burden on those waiting the longest, Congress could pass H.R. 392. With 323 cosponsors, the bill has achieved a level of bipartisan support unheard of in this age of polarization. “Due to an arbitrary per-country cap in the employment-based green card laws, immigrants who come here legally on work visas from India or China face a massive backlog for obtaining their permanent residence,” H.R. 392’s chief sponsor, Rep. Kevin Yoder (R-KS), told me in an interview. “If you do some simple math, you’ll realize many of these individuals will go their entire lives without ever getting their green card. Whereas, there are individuals who come here from other smaller nations that can get one in a matter of two to three years.” Yoder’s bill would transition to an immigration system that operates without per-country limits in the employment categories. That would dramatically reduce the wait times for those who have already been waiting a decade or more and allow all new entrants to gain permanent residence in a more reasonable time frame. Second, Congress should raise the annual limit well above the 140,000 now permitted each year for employment-based immigrants. Third, Congress should exempt the dependents of sponsored immigrants from the numerical limit, as well individuals with graduate degrees in science and engineering fields. For those who worry this will lead to fewer jobs for U.S. workers, well, stop worrying. “The results of the state-level analysis indicate that immigration does not increase U.S. natives’ unemployment or reduce their labor force participation,” according to a study for the National Foundation for American Policy by economist Madeline Zavodny. “Instead, having more immigrants reduces the unemployment rate and raises the labor force participation rate of U.S. natives within the same sex and education group.” The Benefits of Solving the Problem Enacting these reforms is a humane solution that will benefit America economically. If U.S. companies can retain and attract top talent they will better compete in global markets and create more jobs in America. A solution would also help people like Sunayana Dumala. In February 2017, a racist gunman yelled, “Get out of my country” and shot Srinivas Kuchibhotla and another H-1B visa holder (Alok Madasani) at Austins Bar & Grille in Olathe, Kansas. (Ian Grillot was shot trying to disarm the shooter.) Srinivas Kuchibhotla’s employer applied for his green card in 2010. Because of the per-country limit and numerical restrictions in the employment-based category, the long wait meant Srinivas died before his application was approved. Without permanent residence, his widow, Sunayana Dumala, has no legal right to live permanently in the United States. Rep. Yoder has worked to help Sunayana stay in the U.S., while also seeking a long-term solution to the green card problem for high-skilled immigrants. Jyoti Bansal has lived the kind of American Dream success story everyone can embrace – but it almost didn’t happened. “I waited 7 years for my employment-based green card and I wanted to leave my job and start a new company but couldn’t,” Jyoti told me in an interview. “What is most frustrating about the green card process is you have no control over a major part of your life. I have friends who became frustrated with the uncertainty and after years of waiting they finally left the United States.” Finally, in 2007, Jyoti received an employment authorization document (EAD) as part of the green card process. He left his employer and started AppDynamics. The company, which provides the equivalent of a 24 hour/7 days a week MRI for a customer’s website, with clients such as HBO, grew to over 900 people and a lofty valuation of $1.9 billion. That valuation was shattered in January 2017, just before an initial public offering, when Cisco acquired AppDynamics for $3.7 billion. Jyoti Bansal has moved on to new ventures. But his company that employs over 900 workers and is worth nearly $4 billion almost never got off the ground because of a flawed immigration law. How many scientific breakthroughs and entrepreneurial marvels are being stopped before they start by the per-country limit and our low level of employment-based green cards? It’s time for Congress to fix the problem.

# Inherency

#### The cap limits the number of high-skilled migrants while creating a perception of unwelcome.

da Silva, 2018 (Chantal – immigration and civil rights reporter, “H-1B VISA APPLICATIONS HIT CAP IN JUST FIVE DAYS, DESPITE TRUMP CRACKDOWN”, *Newsweek*, April 11, <http://www.newsweek.com/h-1b-visa-applications-hit-cap-just-five-days-despite-trump-crackdown-881467>, shae)

Despite fears of the Trump administration bringing the country's H-1B visa program to an abrupt halt, applications for the visas for highly-skilled foreign workers hit the 65,000 annual maximum set by Congress in just five days, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) confirmed. "In five days, we received enough applications to meet our cap of 65,000 H-1B visas," USCIS announced on Twitter last week. The agency said it had also met its 20,000-visa cap for its advanced degree exemption, known as the "master's cap," for fiscal year 2019. The agency said it was still counting the applications on Monday and would know by the end of the week how many were received. U.S. businesses use the H-1B program to employ foreign workers in fields that require specialized knowledge. Under the Trump administration, there has been a crackdown on "fraud" in the program, resulting in a slowdown in application processing times. USCIS also introduced a limitation on the program less than two weeks before the government started accepting applications for fiscal year 2019, temporarily suspending expedited processing for H-1B applications, which allowed companies to pay to speed up the process and learn within 15 days whether a candidate would receive the visa. Applications for the program quickly reached their cap despite those obstacles, as well as ongoing fears that hundreds of thousands of workers already employed under the program might be forced to leave the country if proposed changes to end extensions of H-1B visas under the Trump administration's "Buy American, Hire American" plan were approved. FWD.us, a major tech industry lobbying group that includes Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, said the high demand should be a strong indicator of how sorely outside talent is needed in the U.S. “Once again, the H-1B visa petition window this year has closed in less than a week–and the fact that we could reuse the same statement for nearly the last decade is a serious problem for America’s global competitiveness, and, worse, it is entirely preventable," FWD.us President Todd Schulte said in a blog post Monday. Schulte warned that scaling back the program would hurt the U.S. economy and argued that "Americans deserve a high-skilled immigration system that makes it easier for us to remain a magnet for global talent and innovation." Jason Gerlis, the managing director of international consultancy TMF Group USA, warned that the Trump administration's crackdown on H-1B visas would harm the United States' "general competitiveness." "With these processes becoming more complicated, the U.S. is in danger of becoming comparatively less attracted to [its] research and development centers," Gerlis told Newsweek. "The present administration believes that the public sentiment is pointing in the direction of America first," Gerlis said. "The reason they are supportive of those policies is that they believe they will bring jobs home. Unfortunately, I don't think that those policies and their impacts are so clear cut." Gerlis added that countries such as Canada and China, which are working to make it easier for foreign talent to get hired, will be "the ones who win."

# Solvency

## Plan Key

#### Increasing the number of green cards and removing the per-country quota are both critical to boost the qualified skilled immigrants

Anderson, 2015 (Stuart – executive director of the National Foundation for American Policy, “The World Has Changed Since 1990, U.S. Immigration Policy Has Not,” <http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-World-Has-Changed.NFAP-Policy-Brief.Sept-2015.pdf>)

BACKGROUND On October 27, 1990, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990 (“the 1990 Act”). Twenty-five years have passed and, with only minor exceptions, Congress has not updated employment-based immigration law to reflect the enormous changes in the world and the increased demand for – and economic importance of – individuals with technical skills.1 The 1990 Act established two numerical limits that have contributed to what many employers today see as a dysfunctional immigration system. These limits are 1) a 140,000 annual limit on employment-based immigrant visas (also known as “green cards”) for permanent residence, including a “per country” limit, and 2) a 65,000 annual limit on H-1B temporary visas. The two categories are complementary, since, in practice, a high-skilled foreign national almost always is first granted H-1B status before gaining permanent residence (since it can take years to gain permanent residence). An individual who receives an immigrant visa or green card obtains permanent residence, meaning he or she can remain in the United States permanently (barring the commission of a serious crime or long absences from the country). In contrast, a temporary visa, such as an H-1B, generally has a set term that does not allow an individual to stay permanently. H-1B status is typically three years, with a renewal for an additional three years, and an extension permitted when a green card application is pending more than 180 days. Increasing the number of employment-based green cards to accompany any increase in H-1B visas would help prevent larger backlogs for skilled immigrant green cards. LIMITS ON EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARDS While the 1990 Act increased the number of employment-based green cards, the past 25 years has shown the new annual limit was set too low. The overall annual limit on employment-based immigration was increased from 54,000 to 140,000, although the comparison is not precise because Congress reconfigured the preference categories in the 1990 Act. In reality, the legislation did not permit 140,000 new scientists and engineers to obtain permanent residence each year, as supporters of the bill might have assumed. More than half of the 140,000 quota in a typical year is used by the dependents (spouses and children under 21) of the principals sponsored, about 54 percent in FY 2012.2 Only 120,000 of the 140,000 employment-based immigrant visas are reserved for the top three preferences. Also, up to 10,000 of the third preference could be used for “Other Workers,” usually for jobs that do not require a college degree.3 That means typically no more than about 60,000 individual skilled immigrants gain permanent residence each year in America – representing only about 0.02 percent of the U.S. population. Moreover, the legislation retained per-country limits on employment-based immigration. Under those limits generally no more than 7 percent of a preference category can be filled by nationals of a single country. In practice, this provision has harmed individuals from countries with large populations, having a significant impact on immigrants from India and China that could not have been anticipated back in 1990. During the 1990s and in later decades, an increased number of Indian and Chinese students came to the United States to attend U.S. universities, particularly to study engineering and computer science. When recruiting on campuses, U.S. employers used H-1B visas to hire these highly skilled individuals and later sponsored many for permanent residence. Due to the per country limits, the wait times grew longer for Indian and Chinese immigrants. While the wait for many employment-based immigrants is a quite long 6 to 10 years, an analysis by the National Foundation for American Policy has found the theoretical wait time for an Indian national in the employment-based third preference (EB-3) is 70 years.4 Since 1998, Congress has twice provided backlog relief for employment-based immigrants by allowing a number of additional green cards to become available. The second time was aimed at reducing the wait times for health care workers. These infusions of green cards did not solve the long-term problem of the low annual quota.

## Answers To

### H1B Approval Down

#### The Trump administration is still approving 92% of H1B applicants.

CBS News, 2018 (“Trump says he wants skilled immigrants but raises new obstacles”, April 2, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-says-he-wants-skilled-immigrants-but-raises-new-obstacles/>, shae)

The administration and its backers contend it's trying to fix flaws in the existing, employer-centric skilled immigration system while advocating for a complete overhaul of America's immigration system. "The stuff that they're actually doing is not so much restricting skilled immigration as enforcing the law," said Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies, which supports reducing immigration. "They're rolling back some of the extralegal measures that other administrations have taken." A primary avenue for skilled immigrants to enter the United States is the H1B visa for specialty workers, which is heavily used by the technology industry. About 85,000 visas are issued annually in a lottery system. Some critics argue they are a way for companies to avoid hiring U.S. citizens; Mr. Trump himself has said H1B recipients shouldn't even be considered skilled. In 2016, two technology workers sued Disney, alleging 250 U.S. employees were laid off and many were forced to train replacements who were hired on H1B visas. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, saying Disney was following existing immigration laws. The Trump administration has increased its scrutiny of H1B applications, requiring renewals be submitted in person and asking for additional proof the workers are needed and are being paid top tier. "This increase reflects our commitment to protecting the integrity of the immigration system," said Joanne Fereirra, a spokeswoman for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. She added that 92.5 percent of the visas are still approved, only two percentage points lower than under the Obama administration in 2016.

### Domestic Labor DA

#### No trade off with domestic workers.

NBER, 2017 (Steve Maas – contributing writer, “Fewer H-1B Visas Did Not Mean More Employment for Natives”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, December, <http://www.nber.org/digest/dec17/w23902.shtml>, shae)

In response to concerns that foreign workers were taking jobs from Americans, especially in high-technology fields, Congress cut the annual quota on new H-1B visas from 195,000 to 65,000, beginning with fiscal year 2004. A study by Anna Maria Mayda, Francesc Ortega, Giovanni Peri, Kevin Shih, and Chad Sparber, based on data for the fiscal years 2002-09, finds that the reduced cap did not increase the hiring of U.S. workers. In The Effect of the H-1B Quota on Employment and Selection of Foreign-Born Labor (NBER Working Paper No. 23902), the researchers examine data obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request to present the first assessment of the consequences of the cap reduction on various sectors of the skilled labor force. The H-1B program, which was launched in 1990, has provided foreign-born, college-educated professionals their main entry point into the U.S. market. As much as half the growth in America's college-educated science, technology, engineering and mathematics workforce in subsequent decades can be attributed to H-1B workers. Since the cap was tightened in 2004, firms hired between 20 and 50 percent fewer new H-1B workers than they might have hired had it remained at 195,000 visas per year. The researchers find, however, that the reduced pool of foreign workers did not lead firms to hire more Americans, and conclude that this suggests "low substitutability between native-born and H-1B workers in the same skill groups." The cap only applies to for-profit companies, not to new employees of educational institutions or nonprofit research institutions.

#### Immigration creates net more jobs – multiplier effect

Varas, 2018 (Jacqueline – director of immigration and trade policy at the American Action Forum, “Restricting legal immigration to America won't help our economy,” March 7, <http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/377216-restricting-legal-immigration-to-america-wont-help-our-economy>)

The argument that immigrants harm American workers is also flawed. Adding immigrant workers into the labor market does not reduce the total number of jobs available. Immigration creates jobs by generating new economic activity. Estimates suggest that every 100 new H-1B workers, or temporary high-skilled immigrants, result in an additional 183 jobs for U.S. natives, and every 100 new H-2B workers, or temporary low-skilled immigrants, generate an additional 464 jobs for U.S. natives. This multiplier effect is in part because immigrants are imperfect substitutes for native workers. They have different language skills, education levels, and work preferences that lead them to seek different types of employment. This dynamic is especially true for low-skilled immigrants, who are in less direct competition with native workers for jobs. Furthermore, the United States is currently at full employment. With an overall unemployment rate of only 4.1 percent, it is difficult for some employers, especially in labor-intensive industries such as farming and forestry, to find the workers they need even after increasing wages. Instead of eliminating family-based visa categories, President Trump should consider changing the total proportion of U.S. immigration allocated to family reunification. Only 14 percent of immigration to the United States is employment-based. This proportion stands in stark contrast to other countries, such as Australia and Canada, where 61 percent of immigrants are admitted based on employment. Increasing the pool of labor available to U.S. businesses would help ensure that industries with labor shortages such as agriculture, construction and health care have access to the workers they need.

### Outsourcing DA

#### SQ H1B policy incentivizes small and medium size business to outsource.

Mezak, 2018 (Steve – founder and CEO of Accelerance, a leader in global software development outsourcing, “H1B Visas and Software Outsourcing: What You Need to Know”, DevOps, February 22, <https://devops.com/h1b-visas-and-software-outsourcing-what-you-need-to-know/>, shae)

A Rigged Game Against SMBs? Some advocates of small and midsize businesses (SMB) have complained that the H1B Visa program unfairly favors large businesses. Two of the most common examples given are: Expedited processing — Companies can pay for expedited processing of visa applications. By most estimates, this reduces the time to submit an application to the “lottery pool” to a matter of days versus the standard time of multiple months. SMB proponents feel this gives an unfair advantage to large companies with deep pockets. Stuffing the ballot box — There’s no practical limit to the number of applications that a company may submit. SMBs may literally have one candidate and one position they seek to fill. In contrast, large companies may submit and be awarded thousands of visas. This phenomena is even more telling when you look at which companies receive the most visas each year. According to the most recently available report from the U.S. Department of Labor, the top visa recipients are top-tier tech companies; many of them specialize in software development and even contract software development. Conclusions Looking at the particulars of this situation, these are our key takeaways: There’s an IT skills shortage in the United States, which can only be supplemented by using outsourced software development. SMBs may be at a double disadvantage—finding top U.S. citizen talent and competing with tech industry giants in the H1B visa lottery. The particulars of the H1B visa lottery are changing—and it’s unlikely that the changes will result in more (or easier) hires through the visa program. Offshore outsourcing as a strategy can help mitigate the challenges of hiring talent in the United States, whether U.S. citizens or H1B visa holders, and also minimizes the risk of finding value-priced outsourced software developer talent from inside the United States.

#### Expanding H1B’s is uniquely key to prevent outsourcing.

Ali and Waldron, 2017 (Sanwar Ali and Daniel Waldron, “Trump must grant more H1B and L1 visas to combat outsourcing says Forbes contributor”, July 26, <http://workpermit.com/news/trump-must-grant-more-h1b-and-l1-visas-combat-outsourcing-says-forbes-contributor-20170726j>, shae)

According to Stuart Anderson, a Forbes contributor, restricting access to US H1B and L1 visas results in increased outsourcing. Mr Anderson argues that the more ‘Congress and federal government agencies deny access to temporary visas, the more likely they are to pursue investments outside the United States. Mr Anderson believes that foreign companies will utilise their own offices, their network of business affiliates and contracting out to other companies as a means of circumventing US immigration regulations. The Forbes contributor said: “This is common sense and it reflects reality: We live in a global economy.” In Anderson’s opinion almost every major business in the USA, along with a number of medium-sized companies, has moved to grow its presence beyond the US. He believes the decision to shift operations abroad is a direct response to ever more stringent US immigration rules. Additionally, ‘it’s to get closer to customers, Mr Anderson said. While many foreign companies view investment outside the US as a secondary solution, Mr Anderson says that it would be foolish for Congress and federal government agencies to assume that foreign companies shifting abroad will not happen. Less jobs outsourced abroad because of immigrants on US work visas Author Tyler Cowen, an economist from George Mason University, argues that economists grasp the connection between outsourcing and immigration. An excerpt from his book, Average is Over, reads: “An increased intake of immigrants in the USA would mean that the areas in which those immigrants work are less likely to see jobs outsourced abroad.” “Immigration to the US makes it possible to keep those jobs at home. In fact, the bigger a threat outsourcing becomes, the more important immigration is for keeping us competitive and for keeping other complementary jobs in place,” the book reads. Cowen states that if outsourcing is a major concern, then it’s better to adopt a more ‘liberal attitude toward immigration’ as opposed to a restrictive approach. Mr Anderson argues that current US immigration rules, which result in an increased number of employees working for US companies outside of the country, only serve to force companies to invest abroad. Consequently, the US suffers economically and the country’s reputation as a leader in attracting global talent and foreign investment continues to take a hit. Blake Irving, CEO of publicly traded Internet domain registrar and web hosting company, GoDaddy, said: “The simple math suggests that more high-skilled visa holders in the US means an overall reduced need for hiring talent offshore.” Against outsourcing? Support H1B and L1 visas Irving argues that those threatened by outsourcing should back the H1B and L1 visa schemes. Anderson states that such visas are the only ‘practical way for highly-skilled foreign workers or international students educated in the US to remain in the country and work, long-term.’

### Tariffs/Trade War

#### Claims of trade wars are nothing more than political theater. Competition for innovation is what drives conflict.

Garrett, 2018 (Geoffrey – Dean of the Wharton School of Business @ Penn State, “The ‘Trade War’ is Really About the Future of Innovation”, LinkedIn, April 9, <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trade-war-really-future-innovation-geoffrey-garrett?trk=portfolio_article-card_title>, shae)

In the past, I have argued that it is best to view things like trade spats between China and the U.S. as well-choreographed theater designed to appease domestic political audiences without threatening the underlying big economic win-wins between the two countries. It is easy to fit “steel for soybeans” tit-for-tat tariffs into that frame. But the stakes are much higher where the future of innovation is concerned. My economics training tells me it does not matter “who wins” in innovation, because the whole world will benefit from more innovation no matter where it comes from. Moreover, it is clear that the U.S. and China are complementary where innovation is concerned — the U.S. has a comparative advantage in incubating innovation; China’s comparative advantage is scaling it. This makes cooperation so much better than conflict. The problem with this thinking in the current situation is that the economic competition bleeds quickly over into concerns about military/security competition — and the rising power (China) versus incumbent power (U.S.) dynamic more generally. Cyber security is an obvious example. The same technologies that make industrial espionage possible and increase worries about personal data security are also increasingly the backbone of the 21st century military. In fact, most modern technology falls under the “dual use” rubric — important both to commerce and to security. Put it all together, and China-U.S. competition over innovation is here to stay. I do not expect the current trade tensions to spiral out of control — the potential for major damage to the economies of both countries, and to the global economy, is just too great. But even if Trump and Xi continue to emulate their predecessors in managing down their tensions, the underlying struggle over who will win the battle for global pre-eminence in innovation will only intensify. Calling it a trade war is not only misleading. It is also an understatement of what is really going on between the two most powerful countries in the world.

### “US is Most Competitive”

#### The US’ #1 ranking still reflects Obama era data – Trumpian instability worries everyone.

Bris, 2018 (Arturo – Professor of Finance @ IMD Business School, “The US overtakes Hong Kong to rank first among world’s most competitive economies”, The Conversation, May 23, <http://theconversation.com/the-us-overtakes-hong-kong-to-rank-first-among-worlds-most-competitive-economies-97040>, shae)

The US has leapfrogged Singapore and Hong Kong to top IMD’s latest World Competitiveness Rankings. The top five most competitive economies in the world remain the same since 2016, but their order has changed. With the US at the top, Hong Kong has dropped one spot to second and Singapore remains third. Germany has fallen two spots to 15th and the UK has slipped one position to 20th. We compile the rankings using 258 indicators. Hard data such as national employment and trade statistics are weighted twice as much as the soft data from a survey of business executive opinions, which measures the business perception of issues like corruption, environmental concerns and quality of life. The return of the US to the top is driven by its strength in economic performance and infrastructure. Many will wonder if Trump is responsible for this return to the top spot in the rankings. The answer is a mixed bag. Hard data still reflects the results of policies from the Obama administration which boosted employment and output, like the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Meanwhile, the survey of business executives element of the rankings indicates that the Trump administration is perceived as business friendly. But in the category of how attractive the country remains to business executives, the US ranked very low in perceptions of government competency and the risk of political instability. The country also ranked number one in the rankings in 2013-15, which shows that any recent policy decisions have not miraculously catapulted the country to the top.

# Growth ADV

## Aging/Slow Growth

#### Aging demographics will slow the economy even with technological progress

Ezrati, 2018 (Milton – chief economist for the NY-based communications firm Vested, “Aging Demographics: A Threat To The Economy And To Finance,” April 23, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/04/23/aging-demographics-a-threat-to-the-economy-and-to-finance/#361157823f2e>)

Two long-standing trends lie at the root of the country’s demographic problem. One, medical science has dramatically increased life expectancy. According to the Census Bureau, the average American born today can expect to live to about 80, up dramatically from the 68 years averaged in 1950. Life expectancy at age 65 has jumped from 79.7 years in 1950 to 84.3 presently. In other words, the average American now can expect to live in retirement for almost 20 years. While all this is positive, it means that the nation will face an ever-larger dependent population of retirees. Compounding any strain from this unprecedented dependency, medical science and changing customs have at the same time greatly reduced birth rates. The Census Bureau notes that whereas the average American woman in 1950 had 3.5 children over her lifetime, the figure today has fallen below 2.0. With fewer young workers to support an ever-larger retired population, the economic and financial strains become harder to avoid. The statistics are striking. In 1950, the economy had at its disposal 8.1 people of working age for each person of retirement age. The most recent figures indicate that this “dependency ratio,” as the demographers call it, has shrunk to just over 5.0. By 2030, Census estimates it will have fallen to 3.0. Even if the average retiree had ample savings to sustain himself or herself, which is hardly the case, those trends will leave the economy struggling to find enough workers to support the population’s demands for goods and services. After all, retirees, though they have ceased active production, still consume. Each of these three workers will have to produce enough for himself or herself as well as his or her personal dependents and one-third of what each retiree consumes, a heavy burden indeed. Even in an era of incredible technological marvels, such a shortage of talented workers will necessarily slow the pace of economic growth. A few years ago, when the pace of growth regularly disappointed, several analysts explained the poor economic showing in terms of these demographic pressures. Since, the acceleration of growth has quieted such talk. But if demographics cannot explain cyclical variations, they do point ultimately to an economic drag. Some academic research suggests that the aging trend alone could cut the economy’s historic growth rate down by a fifth. Some estimates look more ominous, suggesting that growth would stop altogether. Commentators, of course, cannot resist hyperbole. The Peterson Institute has stated flatly that “aging could trigger a crisis that engulf the world’s economy [and] may threaten democracy itself.” Perhaps a risible response to the problem, but still, exaggeration in some quarters provides no excuse to ignore the significance of the underlying problem. In the demographic debate, many have downplayed the urgency, pointing to artificial intelligence (AI) and other technological fixes as an answer to the nation’s future labor needs. Such observations no doubt carry a measure of comfort. AI and other such fixes could certainly delay the day of reckoning. But even as people look to such wonders for answers to the human shortfall, the aging trend casts a shadow over the economy’s future ability to innovate as well as to produce. Many scientists and social historians, Albert Einstein and the great mathematician John von Neumann among them, have stressed that it is youth that produces essential scientific advances. Such commentators have much evidence on their side, too. Einstein gave the world his groundbreaking theories at age 26. Most other notable scientists have done their most important work by age 30. A study of scientific Nobel laureates indicates that on average they do their significant work before age 35. The evidence may be far from conclusive, but sufficient to question any complacency around continuing advances in AI. Demographic trends also raise questions about how the economy will pay for technological substitutes. Though the relative labor shortage will tend to raise real wages, especially for people with the training the economy wants, and so drive business to find technological substitutes, the rise in labor costs will also cut into profitability, by as much as 10% according to some studies, leaving business with less ability to finance basic research into such technologies much less their practical implementation. Indeed, reduced levels of profitability raise questions about business’ willingness or ability to spend on expansion generally. Additional financial implications of aging demographics will compound such problems. Because retirees tend to draw down on their nest eggs or at the very least stop contributing to them, an outsized retired population will leave the financial system less able to offer capital for economic innovation and expansion, especially since business will also face a profitability squeeze. At the same time, growing demands on public and private pension schemes, as well as healthcare needs, will exacerbate the financial shortfall. The Social Security Administration estimates that over this time such social demands on the nation’s financial resources will increase by a third. To be sure, increasing payroll taxes from increased wages would provide something of an answer to this burden but not a complete one. The picture does include some bright spots, some natural responses that might mitigate the otherwise ill effects of these trends. Longer life expectancies, for instance, may prompt retirees to draw down on their nest eggs at a slower pace than past trends might indicate, easing some of the financial strains otherwise implicit in these demographic pressures. Medical science, by improving the health of older people, might prompt them to a delay retirement, something that would relieve both the financial strains as well as the deterioration in the nation’s dependency ratio. But if these considerations, as well as AI, mitigate the strains implicit in the country’s relentless demographic predicament, they cannot lift them entirely. For relief, then, the nation will need to find ways to employ more productive, trained workers to produce for the nation’s needs as well as pay taxes and contribute to pension plans. Part of that effort will insist on workplace adjustments that can bring a greater proportion of the population into productive employment. Part of it will look to trade to supplement demographic shortfalls. Part will involve the hot topic of immigration, on which the next post will focus.

## Skilled Immigration Key

#### Boosting skilled immigration is the best way to achieve consistent 3 percent growth --- injects more workers into the economy

Thompson, 2018 (Derek – senior editor at The Atlantic, “One Simple Way Trump Can Get the Economic Growth He Wants; He isn’t going to like it: It’s more immigration,” February 27, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/trump-growth-immigration/554186/>)

The Trump administration’s latest budget, which was released in mid-February, projects 3 percent annual GDP growth for much of the next decade. Most economists consider that forecast to be somewhere between wildly optimistic and historically absurd. Why? Because consistent 3 percent growth, while the norm for countries like China and India, is exquisitely rare among developed economies. The average annual growth of America’s GDP since the Great Recession has been about 2 percent. Achieving Trump’s dream of growth would require some heroic supercharging of the economy. There are several ways that economic growth can take off in a country like the U.S. First, the federal government has a wide arsenal of policies to combat recessions. When the economy slips into a funk, the feds can cut taxes and increase spending, thus running a large short-term deficit to combat slow growth. The Federal Reserve can slash interest rates to encourage corporations to borrow and spend more money than they otherwise would. The most obvious problem with deploying any recession-busting policies now is, well, the U.S. isn’t in a recession. Quite the opposite: The economy is nearly at full employment. Interest rates are already low and most economists expect them to do nothing but rise in the next few years, which should discourage investment and growth. The Republican tax cut, combined with increased spending, will increase the deficit for the next few years—a rarity this deep into a recovery. It’s conceivable that those deficits might provide a bit of a boost. But sustained 3 percent growth isn’t likely. So, how can a growing economy accelerate? Imagine a factory owner who wants to expand his shoe-manufacturing capacity. The owner can invest in shoelace machines and employee training to increase the per-worker productivity of the factory. He could also simply hire more workers. Just like that hypothetical factory owner, the economy’s growth fundamentally comes from just two things—productivity growth and labor-force growth. The trouble with rapid productivity growth is that it’s a bit like permanent happiness—much easier to obsess over than to achieve. Indeed, economists obsess over productivity quite a bit, but they often disagree about what increases it, and, as some of them sheepishly admit, they’re not even all that great at measuring it. So far this century, productivity growth in the U.S. has been consistently low—even negative—since the end of the dot-com bubble. Several studies suggest that as rich countries like the U.S. get older, their productivity-growth rates naturally decline. (Since there’s a lot about productivity that puzzles economists, they aren’t entirely sure why this happens, either.) Designing a budget projection around a sudden surge in productivity is a bit like betting one’s life savings on the discovery of alien life on the moon. Not utterly hopeless. But certainly not advisable. So, what’s the trick to raising GDP if productivity levels are subdued? More workers. In the second half of the 20th century, economic growth in the U.S. rode a labor-force boom, after the Greatest Generation gave birth to the Boomers, then the largest generation in history. But in the last decade, that demographic wind has turned against the U.S.—and most advanced economies. As the Obama White House said in its 2013 economic report, “real GDP in the United States is likely to be permanently slower than it was in earlier eras because of a slowdown in labor force growth.” It’s not just that population growth is slowing down. What’s more, the share of Americans between 25 and 54 who are working—a statistic known as the “prime age labor participation rate”—has been generally declining since the late 1990s. There are two simple ways to add more people to the U.S. population: more babies and more immigrants. The trouble with increasing fertility is that no advanced economy seems to have figured out how to do it. The U.S. is in the middle of a protracted lull in baby-making—but so is Scandinavia, and Western Europe, and Japan, and Russia. Low birth rates may simply be a consequence of gender equality and overall prosperity: As a nation’s share of educated women grows, its fertility rate tends to decline, perhaps because working women don’t have the time, money, or interest in raising the sort of large families that were so common (and necessary) in agrarian economies. Productivity growth is unpredictable, and fertility growth is elusive. What’s left? Well, there’s immigration. Achieving higher growth without another baby boom or accelerating productivity isn’t difficult—if the country simply let in more immigrants each year, GDP growth would almost surely accelerate. More able-bodied workers means more work; more work means more production; and product is, after all, the final noun in GDP. But Republicans are, quite publicly, pursuing the opposite strategy. The immigration legislation from Senators Tom Cotton of Arkansas and David Perdue of Georgia proposes a 50 percent cut to the nation’s immigration levels. The Trump administration, which has endorsed the plan, said it wants to reduce legal immigration to the United States by half within the decade. This puts the Trump administration’s economic policies in conflict with its economic projections. Other countries looking to jump-start economic growth in a period of low fertility are liberalizing their immigration policies. Japan, which is further along the aging curve than the U.S., has revamped its immigration laws this century, doubling its share of foreign-born workers (from an admittedly measly 1 percent in the late 1990s to about 2 percent today). Along with strong monetary stimulus, that doubling of the foreign-born population has contributed to stronger growth than Japan would have had otherwise. As I’ve written, the economic case for maintaining and even increasing immigration levels in the U.S. is extremely strong. The White House is discouraging talented people from immigrating during a period of low productivity and falling fertility while predicting a growth miracle. All budgets are fantasies. But there is a greater sin here than fantastical forecasting. And that is using magical growth projections to cover up for a small-minded immigration policy.

## A2 Dedev

### Growth Sustainable

#### Economic growth is sustainable and tech solves---lower fertility, environmental regulations, innovation, and halting deforestation.

Bailey 15 – Ronald Bailey, B.A. Philosophy, B.A. Economics, University of Virginia, science correspondent at Reason Magazine, formerly served as an adjunct analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, 2015 (“Fast Growth Can Solve Climate Change,” *Scientific American*, November 30th, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fast-growth-can-solve-climate-change/>, AIvackovic)

As representatives from 196 countries gather in Paris this December to negotiate a universal climate treaty, they should keep in mind that richer is more climate-friendly, especially for developing countries. Why? Because faster growth means higher incomes, which correlate with lower population growth. Greater wealth also means higher agricultural productivity, freeing up land for forests to grow as well as speedier progress toward developing and deploying cheaper non–fossil fuel energy technologies. These trends can act synergistically to ameliorate man-made climate change. As economic growth increases incomes, fertility tends to fall toward, and even below, the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. Some demographers argue that world population could peak at around nine billion by the middle of this century and then begin declining. Lower population growth means less demand for energy and other resources than there would otherwise have been. According to the latest World Bank data on 212 national jurisdictions, 85 countries are currently at or below the replacement rate, including Japan, China, Russia, Brazil the U.S. and all of Europe. Total fertility rates in large developing countries like India, Bangladesh and Mexico are also near the replacement rate. Economic development initially worsens environmental externalities such as deforestation and pollution, including the accumulation of climate-damaging greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and oceans. But long term, pollution and deforestation can start to improve as economic growth boosts the incomes of once poor people. The wealthier people become the more they demand and get improved environmental quality via regulation and market mechanisms that promote cleaner and less resource-intensive processes and technologies. For example, since 1980 carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide air pollution is down 85, 80 and 60 percent, respectively, even as real U.S. GDP more than doubled. Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ latest global forest trends report shows that deforestation halts and reverses when per capita incomes reach a threshold of around $4,200. Economies increasingly grow by squeezing more value out of less stuff. The Worldwatch Institute reports that U.S. carbon intensity (the amount of CO2 emitted to produce a dollar of GDP) has fallen 60 percent since 1990. Boosting agricultural productivity in poor countries will mean more land for forests. Expanding forests soak up carbon dioxide, thus slowing warming. Right now cereal yields in India and Nigeria average 2,962 and 1,537 kilograms per hectare, respectively. This contrasts with the U.S. average of 7,340 kilograms per hectare. Agronomist Paul Waggoner of the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station has calculated that “if during the next 60 to 70 years the world farmer reaches the average yield of today’s U.S. corn grower, the 10 billion [people] will need only half of today’s cropland while they eat today’s American calories.” Jesse Ausubel, head of the Human Environment Program at The Rockefeller University, now finds that humanity is already near peak farmland. If bioethanol subsidies that encourage the conversion of food into fuel could be eliminated, then up to 160 million hectares of land could be restored to nature by 2060. That’s an area about double the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River. And as farming efficiency improves, more people can move to cities, freeing up land for nature. Finally, faster economic growth provides the wherewithal to spur innovation and create cheaper and more efficient technologies. Swanson’s Law is an example of increasing economies of scale: Every time global solar panel production capacity doubles, the price drops 20 percent. At the current rate of growth, electricity from solar panels will be cheaper than that produced by burning natural gas in less than a decade. Similarly, climate scientist James Hansen and his colleagues have urgently argued that there is “no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power.” A recent study published in PLoS ONE by Swedish and Australian researchers estimates that replacing all fossil fuel energy generation with nuclear power could be done in 25 to 34 years. Economic growth supplies the capital needed to fund the global no-carbon energy transformation, not mandates to deploy current, expensive, clunky versions of renewable energy and nuclear technologies. Just as cell phones enabled poor countries to skip over landline telephone infrastructure, economic development coupled with increasingly cheap solar panels attached to inexpensive, high-efficiency energy-storage systems, including batteries, could help them bypass centralized fossil fuel plants and power grids. To truly address climate change, responsible policy makers should select courses of action that move humanity from slow- to high-growth trajectories, especially for the poorest developing countries. This includes honest bureaucracies, the rule of law, free markets, strong property rights and democratic governance. Whatever slows down economic growth will also slow down environmental cleanup and renewal.

### Growth Solves Env

#### Faster, consistent growth is the only way to outpace otherwise inevitable environmental limits that will cause extinction

Shkliarevsky 18 --- professor of history at Bard College [Gennady, professor of history at Bard College where he has taught since 1985, January 5, 2018, “Tax Cuts and the Problem of Economic Growth,” International Policy Digest, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/05/tax-cuts-and-the-problem-of-economic-growth>]

Does this problem have a solution? Is it possible for humanity to break out of the current vicious circle and achieve a constant, stable, sustained, or even exponentially increasing economic progress? Production and consumption are the two most important categories in our economy and economic thinking. They constrain each other and this mutual constraint acts as a limitation on the rate of our economic growth. The typical effect of the expansion of production is the increase in supply. Supply growth results in declining prices. The decline in prices signals that the market is saturated and production must slow down. When production slows down, supply diminishes and prices begin to grow, which triggers a new expansion of production. When production expands, our wealth grows and economy appreciates. Consumption generally depreciates products and thus our wealth declines and our economy depreciates. Thus, production and consumption constrain each other and this constraint limits the rate of our economic growth. In order to solve this problem and achieve constant growth, we need to constantly rejuvenate our economy, we need to ensure a sustained supply of new products to the market and, moreover, we need to make sure that these products are needed. The main economic problem we face today is precisely in bringing novelties to the marketplace. Many business people, economists, pundits and politicians have stressed that we will have to innovate our way out of the current economic predicament. Therefore, creativity and creation are the key to solving the problem of growth. However, creativity, or what we call entrepreneurship when we talk about economy, is not a science. We cannot use it in any predictable way. It is a very uncertain and contingent factor that is fraught with many unknowns and surprises. Therefore, the problem of economic growth is reformulated into the problem of how to make innovation constant, predictable, and steady, rather than sporadic and contingent. In other words, how can we control our creativity? As has already been pointed out, consumption acts as a constraint on production. Production appreciates and consumption depreciates. The tendency of consumption to depreciate our economy is the reason for the existence of limits to rates of economic growth. As one can see, production and consumption are two most essential economic functions. They are mutually dependent, complementary and cannot exist without each other. The problem for achieving constant and sustained growth is that their vectors point in different directions: one toward appreciation and the other toward depreciation. However, do they have to be opposed to each other? There are two kinds of consumption that we know. One kind of consumption is consumption of final products. Indeed, this kind of consumption always depreciates products. You drive your new car out of the parking lot and it immediately loses value. But this form of consumption is not the only one we know. There is also a form of consumption that appreciates products, for example, consumption of raw materials or semi-finished products. Another interesting case of consumption that appreciates is the consumption of technological devices and machines. Indeed, physical use of such devices and machines depreciates them. However, they also represent certain technological knowledge. Knowledge consumption involves our mind. Mental consumption inevitably involves mediation and, therefore, construction that takes place in our mind. In other words, in order to consume something our mind has to create forms of mediation that allow us to consume this something, or, in other words, we have to produce it in our mind. Our sense organs transmit to our brain electrical signals that the brain interprets. We produce reality and production necessarily involves appreciation. Thus mental consumption involves necessarily the creation of new knowledge and hence appreciation. The above argument bears one important conclusion that consumption does not necessarily involve depreciation. Consumption can also, like production, be associated with appreciation, particularly consumption that involves mental activity that is associated with production of knowledge, or creation. We live in the era of knowledge society when knowledge is the main means of production and the principal product. The share of knowledge production by comparison with the production of consumer goods is constantly growing and already begins to outstrip the latter. Since consumption of knowledge, just like its production, is associated with appreciation, the transition to knowledge society suggests that in the modern economy both consumption and production will lead to appreciation and increase in wealth. They do not stand opposed to each other and their balance does not slow down the economy but is the source of its appreciation and constant growth. Balance in this case means that when production grows, so does consumption and both contribute to appreciation of the economy and economic growth. The constraint on the rates of growth disappears and the pace of economic growth can accelerate. The combined effect of growth that comes from production and consumption is double from what it is in our current economy. In other words, economic growth becomes exponential and limitless: as production increases, so does consumption, and more consumption leads to greater appreciation and greater wealth. This infinite and exponential economic growth is not only possible, but is, in fact, essential. Without such growth our civilization simply cannot exist. Our civilization is essentially a dissipative system that constantly generates entropy. As soon as this system ceases to create new levels and forms of organization, it begins to deplete available resources. The only way it can sustain itself indefinitely is by constantly redefining itself in ways that allow us to capture new flows of energy and resources; and where there are new flows of energy and resources, work can be performed. It is our destiny to play this catch-up game, and the only way we can play it indefinitely is by constantly creating new levels and forms of organization of reality so as to maintain the overall entropy level at zero. There is no way for our civilization to go back to less powerful levels of organization of social production, as advocated by the adepts of de-growth, or even to maintain the same level of production organization (steady-state economy). Limits to growth or de-growth are not ultimately realistic possibilities. Our civilization can only move forward. If we decide to terminate the progress of our civilization, we will embark on the path that leads only to its eventual disintegration and disappearance—an option that even supporters of limits to growth or de-growth do not want to entertain.

#### Accelerating economic growth and technology prevent environmental impacts

Keith et al 15 – David Keith, Ph.D. in Experimental Physics @ MIT, Professor of Applied Physics in the School of Engineering at Harvard and Applied Sciences and Professor of Public Policy in the Harvard Kennedy School; Ruth Defries, Denning Family Professor of Sustainable Development at Columbia University, recipient of 2007 MacArthur Fellowship, Ph.D. in 1980 from the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering at Johns Hopkins University; John Asafu-Adjaye, the professor of economics at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia; Barry Brook, professor of environmental sustainability at the University of Tasmania; Linus Bloomqvist, Director of Conservation at the Breakthrough Institute and a member of the Breakthrough Advisory Board; Stewart Brand, cofounder of Revive & Restore, The Long Now Foundation, The WELL, Global Business Network, and founder/editor of the Whole Earth Catalog; Erle Ellis, environmental scientist at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County; Christopher Foreman, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Mark Lynas, visiting fellow at Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, working with the newly launched Cornell Alliance for Science; Ted Nordhaus, chairman and cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute; Martin Lewis, senior lecturer in the department of history at Stanford University; Roger Pielke, Jr., professor in the environmental studies program at the University of Colorado and director of CU’s Center for Science and Technology Policy Research; Rachel Pritzker, president and founder of the Pritzker Innovation Fund; Michael Shellenberger, president and cofounder of the Breakthrough Institute; Joyashree Roy, ICSSR National Fellow and professor of economics at Jadavpur University in Kolkata, India; Robert Stone, awardwinning, Oscar- and Emmy-nominated documentary filmmaker; Mark Sagoff, senior fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy and a professor of philosophy at George Mason University; Peter Teague, Senior Advisor at Breakthrough Institute, 2015 (“An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” April 2015, http://www.ecomodernism.org/)

Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. Personal, economic, and political liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. Historically large numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. us, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.

#### Economic innovation solves the environment – promotes self-development

Bailey, science correspondent, ’14 (Ronald; 10/31/14; award-winning science correspondent; Reason, “Is Capitalism Environmentally Unsustainable?”, <http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/31/is-capitalism-unsustainable?n_play=54547667e4b0dcc26e7944fe)>

Human activity is remaking the face of the Earth: transforming and polluting the landscape, warming the atmosphere and oceans, and causing species to go extinct. The orthodox view among ecologists is that human liberty—more specifically economic activity and free markets—is to blame. For example, the prominent biologist-activists Paul and Anne Ehrlich of Stanford University recently argued in a British science journal that the environmental problems we face are driven by "overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens' aggregate consumption." The Ehrlichs urge the "reduction of the worship of 'free' markets that infests the discipline" of economics. But the notion that economic activity and free markets are antithetical to the flourishing of the natural world is complicated by the fact that the countries with the biggest environmental problems today, and the least means and apparent interest in addressing them, are not the liberalized ones with advanced capitalist economies but the ones with weak or nonexistent democracies and still-developing economies. So is it really the case that liberty and the environment are simply opposed? Does the good of one come only at the expense of the other? Or can liberty and a flourishing natural environment reinforce one another, the good of one encouraging the good of the other? Can economic activity under a system of liberty be environmentally sustainable in the long run? ... Many of these academics—though not all—acknowledge that market economies on the whole have greatly improved the lot of humanity over the past few centuries, leading to better standards of living, higher levels of education, and more civil and political rights. But they argue that the system of liberty produces accumulating externalities that will eventually drive civilization to self-destruction. Either human beings start restructuring civilization soon, the Ehrlichs warn, or "nature will restructure civilization for us." The Lockean response to these academics' worries is that free-market capitalism is as much about growing inward as outward—about learning to derive progressively more value from a finite supply of natural resources, so that we need not consume ever more of those resources. On this understanding, there need be no contradiction between meeting human material needs and preserving a large portion of the natural environment. So we have two broad views of the sustainability of the system of liberty, and they could hardly be more opposed: one of steady growth and self-reinforcing gains in the efficient use of natural resources, and one in which this growth may be maintained for a deceptively bountiful period of human history before it collapses in on itself. ... We can now begin to see the shape of an answer to our initial question of whether liberty and the natural environment must necessarily be opposed. In early stages of modern economic development, as liberty is unleashed in open-access orders, people convert relatively plentiful but unproductive nature into more productive but relatively scarcer human labor—that is, higher population—and manufactured capital. In those early stages, liberty and the environment function as what economists call "substitute goods," with more liberty resulting in less demand for the environment in its natural state. In such societies, fertility rates remain high and environmental amenities and quality continue to deteriorate. But at later stages of economic development, human and manufactured capital become so effective, thanks especially to technological progress, that the environment can be returned to a more natural state. And since such societies are more prosperous, they can better afford the costs of environmental regulations, even inefficient ones. ... Free markets are the most robust mechanism ever devised by humanity for delivering rapid feedback on how decisions turn out. Profits and losses discipline people to learn quickly from and fix their mistakes. By contrast, top-down bureaucratization tends to stall innovation and to make it more difficult for people and societies to adapt rapidly to changing conditions, economic and ecological. Centrally planned economies fail; centrally planning the world's ecology will fail as well. Our aim must be to find ways for liberty and the environment to flourish together, not to sacrifice one in the vain hope of protecting the other.

### No Warming Impact

#### No impact to warming – empirics, adaption, and their science is flawed

Shani ’15 (Amir Shani – PhD @ the University of Central Florida, researches ecotourism and ethics at the University of the Negev, Eilat Campus. Boaz Arad – spokesman in the Public Policy Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, “There is always time for rational skepticism: Reply to Hall et al,” April 2015, ScienceDirect)

The uncertainty that encompasses current climate change assessments is strengthened in light of the studies indicating that over earth's history there have been distinct warm periods with temperatures exceeding the current ones (Esper et al., 2012, McIntyre and McKittrick, 2003 and Soon and Baliunas, 2003). Reviewing the relevant scientific literature, Khandekar, Murty, and Chittibabu (2005) concluded that “in the context of the earth's climate through the last 500 million years, the recent (1975–2000) increase in the earth's mean temperature does not appear to be unusual or unprecedented as claimed by IPCC and many supporters of the global warming hypothesis” (p. 1568). Other studies challenged the mainstream climate change narrative, according to which CO2 levels in the earth's atmosphere play a prominent role in rising temperatures. One notable example is the research by Shaviv and Veizer (2003), which demonstrates that the earth's temperature correlates well with variations in cosmic ray flux, rather than changes in atmospheric CO2. These findings and others stir contentious debates within the climate scientific community, but are nevertheless largely overlooked by the IPCC, which ignores alternative explanations for climate change. Regrettably, Hall et al. scornfully dismiss this evidence, presented in our research note, based on cherry-picking of a few “non-peer-reviewed” references that were cited, some vague claims about “misreading” and “selective citing,” as well as other semantic nitpicking. 4. Impacts of climate change The IPCC warns that climate change is likely to have severe consequences, particularly for poor countries, such as increased hunger, water shortages, vulnerability to extreme weather events and debilitating diseases. However, these estimations have been heavily criticized for failing to properly account for substantial improvements in adaptive capacity (i.e., the capability of coping with the impact of global warming) that are likely to occur due to advances in economic development, technological change and human capital over the next century (Goklany, 2007). Fostering economic growth and technological development, largely achievable through the use of fossil fuels, will strengthen both industrialized and developing countries' adaptive capacity to deal not just with possible future climate change consequences, but also with other environmental and public health problems. Such policy will provide greater benefits at lower costs than drastic climate change mitigation efforts involving substantially cutting greenhouse gas emissions (Goklany, 2004 and Goklany, 2012). Furthermore, the analyses of Galiana and Green (2009) exemplify that in the current state of energy technologies, the suggested plans for ambitious emission reductions will likely severely clobber the global economy, especially in view of present economic conditions. In order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at accepted levels, there is a need for enormous advances in efficient energy technology, which is currently missing (Pielke, Wigley & Green, 2008). In any case, even if every industrialized nation meets the most ambitious emissions targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, such efforts are likely to have little effect, particularly in the light of the considerable increases in greenhouse gas emissions by rising economic superpowers as China and India, as well as the remaining developing world (Wigley, 1998). Hall et al. criticized us for choosing “selective citations…that discuss natural processes potentially affect climate in specific locations and times.” Yet the purpose of referring to such studies was to refute the claims made by the IPCC and other climate change alarmists to the effect that recent extreme weather events (e.g., floods, droughts and storms) are the consequences of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Moreover, data shows that despite claims that the number and intensity of extreme weather has increased, between 1900 and 2010 the average annual death and death rates from extreme weather events has declined by 93% and 98%, respectively (Goklany, 2009). This is mostly due to economic and technological factors, such as improved global food production, increase globalized food trade and better disaster preparedness. IPCC's exaggerated estimations of climate change impacts were also noted in an op-ed in Financial Times written by climate economist Richard Tol (2014), a week following his demand that his name as one of the leading authors be removed from the IPCC's AR5 due to its over alarmist assessments of the impacts of AGW and underestimation of humanity's adaptive capacity. As concluded by Tol, “Humans are a tough and adaptable species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic, in the desert and in the rainforest. We survived ice ages with primitive technologies. The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to humankind is laughable” (2014, para 1).

### Transition Bad

#### Transition fails—all empirics go aff

Porter, 15—Economic Scene Columnist for the New York Times (Eduardo, “Imagining a World Without Growth”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/business/economy/imagining-a-world-without-growth.html>, dml)

Whatever the ethical merits of the case, the proposition of no growth has absolutely no chance to succeed. For all the many hundreds of years humanity survived without growth, modern civilization could not. The trade-offs that are the daily stuff of market-based economies simply could not work in a zero-sum world. “It would be a nonstarter to have zero growth within a given country in terms of creating conflict between groups,” Professor Greenstone told me. “If one were to take this further and make it international, it feels like an even bigger stretch.” Let’s examine what our fossil-fueled growth has provided us. It has delivered gains in living standards in even the poorest regions of the world. But that’s only the beginning. Economic development was indispensable to end slavery. It was a critical precondition for the empowerment of women. Indeed, democracy would not have survived without it. As Martin Wolf, the Financial Times commentator has noted, the option for everybody to become better off — where one person’s gain needn’t require another’s loss — was critical for the development and spread of the consensual politics that underpin democratic rule. Zero growth gave us Genghis Khan and the Middle Ages, conquest and subjugation. It fostered an order in which the only mechanism to get ahead was to plunder one’s neighbor. Economic growth opened up a much better alternative: trade. The Oxford economist Max Roser has some revealing charts that show the deadliness of war across the ages. It was a real killer in the era of no growth. Up to half of all deaths among hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists and other ancient cultures were caused by conflict. The bloody 20th century — stage for two world wars, the Holocaust and other war-based genocides — still doesn’t even come close. Naomi Klein, a champion of the leftward fringe newly converted to the environmental cause, gleefully proposes climate change as an opportunity to put an end to capitalism. Were she right, I doubt it would bring about the workers’ utopia she appears to yearn for. In a world economy that does not grow, the powerless and vulnerable are the most likely to lose. Imagine “Blade Runner,” “Mad Max” and “The Hunger Games” brought to real life. The good news is that taking action against climate change need do no such thing. It will not be easy, but we can glimpse technological paths that will allow civilization to keep growing and afford the world economy a positive-sum future.

#### No transition---growth mindset locked in and system of capital is inevitable.

Liodakis 18 – George Liodakis, retired professor of Political Economy at the Technical University of Crete, Greece, 2018 (“Capital, Economic Growth, and Socio-Ecological Crisis: A Critique of De-Growth,” *Taylor and Francis*, Available Online via Taylor and Francis Subscription, AIvackovic)

2. Capitalism and the Panacea of Economic Growth From a Marxist perspective, we will argue below that economic growth is “genetically” inscribed in the very nature of capitalism as a historically specific mode of production. On the other hand, mainstream theories, but also the historical evidence concerning the development of capitalism, indicate that the periodical fluctuations and occasional crises of capitalism can be partially smoothed out only through some type of time-fixing and/or space-fixing (see Harvey1982). As is well known, the time-fixing concerns the expansion of (effective) demand and is associated with credit expansion and state intervention, under the influence of the theory of J. M. Keynes. This type of policy, without resolving the internal contradictions and failures of capitalism, constitutes an uncertain flight forward and a postponement of crisis. The space-fixing may also concern the expansion of demand, but also all the preconditions for a profitable production and sale of the com- modities produced. It is associated with the expansion of international trade, all forms of capital flows, international contradictions, and imperialism. This type of policies or pro- cesses may ensure a temporary stabilization and development of capitalism, but may also constitute a short-sighted shift or relocation of the problem to another country (Overbeek 2012). Both these policies (time- and space-fixing) may, in the short run, ensure or improve the conditions for the stabilization and economic growth of capitalism, regardless of the likelihood of generating a greater instability and destructive ecological implications (Sti- glitz2003,8–9). What we have here is a systemic failure of capitalism and the market mechanism to ensure a socially rational and effective allocation of the productive resources available, an adequate and socially legitimate satisfaction of social needs, an acceptable level and advancement of social welfare, and an ecological compatibility of all socio-econ-omic activity (Swyngedouw 2009). Instead of tackling this fundamental failure, capitalist governments and business executives escape with a flight forward and a global expansion. In other words, they eschew to economic growth, while indirectly increasing the economic and ecological fragility of the planetary socio-ecological system. What is astonishing, even if not paradoxical, is that this growth imperative of capitalism is generally acceptable, not only by the social forces of capital and state institutions, but also by working people and their collective agents (labor unions and associations). Capitalist agents cogently consider economic growth as a precondition of increased sales of commodities and profit maximization. And though capitalist accumulation may also pro- ceed through a process of“accumulation by dispossession,”as Harvey (2003) has pointed out, growth is the main vehicle of capital accumulation. The operatives and the political personnel of the state are also in favor of, and tend to promote economic growth for sev- eral reasons. A large number of public works, an increasing volume of investments (public and private), and a growing economic activity imply an increase of public (tax) revenues and a greater employment of labor, apparently promoting social welfare. In this sense, higher rates of economic growth seem to indicate a more successful public administration and a higher economic performance, which are a precondition for the re-election of pol- itical personnel. This also applies to elected cadre, municipal leaders and decentralized social agents. In the case of extensive corruption, economic growth and an increased volume of public provision or an increased number of entrusted works are a fine oppor- tunity for state functionaries and political or municipal leaders to collect various commissions. But working people and their collective agents seem also to be content with higher rates of economic growth. In a capitalist society, where an extensive reserve army of labor is a precondition for the profitable investment of capital and the right to decent work and life is not warranted, workers and their unions are usually satisfied with a few more employ- ment places or a promised reduction of employment lay-offs. Under conditions of declin- ing public employment, as is the case in the current context of a dominant neo-liberalism, working people are entrapped, to an even greater degree, in the vagaries and uncertainties of the labor market. Employment positions, as a result of business expansion and econ- omic growth, are usually offered to working people as a favor or gift, while in fact they are a source of surplus value and profit extraction. Instead of demanding appropriate work ensuring a decent income, workers and unions appear, also, to consent to economic growth. Thus, a nearly general consensus on economic growth tends to arise. It is in this sense that Swyngedouw (2014, 91) speaks of a rising de-politicization and“a naturalization of the need of economic growth and capitalism as the only reasonable and possible form of organization of socio-natural metabolism.” Growth appears as a panacea for the resolution of all problems. With the dominant role of mass media reproducing this perception, it is nowadays hard to object to the necessity of economic growth. And yet, as will be argued further below, economic growth tends to undermine the fundamental sources of all social wealth, labor and nature, and it is for this reason that a great number of radical and Marxist critics have targeted economic growth (see Altvater2001; Andreasson2005; Herrera2011; Alvarez Lozano2012; Dale2012; Sanders2016). However, what is here important to point out is that, the systemic necessity of growth under capitalism and the growth consensus outlined above give rise to a powerful growth ideology. In fact, growth is not merely the result of an ideology, but stems from the nature and the internal dynamics of capital. The competitive and exploitative character of capitalism and its purpose of exchange value and profit maximization directly imply the necessity of a continuous growth. Simultaneously, the growth ideology developed particularly during the post-war period has significantly served the reinforcement of the process of economic growth and its social legitimation, despite all the negative social and ecological implications. For reasons already noted, and insofar as economic growth is a precondition for the expanded reproduction of capital, the productivism lying behind economic growth tends to obscure the class character of the social relations of production, and to blunt rather than help develop the class consciousness of the working class.

### No Mindset Shift

#### No mindset shift—they can’t achieve elite buy-in or societal consent for the transition.

Buch-Hansen, 18—Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School (Hubert, “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy,” Ecological Economics Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 157-163, dml)

Political projects do not become hegemonic just because they embody good ideas. For a project to become hegemonic, (organic) intellectuals first need to develop the project and a constellation of social forces with sufficient power and resources to implement it then needs to find it appealing and struggle for it. In this context, it is worth noting that degrowth, as a social movement, has been gaining momentum for some time, not least in Southern Europe. Countless grassroots' initiatives (e.g., D'Alisa et al., 2013) are the most visible manifestations that degrowth is on the rise. Intellectuals – including founders of ecological economics such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly, and more recently degrowth scholars such as Serge Latouche and Giorgos Kallis – have played a major role in developing and disseminating the ideas underpinning the project. A growing interest in degrowth in academia, as well as well-attended biennial international degrowth conferences, also indicate that an increasing number of people embrace such ideas. Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required. It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97). While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power. Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23). In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project. The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989). 6. Consent It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project. Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense. Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this. At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

# Deterrence ADV

## Tech Workers Key

#### Boosting skilled immigration is the critical variable to maintain U.S. technological leadership.

Zhao, 2018 (YuKong – president of the Asian American Coalition for Education, “Commentary: Missing priority in immigration reform: high-skilled workers,” January 29, <http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-high-skilled-workers-forgotten-immigration-reform-20180129-story.html>)

The recent government shutdown underscores the difficulty of immigration reform. It is absolutely right to debate how to improve border security, and how to solve the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals issue in a humane way. However, one important immigration agenda has largely been ignored in this debate: how to enhance and increase high-skilled labor — H-1B visa immigration. More important, how does our nation continuously attract the world’s talents that are essential to maintaining America’s technological leadership in the world? It is unfortunate that when many politicians passionately talk about the economic contribution of DACA recipients, they do not even mention the very immigrant group that has made the largest contribution to the American economy: H-1B visa recipients. Since the inception of the program in 1990, the United States has granted about 2.5 million H-1B visas to highly educated foreign immigrants. Many of them were educated in the United States and decided to stay in America to support science, education and especially high-tech industries. With the decline of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education, America is failing to educate enough home-grown engineers to support the rapidly growing high-tech firms, which are the No. 1 growth engine of the American economy in recent decades. In my view, many of the engineers in these companies are foreign born, as are many professors in STEM departments of American colleges. Today, high-skilled immigrants have become the backbone of American ingenuity. These high-skilled immigrants also contribute significantly to the American economy. According to a 2016 report issued by National Science Foundation, median salaries of immigrant engineers and scientists were, on average, higher overall than that of their U.S.-born counterparts, $72,000 compared to $64,000. They are important contributors to American tax revenue. Equally important, highly educated immigrants embrace American values and observe the laws, and rarely commit crimes. Even though H-1B visa recipients have been making tremendous contributions to American society, they are not reasonably embraced by our outdated immigration policies. Each year the U.S. grants green cards to more than 1 million new immigrants, but only 85,000 get H-1B visas, less than 10 percent of the total immigrants. Because the quota is far less than applicants (236,000 in 2017), the H-1B visa program is currently implemented through a lottery, departing from its original purpose of serving the needs of American firms. For many foreign students who have the right skill-set and willingness to contribute to America, obtaining an H-1B visa is a challenging and emotional process. Many American companies do not sponsor working visas for foreign students, so they have to apply for jobs from the limited companies that do. If they’re lucky, after demonstrating unique qualifications and overcoming language and cultural barriers, some foreign students are able to find jobs. Even with that, they have to go through another emotional torture — waiting for the H-1B visa lottery. If they fail to both find jobs and obtain an H-1B visa, they have to face the heartbreaking choice of leaving America. Some graduate students might have American-born children they must take when they leave America. Simply because most foreign students respect American laws, they rarely complain or demonstrate when they face the legal deadline to leave America. As a result, our politicians, who tend to be swayed by emotions, often ignore the most valuable people America should keep. It is true that the H-1B visa policy has some loopholes that need to be addressed. However, the right way is to reform and enhance the policy. Complaints, in response, from either the left or the right are often short-sighted, and should not become the primary basis for America’s policymaking. History has proved that one of the major cornerstones of American exceptionalism is her magnetic ability to attract the most talented and hard-working immigrants from all over the world to build America into the greatest nation on Earth. In the 21st century, America has lost its technology dominance in too many industries, from auto manufacturing and consumer electronics to consumer drone technologies. We need talented and hard-working immigrants more than ever. As the world is rapidly transitioning into a knowledge-based economy, America’s immigration policy should primarily focus on how to continue attracting the world’s talents, instead of just responding to political influences.

#### Silicon Valley is uniquely reliant on foreign workers.

Ammachchi, 2018 (Narayan, “H1B Visa: Immigrant Workers Are the Majority in Silicon Valley”, Nearshore Americas, January 24, <http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/h1b-visa-immigrant-workers-majority-us-silicon-valley/>, shae)

Silicon Valley is reportedly so heavily dependent on H1B visa holders that it might become a veritable ghost town if deprived of them — foreign tech employees are in fact the majority in Silicon Valley, according to the Silicon Valley Competitiveness and Innovation Project (SVCIP) Report. An analysis of the 2016 census data by the Seattle Times also found that foreign workers account for 71% of workers in the San Jose area. Silicon Valley remains the “center of the tech universe,” the paper declared. Outside of the Valley, just about every large technology center in the country relies more on foreign workers than domestic ones. More than half of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) workers in the Valley are foreigners, with California natives accounting for barely 18% of the workforce. In New York City, 43% of STEM workers are from other countries, according to SVCIP researchers. No doubt that most of these foreign workers have landed a job in the country through the H1B visa program. In fact, processing the H1B visa is very expensive, so only deep-pocketed companies can afford to make use of it.

## Tech Innovation Deters

#### Tech innovation deters global conflict

Taylor, 2004 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor>, ENDI)

Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11 Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus **increases the applicability of international institutions**, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; 15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technologyinevitably drives nations to form a world state. 16 However **most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society**, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course,Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place.

## Cap Hurts Small Biz

#### H1B cap prices out smaller companies from applying.

NBER, 2017 (Steve Maas – contributing writer, “Fewer H-1B Visas Did Not Mean More Employment for Natives”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, December, <http://www.nber.org/digest/dec17/w23902.shtml>, shae)

On the employer side, the lower cap favored larger firms with greater experience navigating the bureaucracy of the visa program and with in-house legal teams that could handle the paperwork. This proved especially advantageous in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, when demand for visas was so high that the number of applications exceeded the quota level within the first week and the government resorted to a computerized random lottery system to allocate them. Smaller firms simply could not afford to spend money applying for visas when they were not sure whether they would obtain one.

## A2 Heg Bad

### Heg Good

#### US leadership is necessary to block revisionist powers, prevent terrorism, and prevent a global war

Kagan 2017 - Senior Fellow @ Brookings   
Robert, "Backing Into World War III," Feb 6, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident. In recent years, both pillars have been shaken. The democratic order has weakened and fractured at its core. Difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, and a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism have together produced a crisis of confidence not only in the democracies but in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project elevated universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and to the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and facilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism, an increasing focus on the Other in all societies, and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We are witnessing the opposite of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” History is returning with a vengeance and with it all the darker aspects of the human soul, including, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of confusion and incoherence. The Dark Ages 2.0 This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable, a recurring phenomenon produced by inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy. In the 1930s, economic crisis and rising nationalism led many to doubt whether either democracy or capitalism was preferable to alternatives such as fascism and communism. And it is no coincidence that the crisis of confidence in liberalism accompanied a simultaneous breakdown of the strategic order. Then, the question was whether the United States as the outside power would step in and save or remake an order that Britain and France were no longer able or willing to sustain. Now, the question is whether the United States is willing to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power or whether Americans are prepared to take the risk — if they even understand the risk — of letting the order collapse into chaos and conflict. That willingness has been in doubt for some time, well before the election of Trump and even before the election of Barack Obama. Increasingly in the quarter century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always clearly served — and when the United States seems to be making all the sacrifices while others benefit. Few remember the reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century. The millennial generation born after the end of the Cold War can hardly be expected to understand the lasting significance of the political, economic, and security structures established after World War II. Nor are they likely to learn much about it in high school and college textbooks obsessed with noting the evils and follies of American “imperialism.” Both the crises of the first half of the 20th century and its solution in 1945 have been forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing that global role have worn thin. Whereas previous unsuccessful and costly wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as with the energy crisis and crippling “stagflation” of the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2008 have. Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but his core strategy was retrenchment. In his actions and his statements, he critiqued and repudiated previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests. The Obama administration responded to the George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan not by restoring American power and influence but by further reducing them. Although the administration promised to “rebalance” American foreign policy to Asia and the Pacific, in practice that meant reducing global commitments and accommodating revisionist powers at the expense of allies’ security. The administration’s early attempt to “reset” relations with Russia struck the first blow to America’s reputation as a reliable ally. Coming just after the Russian invasion of Georgia, it appeared to reward Moscow’s aggression. The reset also came at the expense of U.S. allies in Central Europe, as programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic were jettisoned to appease the Kremlin. This attempt at accommodation, moreover, came just as Russian policy toward the West — not to mention Putin’s repressive policies toward his own people — was hardening. Far from eliciting better behavior by Russia, the reset emboldened Putin to push harder. Then, in 2014, the West’s inadequate response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than the Bush administration’s anemic response to the invasion of Georgia (Europe and the United States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine), still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S. administration to force Russia back in its declared sphere of interest. Obama, in fact, publicly acknowledged Russia’s privileged position in Ukraine even as the United States and Europe sought to protect that country’s sovereignty. In Syria, the administration practically invited Russian intervention through Washington’s passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the growing impression of an America in retreat across the Middle East (an impression initially created by the unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq). Subsequent Russian actions that increased the refugee flow from Syria into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident damage of those refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The signal sent by the Obama administration was that none of this was really America’s problem. In East Asia, the Obama administration undermined its otherwise commendable efforts to assert America’s continuing interest and influence. The so-called “pivot” proved to be mostly rhetoric. Inadequate overall defense spending precluded the necessary increases in America’s regional military presence in a meaningful way, and the administration allowed a critical economic component, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to die in Congress, chiefly a victim of its own party’s opposition. The pivot also suffered from the general perception of American retreat and retrenchment, encouraged both by presidential rhetoric and by administration policies, especially in the Middle East. The premature, unnecessary, and strategically costly withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, followed by the accommodating agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, and then by the failure to hold the line on threats to use force against Syria’s president, was noticed around the world. Despite the Obama administration’s insistence that American strategy should be geared toward Asia, U.S. allies have been left wondering how reliable the U.S. commitment might be when facing the challenge posed by China. The Obama administration erred in imagining that it could retrench globally while reassuring allies in Asia that the United States remained a reliable partner. Nature abhors a vacuum The effect on the two great revisionist powers, meanwhile, has been to encourage greater efforts at revision. In recent years, both powers have been more active in challenging the order, and one reason has been the growing perception that the United States is losing both the will and the capacity to sustain it. The psychological and political effect of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the United States, which has been to weaken support for American global engagement across the board, has provided an opening. It is a myth, prevalent among liberal democracies, that revisionist powers can be pacified by acquiescence to their demands. American retrenchment, by this logic, ought to reduce tensions and competition. Unfortunately, the opposite is more often the case. The more secure revisionist powers feel, the more ambitious they are in seeking to change the system to their advantage because the resistance to change appears to be lessening. Just look at both China and Russia: Never in the past two centuries have they enjoyed greater security from external attack than they do today. Yet both remain dissatisfied and have become increasingly aggressive in pressing what they perceive to be their growing advantage in a system where the United States no longer puts up as much resistance as it used to. The two great powers have differed, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful, cautious, and patient of the two, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and regional intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature, with strategic objectives. And while Beijing has been wary of using military force until now, it would be a mistake to assume it will continue show such restraint in the future — possibly the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives. As the trend lines draw closer, this is where the first crisis is likely to take place. Russia has been far more aggressive. It has invaded two neighboring states — Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 — and in both cases hived off significant portions of those two nations’ sovereign territory. Given the intensity with which the United States and its allies would have responded to such actions during the four decades of the Cold War, their relative lack of a response must have sent quite a signal to the Kremlin — and to others around the world. Moscow then followed by sending substantial forces into Syria. It has used its dominance of European energy markets as a weapon. It has used cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in extensive information warfare on a global scale. More recently, the Russian government has deployed a weapon that the Chinese either lack or have so far chosen not to deploy — the ability to interfere directly in Western electoral processes, both to influence their outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. Russia funds right-wing populist parties across Europe, including in France; uses its media outlets to support favored candidates and attack others; has disseminated “fake news” to influence voters, most recently in Italy’s referendum; and has hacked private communications in order to embarrass those it wishes to defeat. This past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon against the United States, heavily interfering in the American electoral process. Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great powers, it has so far had more success than China in accomplishing its objective of dividing and disrupting the West. Its interference in Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and its role in creating increased refugee flows from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of Europeans’ confidence in their political systems and established political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with American passivity, has exacerbated existing doubts about American staying power in the region. Beijing, until recently, has succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States out of concern for growing Chinese power — but that could change quickly, especially if the United States continues on its present trajectory. There are signs that regional powers are already recalculating: East Asian countries are contemplating regional trade agreements that need not include the United States or, in the case of the Philippines, are actively courting China, while a number of nations in Eastern and Central Europe are moving closer to Russia, both strategically and ideologically. We could soon face a situation where both great revisionist powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, posing extreme challenges to American and global security in two regions at once. The dispensable nation All this comes as Americans continue to signal their reluctance to uphold the world order they created after World War II. Donald Trump was not the only major political figure in this past election season to call for a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. President Obama and Bernie Sanders both expressed a version of “America First.” The candidate who spoke often of America’s “indispensable” global role lost, and even Hillary Clinton felt compelled to jettison her earlier support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. At the very least, there should be doubts about the American public’s willingness to continue supporting the international alliance structure, denying the revisionist powers their desired spheres of influence and regional hegemony, and upholding democratic and free market norms in the international system. Coming as it does at a time of growing great-power competition, this narrowing definition of American interests will likely hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. The weakness at the core of the democratic world and the shedding by the United States of global responsibilities have already encouraged a more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers. That, in turn, has further sapped the democratic world’s confidence and willingness to resist. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover, absent a rather dramatic shift of course by the United States. That shift may come too late. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the democratic powers made the most important and ultimately fatal decisions. Americans’ disillusionment after World War I led them to reject playing a strategic role in preserving the peace in Europe and Asia, even though America was the only nation powerful enough to play that role. The withdrawal of the United States helped undermine the will of Britain and France and encouraged Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia to take increasingly aggressive actions to achieve regional dominance. Most Americans were convinced that nothing that happened in Europe or Asia could affect their security. It took World War II to convince them that was a mistake. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict. In such times, it has always been tempting to believe that geopolitical competition can be solved through efforts at cooperation and accommodation. The idea, recently proposed by Niall Ferguson, that the world can be ruled jointly by the United States, Russia, and China is not a new one. Such condominiums have been proposed and attempted in every era when the dominant power or powers in the international system sought to fend off challenges from the dissatisfied revisionist powers. It has rarely worked. Revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. In fact, their very expansion creates insecurity, by frightening neighbors and leading them to band together against the rising power. The satiated power that Otto von Bismarck spoke of is rare. The German leaders who succeeded him were not satisfied even with being the strongest power in Europe. In their efforts to grow still stronger, they produced coalitions against them, making their fear of “encirclement” a self-fulfilling prophecy. Give ‘em an inch, they’ll take a mile This is a common trait of rising powers — their actions produce the very insecurity they claim to want to redress. They harbor grievances against the existing order (both Germany and Japan considered themselves the “have-not” nations), but their grievances cannot be satisfied so long as the existing order remains in place. Marginal concession is not enough, but the powers upholding the existing order will not make more than marginal concessions unless they are compelled to by superior strength. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by taking Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. They demanded much more, and they could not persuade the democratic powers to give them what they wanted without resorting to war. Granting the revisionist powers spheres of influence is not a recipe for peace and tranquility but rather an invitation to inevitable conflict. Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltic States, to the Balkans, and to the heart of Central Europe. And within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, other nations do not enjoy autonomy or even sovereignty. There was no independent Poland under the Russian Empire nor under the Soviet Union. For China to gain its desired sphere of influence in East Asia will mean that, when it chooses, it can close the region off to the United States — not only militarily but politically and economically, too. China will, of course, inevitably exercise great sway in its own region, as will Russia. The United States cannot and should not prevent China from being an economic powerhouse. Nor should it wish for the collapse of Russia. The United States should even welcome competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes — economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the democratic system, even if it is not itself democratic. But military and strategic competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since World War II that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security and relative stability. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about “soft power” and “smart power,” they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to maintain the balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Part of that willingness entails defense spending commensurate with America’s continuing global role. For the United States to accept a return to spheres of influence would not calm the international waters. It would merely return the world to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres. These unsettled, disordered conditions produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent as a powerful unified Germany took shape, and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity and death on an epic scale. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of World War II that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. It will be more than a shame if Americans were to destroy what they created — and not because it was no longer possible to sustain but simply because they chose to stop trying.

### Heg Sustainable

#### It’s sustainable – monetary hegemony subsets their offense, it controls military advantages despite Trump.

Stokes 18 – Doug Stokes is a Professor in International Security and Strategy in the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter. “Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order” Published in 2018. Accessed 7/7/18. (<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_8_238_Stokes.pdf>; EG)

As the protector of an open, integrated international market, the American state can claim special privileges to enable it to preserve the zone effectively, and there are a number of areas where being the system maker gives the US huge positional advantages. The first such area we should note here is its ‘dollar hegemony’, whereby the greenback acts as the world’s default global currency: this, most notably, allows it to run progressively larger current account deficits without having to worry about foreign exchange reserves. This makes the US Federal Reserve the world’s de facto central bank, giving it the luxury of unilaterally setting borrowing costs for the rest of the global economy. It is this form of dollar hegemony, and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ it affords the American state,28 that has helped inform a range of scholarship on American economic decline, especially in relation to a rising China and the potential internationalization of the renminbi and the associated challenge to US monetary regimes. According to this ‘declinist’ narrative, if the dollar loses its international reserve currency status other aspects of US hegemony, most notably its global military primacy, will begin to crumble as other currencies vie for international monetary leadership.29 In short, the ‘dollar’s reserve currency role is central to America’s geopolitical preeminence and if it loses that status US hegemony will be literally unaffordable’.30 However, not only does this ‘renminbi revisionism’ ignore the ways in which US military primacy in east Asia helps bolster its monetary power (see below); it is not borne out by the hard data. According to the most recently available data from the Bank of International Settlements in its 2016 triennial survey, the dollar accounted for 88 per cent of all over-the-counter trades in foreign exchange markets in 2016. The renminbi accounted for just 4 per cent.31 This is a huge disparity and hardly supports the idea of an imminent end to dollar hegemony. Dollar hegemony also has profound geopolitical implications. Specifically, the United States can fund its overseas military operations with freshly printed dollars largely at will. Between 2003 and 2008, for example, the ‘largest airborne transfer of currency in the history of the world’ saw the Federal Reserve print and ship US$40 billion in cash to Iraq to help finance the war. In just ‘the first two years, the shipments included more than 281 million individual bills weighing a total of 363 tons’.32 Dollar dominance has thus ensured that imports, debts and overseas military–political operations could all be paid for with greenbacks produced by the American state, which at the same time could gear its domestic macroeconomic management exclusively to conditions within the United States without any significant external constraint. More interestingly, dollar liquidity means that investors continue to use US monetary regimes even in the context of major global economic instability. For example, during the global financial crisis of 2008, not only did we not see a flight from US financial and monetary regimes, we actually saw the reverse: a global flight of capital into US debt markets, to the extent that in some instances US Treasury bonds had negative interest rates.33 In short, dollar hegemony and its privileges allow the US to externalize major crises through its unilateral capacity to alter its interest rates, to force other states to adjust accordingly, and to fund geopolitical hegemony on the cheap.

#### American hegemony can survive under Trump – it’s just a question whether he can change his approach

Brands 18 – Hal Brands, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 ("American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump", Project Muse, Available Online from <https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/2061018/pdf>, pp. 179, Dsen)

Breathlessness should be avoided in considering the ramifications here: Trump’s behavior will not cause U.S. power and leadership to collapse overnight, nor does his presidency spell imminent doom for the system America has done so much to create. America’s core alliances are institutionalized enough that they will surely outlast Trump; the international trade system has sufficient resiliency and support from other leading members that it, too, will likely endure, even though it will come under far greater pressure. America’s international image may recover once Trump departs the scene (as it did after George W. Bush’s presidency), and the United States will retain, for many years to come, ample hardpower capacity to influence global affairs. The silver lining, then, is that America is simply too powerful, and the international order it has underwritten too robust and successful, for Trump to squander this strategic inheritance entirely. The dark cloud, however, is that Trump can still cause real damage over the course of a fouryear or perhaps eight-year presidency—and the damage will only accumulate the longer this approach to foreign policy persists.

### Transition Bad

#### The transition will be riddled with conflict because retrenchment emboldens revisionist powers globally.

Brands 15 – (Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. During 2015-16, he is also serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,” September 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA621792>, p.)//sy

What consequences would follow if the United States retracted the presence and commitments that have permitted it to play this role? While the future cannot be predicted with certainty, the most logical and obvious result would be to imperil influence and stability alike. On the former issue, it is simply not clear why American influence in other countries’ and regions’ affairs would persist—much less expand—if the policies and presence that have so long enabled that influence were abandoned. It seems far more probable that actors who no longer benefitted from such strong and visible U.S. support would have considerably less reason to defer to American wishes, just as it seems probable that the weakening or termination of U.S. alliances would leave Washington with diminished ability to exert leadership in crucial regions. Likewise, a major geopolitical pullback could make it more difficult to maintain the regular international military training and exercises that expand American reach by promoting interoperability with friends and partners.99 In effect, forward presence and security commitments have been the currency that Washington uses to buy a good portion of its international influence. A broad-based retrenchment would presumably devalue that currency and weaken other mechanisms that Washington has traditionally used to shape relationships and project its global voice. Retrenchment would seem a little less dangerous when it comes to international stability. Offshore balancers may be right to predict that their strategy would compel local or regional powers to devote additional resources to defense, and perhaps mitigate certain issues of contention with those nations that are currently antagonized by U.S. presence.100 Cutting Taiwan loose would certainly remove one potential flashpoint vis-à-vis China; reducing or eliminating the American military presence in Europe might indeed meet with Russian approbation. The problem, alas, is that it is also logical to expect that removing the American pacifier would unleash the more pernicious impulses that U.S. presence traditionally has suppressed. Security competitions that have long lain dormant might reawaken and intensify as countries more actively built up their own military capabilities. Long-repressed national rivalries might reignite following the elimination of strong American presence and the reassurance it offers. Additionally, while revisionist powers that dislike existing orders in Europe, the Persian Gulf, or East Asia would probably take a positive view of American retrenchment, they might just as likely exploit the retraction of U.S. power to assert their own claims more forcefully. In sum, if one accepts Mearsheimer’s own view that Washington has long played Leviathan in crucial regions, then it is hard to dispute the corresponding concern: “Take away that Leviathan, and there is likely to be big trouble.”101 As with the question of nuclear proliferation, this is more than a theoretical concern. It does not take much imagination to see where and how such trouble might reemerge today. In Europe, normally the most peaceful and stable of the three major regions, a progressively more aggressive Russia is already destabilizing neighboring states, using force to redraw national boundaries, and generally contesting the post-Cold War notion of a continent whole, free, and at peace.102 In the Middle East and particularly the Persian Gulf, growing Iranian assertiveness has provoked profound regional anxieties that have played out in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen, as well as hints of a potential arms race—all as the Gulf countries simultaneously face the instability and violence associated with the rise of the IS. Not least of all, China’s ascendancy is jostling the regional order in East Asia. Beijing’s territorial claims and military buildup have sparked rising tensions with its neighbors, many of which—such as South Korea and Japan—still harbor lingering historical animosities vis-à-vis one another. In the early post-Cold War period, one analyst famously argued that East Asia was “ripe for rivalry”; even with a continuing U.S. presence, that description seems increasingly apt today. Across these regional contexts, there is thus much reason to worry that the result of retrenchment would not be low-cost, post-American stability, but rather intensified turmoil and upheaval.103

#### Loss of US dominance is an impact filter — it makes all transnational threats more likely.

Brooks and Wohlforth 16 — (Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. “The Once and Future Superpower: why China won't overtake the United States,” May/June 2016, <https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=facoa>, p.98-99)//sy

Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.

#### Transition exacerbates the risk of warming, pandemics, and piracy while ruining democratic modeling and HR initiatives.

Brands 15 – (Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. During 2015-16, he is also serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,” September 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA621792>, p.45-46)//sy

Some offshore balancers acknowledge as much, and argue that Washington could accept—perhaps benefit from—such instability so long as it did not permit a hostile power to dominate a core region of Eurasia.104 The trouble with this assertion is that it ignores the damage that increased global instability could inflict on important U.S. interests even if a regional hegemon did not emerge. For one thing, it seems unlikely that greater global conflict and turmoil would facilitate the intensive multilateral collaboration needed to address transnational problems ranging from climate change to pandemics to piracy. It seems just as improbable that such an atmosphere would conduce to the continued flourishing and spread of liberal democracy. Scholars widely recognize that, in places from Germany and Japan during the Cold War to Eastern Europe in the 1990s, American presence and/or guarantees helped incentivize democratic reforms and foster the security in which liberal institutions could succeed.105 There is equally recognition that “a stable and prosperous world is more conducive to democratic spread and human rights protection than an unstable, less prosperous world.”106 Offshore balancing, therefore, would not simply downgrade the democracy-promotion initiatives that have facilitated liberalism’s remarkable advance in recent decades.107 The greater instability that would likely follow an American retrenchment could also prove quite damaging to hopes for the continued strength and spread of the political institutions that the United States prefers.

# Resource Wars Add-On

#### U.S. lead innovation is critical to develop and distribute global solutions on health, energy, food, education, water, and security

Wadhwa, 2013 (Vivek Wadhwa To the U.S. House of Representatives Full Judiciary Committee Hearing, “America’s Immigration System: Opportunities for Legal Immigration and Enforcement of Laws against Illegal Immigration,” February 5, <http://www.aila.org/File/Related/13020147a.pdf>,)

I am here to tell you that these fears are largely unfounded and that the future is ours to lose. America has a way of constantly reinventing itself and reaching new heights. This is what is happening now; America is in the midst of its next great rebound. Its scientists and entrepreneurs are setting the wheels in motion to solve humanity’s grand challenges—in areas such as health, energy, food, education, water, and security. This will be the most innovative decade in human history—when we begin to go from worrying about shortages to worrying about how to share the abundance that we are create. The decisions we make on immigration will either facilitate this rebound or trip up the entrepreneurs who are working to make it happen. Let me briefly explain the advances I am talking about so that you understand the increasing importance of a skilled workforce. We have seen how computers are becoming more powerful year by year as prices drop. In the technology industry, this advance is known as Moore’s Law. It’s not just in computer hardware; the same exponential growth is happening in an assortment of other technologies. Take the manufacturing industry. Advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing are dramatically reducing the costs of manufacturing and making it possible to create new types of products. These technologies are rapidly eroding China’s cost advantage. It is very likely that, within a few years, we will reach the tipping point when it becomes cheaper to manufacture in the U.S. than in China. Note how fracking technology has rejuvenated America’s oil industry. We are about to see an even greater rejuvenation in American manufacturing. Advances in digital medicine and genomics are also transforming the health-care industry. Inexpensive sensor-based devices are allowing us to start monitoring our health so that we can prevent disease and dramatically reduce health-care costs. Entrepreneurs are building iPhone apps that act like medical assistants and detect disease; smart pills that we swallow in order to monitor our internals; and body sensors that monitor heart, brain, and body activity. These new devices empower the patient to monitor and improve their own health. I am a heart patient, and carry an AliveCor heart monitor that can perform an instant EKG if I ever need it, for example. Advances in DNA sequencing are opening up new possibilities for advancing health care. Full human-genome sequencing cost billions of dollars a decade ago. It now costs thousands of dollars, and will come to cost less than a blood test. Scientists and engineers are discovering the correlations between disease, lifestyle, and genome. In the future it will be possible for doctors to prescribe the most patient-appropriate medicines based on a person’s DNA. This is just the tip of the iceberg. There are similar advances happening in other fields where technology can be applied. Google is developing an Artificial Intelligence–based self-driving car that can change the face of cities by eliminating the need for parking spots, eliminate highway fatalities and traffic congestion, and dramatically reduce fuel consumption. New education technologies are changing the way we can teach and bring knowledge to the masses. Advances in nanotechnology are allowing us to develop new types of lighter and stronger materials such as carbon nanotubes, ceramic-matrix nanocomposites, and new carbon fibers. All of these advances are being made by entrepreneurs working hand in hand with engineers, scientists, physicians, and researchers. Foreign-born workers are leading the charge in all of these fields. In the era of exponential technologies that we are entering, education and skill matter more than ever. Small teams of people can do what was once possible only for governments and large corporations—solving grand problems. Diversity in background, in field of knowledge, and in thinking are great assets. We need the world’s best and brightest more than ever before. Yet, as the research of my team at Stanford, Duke, and UC-Berkeley has shown, our visa policies are doing the opposite: chasing away this talent. Our earlier research had determined that from 1995 to 2005—the time of the Internet boom—52% of Silicon Valley’s startups were founded by people born abroad—people like me. When we updated our research recently, we found that this proportion had dropped to 44%. This was historically unprecedented. Foreign students graduating from American colleges have difficulty in finding jobs because employers have difficulty in getting H1-B visas. Those graduates who are lucky enough to get a job and a visa and who decide to make the U.S. their permanent home find that it can take years—sometimes more than a decade—to get a green card. If they have ideas for building world-changing technologies and want to start a company, they are usually out of luck, because it is not usually possible for people on H1-B visas to work for the companies they might start. The families of would-be immigrants are also held hostage to the visa-holder’s immigration status. The spouses of H1-B workers are not allowed to work, and, depending on the state in which they live, they may not even be able to get a driver’s license or open a bank account. They are forced to live as second-class citizens. Not surprisingly, many are getting frustrated and returning home. We must stop this brain drain and do all we can to bring more engineers and scientists here. Contrary to what anti-immigrants groups say, these people expand the economy and create jobs for Americans. In my book The Immigrant Exodus, I prescribed seven fixes to stem the tide and to attract the world’s best and brightest to America: 1. Increase the numbers of green cards available to H-1B holders 2. Allow spouses of H-1B visa holders to work 3. Target immigration based on required skills 4. Allow H-1B Holders to change jobs without requiring sponsorship renewal 5. Extend the term of OPT for foreign students from one to four years 6. Institute the Startup Visa 7. Remove the country caps on green-card applications. The bottom line is that Congress needs to double down and pass legislation which ensures that the supply of employment‐based green cards matches the demands of a knowledge economy. Needless to say that at the same time, we need to improve U.S. education and ensure U.S. workers have the right skills and experience for the new era of technology and rapidly changing and competitive global economy. As I concluded in my book, we need to do all this because a vibrant United States that opens its doors to skilled immigrants will provide a greater benefit to the rest of the world than a closed, shriveling United States because the rules by which the US practices the game of economic development, job formation and intellectual capital formation grow the global economic pie. And the ethos that drives America’s entrepreneurs and inventors, and has driven US policy until very recently, is critically important for the continued development of the global economy. Not only will these entrepreneurs better the U.S., but they will better humanity, they will solve our Grand Challenges.

#### Leveraging technology for water, food and energy and ensuring China is a responsible partner are necessary to prevent great power conflict

Ward, 2014 (Alex – works at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security on U.S. defense policy and strategy, “Only US Can Prevent Great Power War; The preconditions for a hegemonic war currently exist in the world, but the U.S. can still prevent one”, August 22, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/only-us-can-prevent-great-power-war/>)

As the World War I centennial is celebrated, repressed thoughts of great power war once again begin to surface. With today’s highly “interconnected global economy” underwritten by a liberal order leading to the “rise of the rest,” it appears unlikely that any state would want to disrupt the current system. And yet, the constant stream of somber news reignites fears of a calamitous global catastrophe. In times of international flux, where the worst seems possible, it is important to turn to those who can best interpret these eras. In the case of great power or “hegemonic” wars, there is hardly a greater authority than Robert Gilpin. In his seminal work on the subject, War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argues that three preconditions must be met for a hegemonic war to occur. First, Gilpin believes that the soon-to-be warring parties must feel there is a “‘closing in’ of space and opportunities.” Second, there must be a general “perception that a fundamental historical change is taking place.” Finally, events around the world start to “escape human control.” Notably, all three of these conditions currently exist in the world. Closing In Europe, where great power conflict took place for centuries, was heavily congested and contested. As powers like Britain, France, Germany and others rose, they fought for influence and geography at the expense of the others’ territory. Due to the close quarters, any desire for expansion on one country’s part would cause concern in the others. Today, some say, the world is different. The two powers that would compete in a war — the United States and China — are separated by a vast ocean, supposedly making it hard for each to antagonize the other. This, however, is not true. The map may show an expansive world, but new technologies — leading to hyperconnectivity and shorter travel times, especially for military equipment — have made the world “claustrophobic.” To wit, when China announced an “Air Defense Identification Zone” the United States quickly deployed two B-52 bombers to challenge its claim. And that was using old equipment. Both China and the United States are developing hypersonic missiles and vehicles. Humanity has already conquered physical space with commercial flight and fast ships. Now, it continues to shrink space even further for potentially decisive advantage. It is also hard to claim that China and the United States are far apart when they regularly bump up against each other as they have in the South China Sea. Perception Since the dawn of “Pax Americana” after World War II, belief in the United States as the undisputed global hegemon remained fairly stable. Until now. According to a recent Pew poll, Americans’ views of the United States as a global power have reached a 40-year low. Indeed, only 17 percent believe that America plays a “more important and powerful role than ten years ago.” Rightly or wrongly, this perception exists. Even though most people still find the United States preferable to China, regional powers can use the widespread belief that America is declining to make their cases for running the system. In fact they are already doing so to a degree. For example, China’s Global Times reports that 47 percent of people believe China has achieved “major power” status. Should both perceptions keep trending in the same direction — the United States is declining while China rises — then the feeling of an historic shift is almost inevitable. Human Control As current events prove, even the great powers cannot stop horrendous things from happening in the world. From Latin America and Africa to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, chaos and turmoil run rampant. While this is a particularly bad period for international affairs, it is naïve to think this may be an isolated epoch. In fact, there is reason to think the world might grow more unstable in the years ahead. Over the next 11 years, the world can expect another one billion people, reaching a total of around 8 billion by 2030. As technology becomes more powerful, it will do two things. First, it will empower the individual, or a group of individuals, to do great good or great harm. Second, it will allow individuals to be more aware of how the middle class lives. People around the world will demand similar things, causing stress on governments and brewing civil unrest and instability. Thus, as people are further empowered and further angered, the probability that these non-state actors — indeed, normal, everyday people — disrupt international affairs or geopolitics is high. Governments will continue to have less and less control of the citizenry, allowing the regular citizen to do with her newfound power what she wills. In essence, we will see, in a big way, the diffusion of power. Although the world currently satisfies Gilpin’s three preconditions, there need not be pessimism. For one, current relations between the United States and China are nowhere near the point where a potential great war between them is possible, and there is no other rivalry nearing that of Washington and Beijing. Second, some of the trends that can cause harm, like rapid technological progress, can also be used to help stabilize the global order. To be sure, technology could be used to curb the desolation brought on by expectedly low water, food, and energy levels. Finally, and most importantly, Gilpin’s guidance is certainly not comprehensive. There are more variables for which to account (i.e. the effect of nuclear weapons) that dictate whether or not a great power war may take place. That said, Gilpin’s framework serves as a good rubric by which to measure the current global climate. By all measures, this is certainly a dangerous time. But Gilpin’s preconditions shouldn’t be misconstrued as predictive or fatalistic. Indeed, the United States, as the hegemon, has the capability (and responsibility) to preserve the international order and lead the world out of this mess. By keeping good relations with partners and allies, deterring adversaries, reversing the perception of its decline, and leveraging technological capabilities for global good, there is a decent chance that the U.S. can make the great-power-war-incubation period fade away. Should the United States not seize this moment, and ensure that China is a responsible partner in the current global system alongside it, then the chance of a great power war cannot be dismissed, however remote.

# A2 Disads

## Wages DA

### Boosts Wages

#### Skilled immigrants are key to the economy --- won’t drive down wages and their net effect is positive

Smith, 18 --- assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University (3/13/18, Noah, “Cuts to skilled immigration degrade a US strength,” <https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/cuts-to-skilled-immigration-degrade-a-us-strength/>, accessed on 5/25/18, JMP)

This is a big problem, because skilled immigrants are a key part of the U.S. economy. First of all, they’re highly entrepreneurial — between 1995 and 2005, immigrants started more than half of the new businesses in Silicon Valley. As of 2011, more than 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants or their children. It’s impossible to know ahead of time which immigrants will start these companies, but they’re much more likely to be those with decent technical training who come from families with a tradition of starting businesses — in other words, skilled immigrants. They’re also highly innovative. A 2017 study by economists Ufuk Akcigit, John Grigsby and Tom Nicholas examined patenting records, and concluded: “Technology areas with higher levels of foreign-born expertise experienced much faster patent growth between 1940 and 2000, in terms of both quality and quantity, than otherwise equivalent technology areas.” They go on to list a number of famous American inventions whose creators were born elsewhere. As for driving down native-born Americans’ wages, there is evidence that the worry is vastly overblown. It’s true that the H-1B program tethers employees to their employers; for a worker on an H-1B to switch to a different company, the procedure can be time-consuming and annoying. There is some evidence that companies that win the chance to hire more H-1B workers pay lower wages. But there’s also evidence showing that H-1B workers are not paid less than native-born Americans, after accounting for their age and skill level. Moreover, studies that find negative impacts of H-1Bs tend to look only at the specific companies that hire skilled workers. The presence of more smart people in an industry or a city cause new ideas and technologies to flourish. These then diffuse to companies, allowing business to innovate faster, hire more workers and pay higher wages. Skilled foreigners help keep new ideas flowing in technology clusters like Silicon Valley; Austin, Texas; and Raleigh, North Carolina. In addition, having a thick market of smart workers in an area allows a lot of innovative companies to cluster there. Tech companies put their offices in high-cost California because that’s where the engineers live. And engineers move there because that’s where the companies are. This is why even if they lower wages at a particular company, H-1B workers raise native-born wages overall. A 2015 study by economists Giovanni Peri, Kevin Shih and Chad Sparber found: “Increases in (foreign) STEM workers are associated with significant wage gains for college-educated natives. Gains for non-college-educated natives are smaller but still significant. Our results imply that foreign STEM (workers) increased total factor productivity growth in US cities.” If Trump’s immigration policies break this virtuous cycle, the tech industry could eventually decide to make its home elsewhere — in immigrant-friendly Canada, or even in emerging economies of China and India. That would result in many fewer good jobs, and lower wages, for American workers — skilled and unskilled alike. The U.S. is playing a very dangerous game under Trump. By systematically degrading one of the nation’s core strengths — the constant inflow of smart, entrepreneurial foreigners — Trump is putting the native-born populace at risk, not helping it. Instead of limiting the H-1B program, the U.S. should replace it with a Canada-style system that gives green cards to skilled foreign workers. It may not get many people marching in the streets, but skilled immigration is an issue that matters for the future of every American.

#### H1B workers boost wages.

Peri et al, 2015 (Giovanni – Professor and Department Chair of Economics @ UC-Davis, Kevin Shih – Assistant Professor in Department of Economics @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Chad Sparber – Associate Professor of Economics @ Colgate University, “STEM Workers, H-1B Visas, and Productivity in US Cities”, *Journal of Labor Economics* 33.1.2, July, shae)

This article uses the inflow of foreign science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workers, made possible by the H-1B visa program, to estimate the impact of STEM workers on the productivity of college- and non-college-educated American workers between 1990 and 2010. The uneven distribution of foreign STEM workers across cities in 1980—a decade before the introduction of the H-1B visa—and the high correlation between the preexisting presence of foreign-born workers and subsequent immigration flows allow us to use the variation in foreign STEM as a supply-driven increase in STEM workers across metropolitan areas. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the foreign STEM share of a city’s total employment increased the wage growth of native college-educated labor by about 7–8 percentage points and the wage growth of non-college-educated natives by 3–4 percentage points. We find insignificant effects on the employment of those two groups. These results indicate that STEM workers spur economic growth by increasing productivity, especially that of college-educated workers.

# A2 Kritiks

## Generic

### Threats Real

#### Threats are real

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Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.